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Abstract 
 
S.H. Velardi. A Call for Transparency in the Food System: Case Studies of State and Federal 
Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) Labeling Initiatives in the United States, 210 pages, 8 
tables, 2 figures, 2018. APA style used. 
 
 
Biotechnology in the food system has become a contentious issue in the United States, as 
citizens, activists and policymakers question the environmental, moral, socio-economic, human 
health and ethical aspects behind this technology. While U.S. governmental agencies assure the 
safety of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) included or the practice of genetic engineering 
(GE) in the food supply, the public has remained wary and skeptical. Social movements for the 
labeling of GMOs have sprouted across the United States beginning in the early 2010s on the 
West coast with limited success. However, the Northeast, U.S. has seen a mix of success, failure 
and stagnation with Connecticut and Maine passing GMO labeling laws partially in 2013 and 
2014 respectively and Vermont enacting the first labeling law in 2016 followed almost 
immediately by the passage of a federal labeling bill one month later. This research project takes 
a mixed-methods approach relying on public testimony, Congressional witness testimony and 
interviews with stakeholders involved in the Northeast statewide and federal labeling initiatives 
to understand how the issue of GMOs and GMO labeling was framed in these policy-making 
settings and which types of framings led to policy passage. Drawing on and extending sociology 
of food and standards, science and technology studies, and frame and policy analysis, this 
doctoral dissertation research project examines the public discourses surrounding the issue of 
biotechnology in the food system as well as external factors influential in social movement 
outcomes such as advocacy coalition structures, resource access and political opportunity 
structures that are influential in the passage of a GMO labeling bill. The majority of frames at 
both state and federal scales focused on a “consumer right to know”, individualism frame that 
resonated well with the public. Vermont was unique in that the public’s and stakeholders’ frames 
focused on sustaining local civic agriculture in the state, which enhanced community solidarity 
and created a communal identity. Those frames coupled with an accessible citizen legislature, 
responsive legislators and absence of lobbyists created a favorable political environment for the 
grassroots labeling coalition’s success leading to policy passage. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Background 
 
The role of biotechnology in the food system through the introduction of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) has ignited fierce debate about the moral, environmental and safety 
issues related to the application of this technology (Thompson 2014; Schurman and Munro 
2010). Supporters of GMOs cite farmer and environmental benefits including labor efficiencies 
(field-wide spraying rather than weed-by-weed efforts) and decreases in pesticide use (Saletan 
2015; NAS 2016), as well as social and moral benefits (providing food surpluses for growing 
human populations and creating nutrient-rich crops for populations suffering from nutrient 
deficiencies) (Asis 2017; Curchoe 2017). However, critics of GMOs contend that GMOs risk 
human health, impact the natural environment (i.e. general degradation, biodiversity loss), erode 
farmer agency, contribute to the loss of traditions in food culture, and further concentrate the role 
of corporations in the agriculture sector (i.e. further loss of the family farm) (Kaur et al. 2013; 
Thompson 2014). The general consensus from U.S. governmental agencies (Food and Drug 
Administration, Department of Agriculture (USDA), Environmental Protection Agency) and 
scientific bodies (National Academy of Sciences) is that there is no increased harm with the 
planting or consumption of GMOs (NAS 2016). However, the public remains skeptical. 
According to a 2016 poll, 93% of Americans believe that the federal government should require 
GMO labeling and 52% believe GMO foods are unsafe (Langer 2016). Moreover, studies based 
in Europe have found that increased factual knowledge of the science behind GMOs has little 
influence on attitudes towards acceptance of the technology (Glaskell et al. 2003; Priest et al. 
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2003). Clearly more than scientific information affects citizens’ perceptions surrounding GMOs 
and GMO labeling.  
In response to the public’s critique and wariness with the development and 
commercialization of GMOs, social movements have been sprouting across the United States to 
push for moratoriums on the planting and labeling of GMOs. While moratoriums have only 
achieved success at very small scales (i.e. county level) and for the most part have failed due to 
legal disputes (Gillam and Doering 2011; Edge 2011), the GMO labeling movements have 
picked up momentum across the United States with a mix of success, failure and stagnation at 
the state and federal level. On the federal front, advocacy groups and legislators have attempted 
to pass a federally mandated labeling bill under a variety of names and with a range of stringency 
in requirements over the past five years. For example, H.R.913 Genetically Engineered Food 
Right-to-Know Act was introduced by Representative Peter DeFazio (D-OR) for two sessions of 
Congress (113th and 114th) but stagnated and did not receive any floor votes (Congress.gov 
2016a). In 2015, the House of Representatives passed 114 H.R. 1599 The Safe and Accurate 
Food Labeling Act of 2015, introduced by U.S. Congressman Mike Pompeo (R-KS), which 
“establishes a federal labeling standard for foods with genetically modified ingredients, giving 
sole authority to the Food and Drug Administration to require mandatory labeling on such foods 
if they are ever found to be unsafe or materially different from foods produced with GM 
ingredients” (Pompeo 2015). This bill, which some pro-GMO labeling groups had termed the 
“DARK Act, (Denying Americans the Right to Know)” would have pre-empted any state-
mandated GMO labeling bills (such as Vermont’s labeling bill that passed in 2016). This bill did 
not pass in the Senate, remaining under review in the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and 
Forestry (Congress.gov 2016b). On July 14, 2016, Congress passed S.764, The Biotech Labeling 
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Solutions Act, deemed a compromise GMO labeling bill that requires the labeling of GMOs. The 
USDA has been granted authority to decide how the information will be displayed, including a 
label on the package or contained within a QR code that consumers could scan with their mobile 
devices. Similar to Rep. Pompeo’s previous bill, S.764 also preempted state-mandated labeling 
requirements (Strom 2016). This Act has already been contested by advocacy organizations, 
industry and governmental agencies that question whether it truly epitomizes consumer rights 
and demands for clear transparent labeling (Charles 2016).  
Before the federal GMO labeling bill passed Congress in July 2016, states had begun to 
introduce their own statewide GMO labeling bills. However, the only state to pass a GMO 
labeling bill was Vermont, which went into effect July 1, 2016. Connecticut and Maine had also 
introduced statewide GMO labeling bills in 2013 and 2014, respectively. However, both of these 
bills had a “trigger clause” attached, that is, before these labeling bills could go into effect, four 
other states must enact labeling, one must border said state, and the combined population of all 
states must total more than 20 million (Wilson 2014). Since Vermont was the only state to pass a 
bill and its population is less than 1 million, Maine and Connecticut were relying on other more 
populous states, especially New York and Massachusetts, to move bills forward. Despite strong 
advocacy from consumer rights groups, environmental organizations and prominent legislators 
for a label, New York’s GMO labeling bill never moved to a floor vote and Massachusetts only 
had a public hearing on their GMO labeling bill that had yet to culminate in a floor vote as well. 
This unique situation in the Northeastern U.S. of success, failure, stagnation, and 
interdependence in labeling bills provide a rich set of case studies to examine the labeling 
discourse used within and across states. Additionally, these state labeling initiatives, especially 
the enactment of labeling legislation in Vermont, have influenced the recent passage of the 
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federal GMO labeling bill and the requirements contained within the specific bill. This 
dissertation project will compare frames and advocacy strategies in each policy-making arena 
within and between these five states as well as between state and federal scales to ascertain 
which proved most effective in the passage of a GMO labeling bill. 
This project takes a case study approach to look at five statewide GMO labeling 
initiatives as well as the labeling bill at the federal level (Figure 1). These five Northeastern 
states were selected to analyze the influential factors in the passage of a GMO labeling law due 
to the variability in labeling initiative outcomes (success, failure and stagnation). In addition, 
these cases share the commonality that all five GMO labeling initiatives were conducted as 
legislative campaigns, unlike states on the West coast, including Washington, California and 
Oregon, that all held ballot initiatives for GMO labeling. Studying statewide legislative 
campaigns allows for particular focus on the impacts of advocacy strategies on legislative 
behavior (Bergan 2009) and to evaluate whether legislators serve as “policy entrepreneurs” in 
statewide social policy development (Kingdon 2011), whereas in ballot initiatives the role of the 
legislator is diminished. Furthermore, studying legislative campaigns within a region (such as the 
Northeast where two out of the five states passed a GMO labeling law with a “trigger clause” 
making them dependent upon a regional passage of a labeling law), facilitates the evaluation of 
whether any collaborative frames (Lubitow 2013) were deployed across states to build stronger 
partnerships and their effect on social movement campaigns.  
Case studies allow researchers to look at events in detail in order to make sense of 
particular phenomena that are bound in time and space (Yin 2014). This collective case study 
approach (Charmaz 2014) enables us to look at multiple case studies and draw comparable 
analyses across different states and scales. This research draws on several data sources including: 
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1) testimony from public hearings on the passage of a statewide GMO labeling bill in four states  
(CT, MA, ME, and VT) in order to understand the way in which the public and different 
stakeholders (citizens, activist organizations, industry groups and health professionals) frame the 
risk (or non-risk) of GMOs and the potential solution (or non-solution) of a label; 2) semi-
structured interviews with prominent stakeholders involved in the labeling debates in each state 
and at the federal level, including environmental groups, consumer rights organizations, farm 
organizations, legislators, and industry, focusing on their perceptions of GMOs, labeling and 
policy implications; and 3) witness testimony from Congressional hearings from the 112, 113, 
and 114 Congress (2011-2016) concerning genetic engineering and labeling to identify which 
stakeholders played a key role in the formulation of public policy on the federal level as well as 
how they frame the problem (or non-problem) of GMOs. 
Figure 1.1 Diagram of research case studies and data sources 
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Research Problem 
Policy studies research demonstrates that in order for policy change to occur, policy 
advocates will attempt to recruit the wider public to their cause by deploying certain arguments 
and frames they believe will resonate with the public (Entman 1993; Chong and Druckman 
2007a). The questions that animate this study are: How are labeling activists and opponents 
framing the issues of GMOs and GMO labeling? What types of frames and advocacy strategies 
in each policy-making arena lead to passage, failure or stagnation in the context of a GMO 
labeling bill? Drawing on and extending sociology of food and standards, science and 
technology studies, social movement studies, and frame and policy analysis, this doctoral 
dissertation research project examines the public discourses surrounding the issue of 
biotechnology in the food system and external factors such as advocacy coalition structures, 
resource access and political opportunity structures that are influential in the passage of a GMO 
labeling bill. I will analyze the discourses used by the public and a wide spectrum of 
stakeholders involved in these labeling debates, including citizen activist groups, consumer 
rights organizations, farmer advocacy groups, industry and legislators, and the policy 
implications of particular discourses and frames.  
 
Contribution of Dissertation  
This dissertation research intends to complement the sociology, social movement and 
policy studies fields by examining discursive influences within social movements and policy 
development related to agriculture and food production. This dissertation project draws upon 
frame analysis to identify which frames or rationales stakeholders in the federal or state level 
labeling initiatives deployed to form their arguments and influence said policies. Frame analysis 
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within social movements can help to illuminate how stakeholders are framing the issue or 
nonissue of GMOs, which frames resonate with the public, and how that influences the presence 
of these issues on the policy agenda.	Frames can be defined as “mentally stored clusters of ideas 
that guide individuals’ processing of information” (Entman 1993: 53) and serve as interpretive 
frameworks that allow people to make sense of a situation (Goffman 1974). The study of frames 
extends back to the early 1970s where Gregory Bateson (1972) introduced the concept of a frame 
as a “metacommunicative device that sets parameters for ‘what is going on’ (Oliver and Johnston 
2005). Snow and Benford (1988), who have conducted seminal work on the concept of framing, 
refer to framing as analyzing “the production of meaning” (198) that moves beyond the “static 
conceptualization of ideology” (197) and “specify the interactive processes by which frames are 
socially constructed, sustained, contested, and altered, the phenomenological and infrastructural 
constraints on those processes and the consequences of these processes for aspects of 
mobilization” (2005, 206-207). Analysis of framing is particularly useful and beneficial in 
analyzing the course of social movements because unlike ideology (which usually will inform 
the deeply held values and beliefs of individuals involved in social movements), frames are 
“empirically observable” (Snow and Benford 2005: 210) and available to scholars to observe and 
examine throughout the course of various debates, conversations, etc. 
This dissertation project also contributes to policy studies by utilizing the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF) to understand the trajectory of state-level policy initiatives in a 
comparative analysis of advocacy coalitions formed, underlying policy beliefs that tie these 
coalitions together and exogenous factors within each state (such as political opportunity 
structures). The ACF, originally developed by Paul Sabatier in conjunction with Hank Jenkins-
Smith in the 1980s, has become one of the most utilized frameworks of the policy process in 
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policy research (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014) but has been used sparingly in comparative analyses 
of policy developments (Leach and Sabatier 2005; Weible et al. 2010). Frame analysis and the 
ACF can be used in conjunction to identify the narratives that coalition members promote and 
the beliefs that tie these coalitions together to recruit like-minded members (Jones and McBeth 
2010; Shanahan et al. 2011). These advocacy coalitions can find success in their push for a 
particular policy outcome, leading to policy change and learning based on their strong alignment 
with policy core beliefs among their members and favorable political opportunities (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994; Henry 2011; Thompson et al. 1990). 
Political opportunities can be defined as channels of access to political decision making, 
availability of political allies to social movement groups, and the stability of political alignments 
and institutions (Tarrow 1992). Framing and political structures work together and may influence 
one another. Framing can influence the political opportunity structures available or a change in 
political opportunities could morph a framing strategy. This dissertation will investigate the 
connections between the frames utilized by stakeholders, advocacy coalitions formed, exogenous 
factors influential in policy development (such as political opportunity structures), and the 
success or failure of a GMO labeling bill.  
 
Description of Format 
This dissertation is comprised of three individual manuscripts, each of which draws upon 
a specific framework to address the aforementioned major research questions in an attempt to 
understand the diverse outcomes of GMO labeling policy at the federal and state level. 
The first manuscript, titled Framing the Food System: A Content Analysis of U.S. 
Congressional Hearings Surrounding the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms 
	 9 
(GMOs) in the Food System (2011-2016) looks at the discourse within federal congressional 
committee hearings related to GMO regulation and labeling that ultimately led to the passage of 
a GMO labeling law in 2016. After years of stagnation in federal policy to increase regulation or 
impose labeling on GMOs, there was a sudden shift in policy with the enactment of the federal 
mandatory GMO labeling bill in 2016. Past literature on the analysis of biotechnology policy 
development has found that the legacy of scientism and scientization have prevented broader 
discussions of the social, economic and moral impacts of biotechnology and helped maintain 
limited government oversight in the U.S (Binimelis and Myhr 2016;	Kinchy et al. 2008; 
Kleinman and Kinchy 2003a; 2003b). However, the passage of a federal labeling law appears to 
turn that notion on its head. This manuscript evaluates the discourse within the three 
congressional sessions leading up to the passage of the GMO labeling law to evaluate who 
testified, what types of framings were used and if there is a shift in the discourse that now 
legitimizes social, economic and moral issues within the discussion of biotechnology. Results 
indicate that there is a shift in discourse from the focus on the broad benefits of GMOs and calls 
for greater regulatory oversight to specific socio-economic benefits and risks of a label. While 
scientism rhetoric is used continually throughout all three sessions, social and economic 
concerns related to labeling and GMOs become a greater point of contention within the political 
debates surrounding GMOs in the food system. 
The second manuscript, titled Local Frames, Local Success: Case Studies of Genetically 
Modified Organism (GMO) Labeling Initiatives in the Northeast, U.S. specifically looks at the 
GMO labeling initiatives at the state level within and across the five states under study (Maine, 
Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut and Vermont). I combine interviews with stakeholders 
active in the state initiatives and content analysis of oral testimony from statewide public 
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hearings to assess the different framings utilized in the debates. In this chapter, I look at the 
different framings of the risks and benefits of GMOs, perspectives on labels and proposed 
solutions at a state-level scale, compared to the previous chapter that looked at these framings at 
the national scale. Analysis of interview transcripts and public witness testimony in the state 
hearings also allow the opportunity to see which frames resonated with members of the public. 
Furthermore, with a diversity of GMO labeling policy outcomes at the state level (failure, 
stagnation and success) I identify connections between different types of framing and success in 
passage of a labeling law to help identify which frames were deemed most effective in the 
passage of a GMO labeling law. Overall, across all five states the majority of frames centered 
around a consumer’s right to know and public health risks with GMOs. However, unique in 
Vermont, activist frames focused on sustaining local agriculture and food production. GMOs 
were viewed as a threat to Vermont’s local food system and the environmental-food ethic 
Vermont citizens embody. Framings tied to state socio-economic concerns appeared to be an 
effective framing strategy for the state compared to the other states under study. 
The third manuscript, titled ‘We’re a Feisty Little State’: Understanding State-Level 
Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) Labeling Policy Change with the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework utilizes the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to understand the diversity of 
policy outcomes across the five Northeastern states under study. While the previous two chapters 
focused primarily on frame analysis to understand policy development, this chapter focuses on a 
number of different factors prevalent in the ACF to understand policy change including the 
creation of advocacy coalitions active in each state, their shared belief systems, a coalition’s 
political capacity (including access to monetary resources, legal authority, public support, 
political authority, etc.) and each state’s political landscape (including political opportunity 
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structures, external institutions, etc.). The majority of this analysis relies on interviews with 
stakeholders active in the state labeling initiatives, especially state legislators who gave an in-
depth account of the bill’s movement through the state legislature. This analysis gave us a 
comprehensive look at a number of different factors that could influence a policy’s success or 
failure. As explained previously, with a trajectory of outcomes in the Northeast (failure, success, 
stagnation), one can evaluate and make connections between states with successful advocacy 
coalitions and favorable political environments that led to policy passage. Vermont’s policy core 
beliefs tied to maintaining local state agricultural food production and a highly accessible citizen 
legislature created an ideal environment for grassroots policy passage. 
The final chapter of this dissertation integrates the findings from individual manuscripts 
to present the major framings utilized in policy discussions of GMOs at different scales and 
across states, how these discourses may have affected policy outcomes and reflections on 
additional influential factors. Avenues for future research are also explored. 
 
Methodology and Data Collection 
I employed a mixed-methods collective case study approach combining interviews and 
analysis of secondary data. Manuscript 1 relied on transcripts of congressional hearings collected 
via the Government Publishing Office (GPO) website, which is the federal government 
repository for official information of the U.S. government including publications from Congress 
and the White House (U.S. GPO 2017). Manuscript 2 data came from semi-structured interviews 
with stakeholders involved in the state-level GMO labeling initiatives and transcripts from 
statewide public hearings on GMO labeling. Manuscript 3 primarily relied on interviews with 
stakeholders and specifically state legislators involved in the state labeling campaigns with some 
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secondary analysis on stakeholder organizations’ materials, such as mission statements and 
newsletters, published on their websites. All qualitative data was analyzed using the qualitative 
software program Atlas.ti. Below, I provide a detailed explanation of methods used for data 
collection and the way in which it was operationalized for each manuscript. 
 
Congressional Testimony Transcripts 
In order to identify hearings that were related to GMO regulation and labeling between 
2012-2016, I initially explored bills that had been introduced into the House of Representatives 
and the Senate during that time period on the Congress.gov database using the search terms 
“biotechnology”, “genetically engineered” and “genetically modified organism.” I noted the 
committees where these bills were introduced and then cross-referenced the committees with the 
GPO to find hearings for each of these committees related to biotechnology. While the 
committee hearings are publicly available via the GPO website, I also searched through Proquest 
Congressional to find any hearings that may have been unpublished (one hearing included in the 
analysis was unpublished). Content analysis using Atlas.ti was performed on each complete 
hearing transcript to bring forth emergent themes and ideas (Neuendorf 2001; Liu et al. 2015). 
After coding was performed, codes were categorized by affiliation of each witness and the 
specific congress in which he or she testified. The complete coding scheme for the congressional 
testimony transcripts can be found in Appendix E. 
 
Statewide Public Hearing Transcripts 
Statewide public hearings related to the labeling of GMOs were collected for each state 
under study. Public hearing testimony was accessible for Connecticut and Maine through their 
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state government websites. Massachusetts’ public hearing testimony was requested via their state 
government office as text. Public hearing testimony for Vermont was requested via the state 
government’s archive office as audio files and then transcribed verbatim. Connecticut and 
Vermont each had two public hearings on the subject of GMO labels (2012, 2013 and 2012, 
2014 respectively), Maine had a hearing in 2013 and Massachusetts in 2015. New York had a 
hearing on GMO labels in 2013 and the transcript was requested via the state government office. 
However, after initial reading of the testimony, New York’s hearing differed significantly from 
the other states’ hearings in that only 14 witnesses testified and the public was not allowed to 
testify. Since the main rationale for collecting public testimony data was to evaluate which types 
of frames the public was using in their reasons for support or opposition to a label, New York’s 
testimony was excluded from the analysis. Content analysis was performed on each piece of 
testimony using Atlas.ti and categorized by witness identity (citizen, industry, government 
legislator, non-governmental organization). The complete coding scheme for the state public 
hearings can be found in Appendix G. 
 
Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with a range of stakeholders involved in the national and state 
(CT, MA, ME, NY, VT) GMO labeling initiatives including state legislators, representatives of 
environmental groups, farmer advocacy groups, biotechnology industry, food industry, science 
advocacy groups and consumer rights organizations. Interviews were conducted over a two-year 
time span from May 2015 to August 2017. A total of 56 interviews were conducted. Using a 
modified snowball technique (Weible et al. 2010), interviewees were identified from background 
material on the state labeling initiatives collected from the internet, media articles and press 
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releases. An initial email request for an interview was sent to either an organization’s contact or 
an individual person of interest. A copy of the standard contact letter can be found in Appendix 
A. Some interviewees were identified by their testimony given at previous statewide labeling 
hearings or suggested by other interviewees as an individual of interest in the labeling initiatives. 
Consent to participate in an interview was gained prior to the start of each interview. The 
interview informed consent statement can be found in Appendix B. Interviews were strictly 
confidential and were assigned an identifier code upon completion of the interview. A complete 
list of interviewee codes with their affiliation can be found in Appendix C. A standard interview 
protocol was used for all interviewees with a semi-structured format to allow for follow-up 
questions to pursue interesting or unexpected responses, which can be found in Appendix D. 
Questions were slightly altered depending upon the interviewee. For example, when interviewing 
an individual or state legislator, certain questions from the standard protocol were left out 
because they did not apply. Overall questions pertained to identifying risks or benefits of GMOs, 
why they supported or opposed labeling and their perspectives on a federal or state-mandated 
label. Interviews were conducted in person or by telephone and lasted 30 to 60 minutes in length. 
All interviews were recorded with permission from participants and transcribed verbatim. 
Interviews were subject to similar coding methods with Atlas.ti as the congressional and 
statewide public hearings to bring forth emergent themes and ideas and subjected to focused 
coding to develop discrete codes and categories (Charmaz 2014). 
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Overview of the Literature 
Framing Analysis and Social Movements 
Political actors attempt to recruit members of the public by creating messages or 
narratives that will sway the public to favor a particular policy decision over alternatives (Chong 
and Druckman 2007a; Baumgartner et al. 2009). Advocates for policy change can encompass a 
wide variety of stakeholders including advocacy organizations, legislators, environmental groups 
and interest groups. When political actors believe that a policy change is necessary they may 
attempt to reframe the issue by trying “to raise the salience of a particular aspect of a problem or 
of a particular solution to the problem” (Baumgartner et al. 2009: 167). If political actors are able 
to identify a new or different definition of a problem, this may help to justify a different solution 
to the problem (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Baumgartner et al. 2009).  
In social movement literature, identifying frames has been a central dynamic to 
understanding the trajectory and strategy of social movements (Benford and Snow 2000). That 
is, understanding how people frame issues helps one understand how they mobilize (Feindt and 
Netherwood 2011). And with a rising number of actors becoming involved in decision-making 
and policy development (Boston et al. 2003; McGann and Johnson 2006), discourse has become 
a great influence on the promotion and development of certain policy ideas over others and has 
blossomed as a vital area of research concern in policy studies (Schmidt 2006; 2010). For	many 
issues, stakeholders will identify multiple frames to explain a problem or highlight a solution. 
Rahn et al. (2016) found that supporters of raw-milk sale legalization in the U.S. utilized frames 
such as health benefits, personal freedom, anti-big government regulation and support of local 
food. Utilizing multiple, integrative frames can provide a multidimensional “package” of frames 
that can appeal to a wider audience (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Haydu 2012; Mondou et al. 2014).  
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Past framing literature has attempted to understand the effect of particular frames on the 
public through experimental design where individuals are subjected to competing frames and 
participate in a post-experiment survey to observe if opinions changed on the topic (Brewer and 
Ley 2011; Chong and Druckman, 2007a, 2007b; Fowler and Gollust 2015; Nisbet et al. 2013; 
Wise and Brewer 2010). However, there are limitations to using these types of experimental 
designs; for example, measuring framing effects may be limited by a pretreatment effect as 
people may have already been exposed to certain framing messages (Barabas and Jerit 2010; 
Gaines et al. 2006). In contrast, being able to examine public testimony from citizens in each 
state can help determine which frames resonate with the public in their support for or opposition 
to a GMO label without a researcher pre-determining possible responses found in public opinion 
surveys or polls (Leyden 1995; Holleman 2012). Furthermore, participants in statewide hearings 
encompass a distinct sample of concerned citizens and stakeholders who are taking an active role 
in the movement for or against a GMO labeling bill. By analyzing the testimonies in each state, 
specific frames utilized can be identified and the effect these frames have on legislative action in 
support or in opposition to a GMO labeling bill. Recent science communication research has 
looked at the effect that public health risk framings have on the public’s concerns and practices 
related to climate change, though not on the actual passage or failure of a particular climate 
change policy (McComas et al. 2015; Myers et al. 2012; Akerlof et al. 2010). The unique case 
studies in the Northeast enable not only the use of public testimony data to evaluate the effect of 
particular frames on the public; but additionally the evaluation of the effect of different frames 
on distinct policy developments across the five states and at the federal level.  
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Advocacy Coalition Framework  
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a prominent theory that analyzes how 
policy change occurs and highlights the impact that advocacy coalitions comprised of individuals 
with common core policy beliefs can have on policy change (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994; 
Weible and Sabatier 2009) and can help identify key factors that drive policy change in a 
complex policy-making environment (Breton and De Leeuw 2011). Interaction, negotiation and 
policy learning within and between coalitions are considered the major driving forces between 
political processes and policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). Therefore, identifying 
how advocacy coalitions work together can help us understand why and how certain policies are 
adopted and/or resisted at the state and/or federal level in the U.S. According to Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith (1999), advocacy coalitions can be comprised of governmental and private 
organizational members who share a three-tiered hierarchal structure of beliefs. The structure 
contains broad and deep core beliefs (such as the values of liberty, security and equality), 
followed by policy core beliefs (such as the role of government versus the market in alleviating 
social ills), and specific secondary beliefs (identification of a problem or solution pertaining to a 
specific location or context) and attempt to influence behavior in the policy sphere over time. 
The ACF evaluates beliefs that bind coalitions together to determine a coalition’s structure and 
stability in social movements and policy development. These coalitions (comprised of 
partnerships between the public and stakeholders) can gain traction in the policy-making arena 
where otherwise they may have been disenfranchised actors (Daley 2007; Leach et al. 2002). In 
this research, the ACF will be used to identify the different advocacy coalitions involved in the 
GMO labeling debates at the state level and the fundamental beliefs that tie these coalitions 
together, based off of frames utilized to identify the problem (or non-problem if GMOs are not 
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considered an issue that needs resolving via policy mechanisms) of GMOs and the solution (or 
non-solution) for labeling. If we can understand how coalitions form based on their beliefs, then 
we can understand how these coalitions will search for, process and evaluate new information, 
specifically in the policy-oriented learning process (Ripberger et al. 2014).  
The ACF has also been used to analyze differences in resources and strategies among 
advocacy coalitions. Pierce (2016) found that in comparing the winning and losing coalitions in 
terms of resources, the winning coalition had more public support but the losing had more 
financial resources. This differs with Sabatier’s and Weible’s (2007) earlier study which found 
that coalitions with greater resource access had the greatest impact in the policy process. Pierce’s 
finding supports Nohrstedt’s (2011) finding that certain resources (such as public support) matter 
more in policy change than others. Increased financial resource access has even been found to be 
a nonfactor in successful coalitions in some studies (Kubler 2001; Pierce 2016). Others have 
found that maintaining a strong coalition was found to be an important strategy in policy change 
(Pierce 2016; Crow 2008; Gupta 2014). Utilizing the ACF in analyzing the GMO labeling 
initiatives across the five states provides the opportunity to analyze multiple factors that could 
have had an influence in the final policy outcomes. I will compare the advocacy coalitions within 
each state, the belief structure tying these coalitions together, resources and strategies as well as 
the specific political landscape within each of these states, which can further influence the 
success or failure or certain coalition strategies or resource use. The ACF is a flexible framework 
that has been used to describe and explain the formation and maintenance of coalitions and 
policy change (Weible and Nohrstedt 2013). While it has been rarely applied comparatively 
using similar methods of data collection and analysis (Leach and Sabatier 2005; Weible et al. 
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2010), this present study offers an approach to conduct comparative analyses using the ACF to 
inform future studies. 
 
Food Governance and “New Politics of Food” 
Food scholars argue that the current period is defined by a “new politics of food” or food 
governance where collective goals are set and pursued by non-state actors with less influence and 
control by state and national governments (Busch and Bain 2004; DuPuis 2000; Bestill and 
Bulkeley 2006; Schweikhardt and Browne 2001). With the rise of neoliberalism, the primacy of 
the market and rejection of state intervention, new spaces arise for non-state actors (such as civil 
society and corporations) as well as supranational actors to participate in specific policy arenas 
(McCarthy 2006; Clapp 2012; Rodrik 2011; Roff 2007). A new role emerges for consumers to 
influence the production-side of food systems through their “conscientious consumerism” and 
participation in food politics (Bartley et al. 2015; Murdoch et al. 2000). In order to capture these 
new consumer-driven markets there has been an increase in private authority driven by non-state 
actors for quality assurance through the act of labeling (Ponte et al. 2011; Bain et al. 2013; 
Bartley et al. 2015; Bain and Dandachi 2014). Specifically in GMO labeling, companies began to 
label their products as Non-GMO voluntarily or through third-party certification (such as the 
Non-GMO Project Verified), which assess and assign labels to companies based on technical 
specifications (NGMOP 2016). Prior to passage of Vermont’s mandatory labeling law, large 
food companies such as General Mills, Kelloggs and Campbells had also begun to voluntarily 
label GMO ingredients (Charles and Aubrey 2016). 
For social movement actors, private authority has become an “alternative pathway” to 
gain power and momentum in an area where political authority has decreased dramatically (Hess 
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2007). The conscientious consumer now has an influential role in the marketplace and can 
advocate for environmental and socioeconomic characteristics in the economy’s productive 
sphere, such as Fair Trade certified, organic certification and “green” environmentally friendly 
products (Kysar 2004; Neilson 2010; Soper 2004; 2007; Micheletti 2003; Bostrom and Klintman 
2008). The concept of transparency in company practices also is influential in food politics with 
normative claims of consumer right-to-know and larger participation and accountability by 
citizen-consumers (Mol 2015). However, some scholars are wary of the likelihood that labeling 
and conscientious consumerism can address socioeconomic ills. Maniates (2001) warns that an 
increase in eco- and social labels could give rise to “individualization of responsibility.” Szasz 
(2007) cites the possible onset of “political anesthesia” which prevents individuals from 
advocating and fighting for broad structural changes that may be more effective in addressing 
environmental and social problems. Bain and Dandachi (2014) have argued that the non-GMO 
movement’s rhetoric of sustainability and social issues has been replaced by neoliberal, 
individualist arguments enhancing consumer ability to make a free, informed choice. 
Furthermore, some scholars note that conscientious consumerism driven by quality assurance 
labels has a very negligible effect on the greater social and political spheres as well as on the 
environmental implications of the production side of consumption and the marketplace (Szasz 
2007; Guthman 2007). Analysis of the frames utilized in the GMO labeling debates can reveal if 
there are calls for “individualization of responsibility”, the address of broader socio-economic 
issues, or different rationales overall in the support for a GMO label. GMO regulations and 
labeling initiatives are examples of direct public contestation and engagement in an organized 
social movement in consumer politics within the agri-food system. Labeling and access to more 
information for consumers and/or citizens has the capability to produce better-informed, more 
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knowledgeable consumers in areas of food production and agricultural practices. However, it is 
important that labels are defined by clear standards that the public is aware of and understands. 
The federal labeling law that came out of Congress in 2016 has been criticized for narrowly 
defined standards that may not encompass all GMOs the public assumes will be labeled. It is 
important to understand the diversity of reasons as to why the public and stakeholders want to see 
a GMO label to help inform standard-making procedures for future GMO labeling rules and 
regulations.  
The struggle over attaching a label involves more than simply making food production 
processes “transparent” but includes political struggles and contestation over how standards are 
defined, who creates the standards, who certifies the food product, and who oversees the labeling 
of the food product (Bain et al. 2013; Hatanaka et al. 2005; Timmermans and Epstein 2010; 
Goodman 2001; DuPuis 2002; Raynolds 2000; Bush 2011). The GMO movement and 
particularly the labeling movement taking place across the states is a political struggle to re-
define producer-consumer relationships and which knowledge systems and political actors are 
given precedence. As Goodman and DuPuis (2002:17) state: “The ‘politics’ of food get played 
out in ways that include both the struggles of contested knowledges and the struggles to form 
political alliances that will become more stable political formations of the future.” Investigating 
how supporters and opponents of GMO labels are framing their positions provide insight into 
which types of knowledge and actors consumers trust (or distrust) in “knowing food.” This study 
is a novel contribution to the sociology of food and standards, and of consumer politics by 
investigating whose knowledge gains precedence in the development of GMO labeling policy. 
Utilizing frame analysis in social movements and the advocacy coalition framework, this 
dissertation research will also contribute to these literatures and policy analysis by examining the 
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influential frames and discourses disseminated in the GMO labeling movement taking place 
within this “new politics of food.”   
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Chapter 2: Framing the Food System: A Content Analysis of U.S. Congressional Hearings 
Surrounding the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in the Food 
System (2011-2016) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The (non)-regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the food system has been a 
contentious issue in the state and federal U.S. policy arenas as the public and policymakers 
debate the ethical implications and environmental and human health benefits and risks of this 
technology. After years of stagnation in federal and state regulation of GMOs and labeling of 
GMOs, a state GMO labeling law was enacted in 2016 in Vermont followed by the immediate 
passage of a federal GMO labeling law. Why has there been a sudden shift in the labeling policy 
surrounding GMOs? Drawing upon frame analysis in policy research, and utilizing five years of 
congressional testimony hearings, I analyze how witnesses and legislators frame the (non)-
problem of GMOs and the solutions in terms of biotechnology regulation and/or labeling. 
Scientism and scientization in public policy development are also addressed. I conduct content 
analysis of witness and legislator testimony from congressional hearings from the 112, 113, and 
114 Congresses (2011-2016) concerning genetic engineering to identify which stakeholders play 
a key role in the formulation of public policy surrounding GMOs and which frames are utilized 
the most in testimony. Despite overwhelming support for GMOs and the call for their continued 
limited regulation by witnesses in these Congressional hearings, the collective action frames 
utilized by opponent witnesses in the later sessions of Congress and the broader social movement 
for GMO labeling, were influential enough to force GMO proponents to reframe their previous 
arguments from the broad benefits of GMOs to socio-economic risks of a GMO label. Thus, 
socio-economic concerns were considered in the policy discussions surrounding biotechnology, 
which ultimately resulted in the passage of a federal mandatory GMO labeling law.  
 
Introduction 
 
 Biotechnology has been a contentious issue in the political domain in the U.S., as 
citizens, activists and policymakers question the environmental, human health, and ethical issues 
behind the applications of this technology (Schurman and Munro 2010; Thompson 2014). Even 
with public apprehension towards this technology, adoption rates of GM crops have soared over 
the last ten years. Since the introduction of herbicide tolerant and insect resistant crops in 1996, 
the percentage of planted GM crops in the U.S. has grown immensely. GM corn grew from 25% 
of all corn planted in 2000 to 92% of all corn planted in 2016. GM soybeans encompassed 54% 
of all soybeans planted in 2000 to 94% in 2016 and GM cotton grew from 61% in 2000 to 93% 
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in 2016 (USDA ERS 2017). Proponents of GMOs cite the many benefits of GM crops as the 
main reasons for mass adoption rates by farmers, including labor efficiencies (field-wide 
spraying rather than weed-by-weed efforts) and decreases in pesticide use (Saletan 2015; NAS 
2016). Proponents also cite future potential benefits such as increasing food production for rising 
populations, introducing nutrient-enhanced crops to nutrient-poor areas (Asis 2017; Curchoe 
2017). However, critics contend that GMOs present risks for human health, impact the natural 
environment (i.e. general degradation, biodiversity loss), erode farmer agency, contribute to the 
loss of traditions in food culture, and further concentrate the role of corporations in the 
agriculture sector (i.e. further loss of the family farm) (Benbrook 2012; Kaur et al. 2013; 
Thompson 2014). The consensus from U.S. governmental agencies (Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), Department of Agriculture (USDA), Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA)) and scientific bodies (National Academy of Sciences) is that there is no increased human 
health risks with the consumption of GMOs (NAS 2016).  
 However, the legislative climate surrounding the regulation of GMOs has been far from 
settled. Between 1999-2016, a total of seventy-eight federal bills were introduced in Congress to 
address the regulation of GM crops and food. Bills ranged from the required labeling of foods 
containing GMOs, to establishing a task force to promote the benefits and safety of 
biotechnology globally, and to allocating different bureaus of government to approve the safety 
of GMOs before commercialization. In the three congressional sessions (2011-2016), the 
majority of bills related to GMOs introduced into Congress focused on the required or voluntary 
labeling of foods containing GMOs. On July 14, 2016, Congress passed S.764, The Biotech 
Labeling Solutions Act, deemed a GMO labeling compromise bill that requires labeling of foods 
containing GM ingredients. Labels can be displayed as a written label, such as “made with 
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genetically engineered ingredients”, a symbol, or contained within a Quick Response (QR) code 
that consumers can scan with their mobile devices. One key facet of this bill is the preemption of 
any state mandatory GMO labeling bills already passed or in the process of passage. Anti-GMO 
advocacy groups deemed this hardly a compromise and referred to it as the “anti-labeling bill” 
(Charles 2016). Opponents criticized the preemption of state labeling laws within the bill and the 
implicit discrimination against those persons, such as impoverished or elderly populations, who 
may not have access to broadband internet or own a mobile smartphone to obtain the information 
contained within the QR code. Consumer rights groups also referred to this bill as “the new 
DARK (Denying Americans the Right to Know) Act” (Center for Food Safety 2016), comparing 
it to its predecessor The Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015, introduced by U.S. 
Congressman Mike Pompeo (R-KS) in the 114 (2015-2016) session. The earlier bill established a 
voluntary non-GMO labeling certification and labeling process, likewise preempting state 
mandatory labeling laws. While that bill only passed the House, many aspects, including the 
preemption of state labeling laws made it to the final version of S.764. For legislators who 
supported S.764, they believed this bill enabled consumers to gain more information at their 
discretion and set a national labeling standard deemed much less confusing and cumbersome for 
food manufacturers and consumers than state-by-state labeling (Addady 2016; Roberts 2016). 
 While the public has debated the merits of biotechnology and numerous pieces of 
legislation were introduced into Congress concerning the regulation and labeling of GMOs over 
a twenty-year time span (1990s-2010s), actual policy change had been non-existent on the issue. 
However, between 2012-2016, there was a fervor of legislative activity at the state and federal 
level related to the labeling of GMOs, culminating in the passage of S.764 in 2016. This increase 
in policy debate and legislative activity at the federal level provides a rich data set to examine the 
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discursive influences on the policy process over a specific time period. I investigate the political 
debates on GMO regulation and labeling taking place in congressional committee hearings from 
2012-2016 to identify influential key actors and rationales in the GMO federal labeling policy 
process. Analysis of policy discourses and framings utilized in policy discussions reveal certain 
interests guiding the political process, their potential influence on future governance and the 
influence of frames and discourses on policy transformation (Kinchy et al. 2008; Holleman 
2012).  
 Sociologists and risk perception scholars have identified some reasons why the public are 
wary of the introduction of GMOs into the food system, such as lack of control over the 
technology, concerns about concentrated corporate control, unknown risks, delay in 
manifestation of harm and the novelty of the technology (Slovic 1993; 2000; 2012; Savadori et 
al. 2004; Roff 2007; Schurman and Munro 2010; Thompson 2014). Researchers have found that 
experts (specifically scientists) will usually weigh new technologies as less risky and more 
beneficial to address societal ills than the public (Wynne, 2001; Savadori et al. 2004; Cook et al. 
2004; Slovic 2012). During the policy-making process, legislators call upon experts (i.e. 
witnesses) to serve as credible individuals providing in-depth objective knowledge on a 
particular topic (Howlett 2009; Keller 2009; Montpetit 2011). Experts can help legislators by 
providing specialized knowledge and predicting intended or unintended consequences of a 
policy. However, if experts narrow the stated risks of a technology to only include 
technoscientific criteria, this can further constrict whose “expertise” and participation are 
deemed legitimate in the development of policy surrounding that technology (Levidow 1998; 
Jasanoff et al. 2015). Therefore, analyzing the types (disciplinary and institutional affiliation) of 
experts and/or witnesses that are invited to speak at these committee hearings is important for my 
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analysis of policy discussions that ultimately lead to policy change. This research will address 
who is considered an “expert” on the issue of GMOs and GMO labeling according to legislators, 
how these “expert” witnesses strategically frame their arguments directed to affect policy and if 
there are changes in witnesses or framings over time. 
In this paper, I argue that social movement activism in opposition to GMO development 
reshaped the debate to focus on specific socio-economic benefits and risks with the inclusion of a 
GMO label, rather than on the broad benefits or risks of GMOs. Specifically, the collective 
action frames utilized by opponent witnesses in the later sessions of Congress and the broader 
social movement for GMO labeling were influential enough to force GMO proponents to 
reframe their previous arguments from the broad benefits of GMOs to the specific risks of a 
GMO label. These findings suggest that public sentiment and effective collective action frames 
can influence the political process, even when they are presented as the minority opinion in 
institutional policy-making settings (such as a committee hearing). These findings also 
demonstrate the interactive process by which frames are constructed and their ability to change 
over time, which can depend on exogenous factors as well as changes in the opposing side’s 
framing strategies. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I briefly discuss the 
historical background of the development of GMOs and the frames utilized to justify their 
continued development, and the evolution of the anti-GMO movements’ strategies and discourse. 
I follow with the analytical framework that guided my methods, background on committee 
hearings as sites of political development investigation, and the analysis of the different framings 
utilized in the committee hearings. Drawing upon my data, I illustrate how the “consumer right 
to know” frame used by opponents was powerful enough to overcome the majority opinion in the 
Congressional hearings and forced GMO proponents to reframe their arguments to address socio-
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economic risks previously deemed illegitimate in past debates about GMO regulation. In the 
final sections, I discuss my conclusions and the implications of the future biotechnology labeling 
law in present food politics. 
 
Biotechnology Development and Discourse: An Optimistic Beginning 
U.S. biotechnology developed in a neoliberal economic context, beginning in the 1970s, 
which stressed open markets, free trade, private property rights and individual initiative 
(McCarthy 2006; Schurman and Munro 2010). Market efficiency was deemed of utmost 
importance where a self-regulating market would produce the most optimal outcomes (McCarthy 
2006). With the power of centralized government diminishing, private industries marketed 
products to address social ills in the areas of fair labor rights, sustainable forestry initiatives, and 
environmental standards, usually with added premiums attached (Bartley et al. 2015). In a 
climate of limited regulation, private investors gave biotechnology scientists freedom and 
funding to work on projects to address agricultural and social issues that could then be 
commercialized and patented for profit (Parayil 2003; Scharper and Cunningham 2006; 
Schurman and Munro 2010). Investors and scientists saw GMOs as a major solution to farmers’ 
problems (including labor and input costs), a way to reduce the cost of food for consumers and 
produce a food surplus for poverty-stricken countries. For the biotechnology industry, the 
possibilities were endless in terms of the problems they could solve, the social ills they could 
cure, and the benefits they could bring to society as a whole. Mary Dell Chilton, one of the 
pioneers of plant biotechnology stated in 1984, “‘The solutions are coming very fast now. In 
three years, we’ll be able to do anything [with gene manipulations] that our imaginations will get 
us to’” (as quoted in Schurman and Munro 2010: 25).  
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In the 2010s, biotech proponents are still attempting to maintain that optimism despite 
critiques that promises were not fulfilled and were rather “airy claims about [GM crops’] pro-
poor promise” (Glover 2010: 86) or “exaggerations of biotechnology achievements” (McAfee 
2003: 213). Some biotechnology critics will cite biotechnology’s failed efforts as evidence of 
these “exaggerations”, such as the Golden Rice project in India, which was meant to address a 
public nutritional vitamin A deficiency. However, the project was never implemented as it was 
met with mass resistance by Indian civil society who viewed it as a quick technological fix and a 
“Trojan horse that may open the route for other GMO applications” (Potrykus 2001: 1160), 
additionally ignoring existing conventional solutions to vitamin A deficiency in the country 
(Shiva 2000; Greenpeace 2005). Nevertheless, biotechnology continues to be framed as a moral 
issue capable of addressing food insecurity and associated with concepts of progress and 
innovation by the biotechnology industry, scientists and U.S. governmental bodies as evidenced 
by limited regulatory oversight and increased research in transgenic crops by publicly-funded 
universities (Jasanoff 2005; Welsh and Glenna 2006; van den Daele 2007; Maeseele 2010; 
Dibden et al. 2013; Motta 2015). Monsanto, one of the largest GM companies, owning 80% of 
the U.S. GM corn and 90% of the U.S. GM soybean market in 2014 (Mitchell 2014), presents 
GM crops as an essential tool for addressing the main challenges for the future, including climate 
change (developing drought-resistant or nitrogen-fixing crops), population growth and food 
security (Glover 2010). Ron Stotish, the CEO for AquaAdvantage, the company that created and 
commercialized the first genetically engineered fish stated:  
We’re soon to be 9 billion people on the face of the earth. We will 
need to grow over the next 20-30 years our ability to produce food 
by as much as 50%. We’ll have to do that at a time when terrestrial 
and oceanic resources are limiting. There is not arable land to 
expand and explore for production. How are we going to meet the 
food needs of the future? The only answer that I am aware of is to 
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produce our food more effectively, more efficiently and more 
sustainably…We will have to use the technology that we have 
available to us today to meet those global food security needs. 
Otherwise someone is going to have to eat less or food is going to 
have to become a lot more expensive (Stotish 2016).  
 
For biotechnology proponents, frames pertaining to the moral and ethical benefits are equated 
with the promise or need for future funding and lasting potential of the industry. Glover (2010) 
discusses how the framing of GM as addressing environmental sustainability, international 
development and hunger was a strategic move by biotechnology proponents to convince 
investors and buyers of its importance for the long term.  
 
Federal Regulation of Biotechnology 
The framings of the environmental, sustainable and food security benefits of 
biotechnology along with the innovative potential it holds to address future problems have also 
been strategically employed by the biotechnology industry to avoid financially cumbersome and 
time-consuming national regulations. Newell (2009) coined the term “biohegemony” to 
demonstrate how biotech companies were able to gain support for reduced regulation in 
Argentina based on material, institutional and discursive power. Particularly with discursive 
power, biotech proponents emphasize its achievements and deflect any challenges to the 
technology. Thus, biotechnology proponents create a win-win narrative where any challenges or 
criticisms of the technology are deemed uninformed or inappropriate. Jasanoff (2005) compared 
the regulation of biotechnology across Britain, Germany and the U.S. and found that differences 
arise due to the capacity of each regulatory institutions’ ability to address scientific, social and 
ethical uncertainties of the technology. The U.S. “approach on the whole favors innovation and 
risk-taking, regulated by the laws of the market…By contrast, both Britain and Germany have 
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opted for more cautious legislative solutions, allowing innovation to proceed only within a 
normative framework arrived at by law” (Jasanoff 2005: 152).  
Presently GM crops in the U.S. receive minimal regulation and oversight. Before 
approval to plant and commercialize, GM developers are required to submit data to the federal 
government either requesting a permit to plant (which would entail oversight and data-sharing 
between the developer and the government department) or the developer can request a petition 
for their crop to maintain de-regulated status if they can demonstrate that their crop is 
substantially equivalent to its non-GM counterpart. If this can be achieved, then the crop will 
maintain nonregulated status and not require any government-mandated provisions, labeling or 
submittal of continual updated data from the developer. Some have questioned whether this is a 
truly transparent process in the approval of new GM crop varieties since the data submitted 
comes from the company developing (and profiting from) the GM crop itself (Roff 2007). The 
government does not conduct its own independent risk assessments but instead relies on the 
company’s conclusions and recommendations. Currently many varieties of GM crops developed 
by Monsanto, Syngenta, and Dow have all nonregulated status (Philpott 2011; USDA 2017).  
 
The Rise and Evolution of the Anti-GM Discourse  
While the optimistic rhetoric of biotechnology has influenced investors and the U.S. 
government to propel its development through reduced regulatory oversight, not all individuals 
have been persuaded of its beneficial potential. Various social movements in the U.S. and 
globally have arisen against the continual, unencumbered development of GMOs since their 
introduction in the 1980s. Historically, the anti-GM movement has drawn upon a variety of 
arguments that have evolved over time as new issues arise to articulate their opposition. At the 
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beginning of the anti-GM movement (1980s), critics framed their opposition by contending that 
biotechnology embodied corporate domination and control of the agri-food sector in the U.S. as 
well as the global imposition of the West’s input intensive monoculture farming techniques on 
Global South smallholder peasants (Stone 2002; Schurman and Munro 2010; Buttel 2005). The 
movement’s discourse continued to evolve into the 1990s as anti-GM activists emphasized that 
any genetic manipulation was unnatural, unethical and risky (McKibben 2003). Buttel (2005) 
contends that in the 1990s and early 2000s the movement began to focus on human health and 
environmental risks associated with GMOs, potentially due to the aftermath of the bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or “mad cow” scandal (which heightened public fears 
surrounding contamination in food products) and the well-established environmental NGO 
network following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Activist strategies during this time focused on 
reforming and strengthening policy to regulate GMOs and instituting planting moratoriums at the 
state and county level (Buttel 2005; Walsh-Dilley 2009; Pechlander 2012). These strategies 
resulted in minimal success as regulations did not change and small-scale moratoriums were 
never able to scale-up from the local to the national level (Walsh-Dilley 2009; Pechlaner 2012).  
Since 2012, the goals of the anti-GM movement have changed from promoting banning 
to labeling of GMOs (Bain and Dandachi 2014). States and counties began to introduce ballot 
initiatives and legislation for the mandatory labeling of GMOs. California’s ballot initiative 
Proposition 37, the “Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Engineered Food Initiative” introduced 
in 2012, drew massive attention to the issue of GMO labeling. Prop 37 (as it was commonly 
referred to) ultimately did not pass but demonstrated the impact that this type of political action 
could have on the overall anti-GMO movement, as a cascade of other statewide GMO labeling 
initiatives ensued. Washington and Oregon followed with ballot initiatives in 2013 and 2014 
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respectively, both narrowly defeated. The Northeastern United States experienced limited 
legislative success, with labeling bills passed in Connecticut and Maine with a trigger clause 
attached and eventually Vermont (with no trigger clause) passed in 2014 and went into effect on 
July 1, 2016. These state labeling bills have been influential in sparking other state labeling bills 
and raising public attention about the issue, which ultimately permeated the national debate1 
(Bain and Dandachi 2014). According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 
20 states introduced GMO labeling bills in 2016 (NCSL 2016). Proponents of these statewide 
and the recent federal labeling campaigns have focused on the rhetoric of “consumer right to 
know”, the ability “to choose” in the marketplace, and “transparency” in the greater food system 
(Caswell 2000; Klintman 2002). 
 
The Influence of Neoliberalism and Scientism in Policy Development 
Reduced regulatory oversight is a fundamental aspect of the neoliberalist rhetoric of 
unencumbered global free trade, reduced trade barriers, and increased standardization of 
regulations related to food safety, human, environmental, and plant health, exemplified in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and measures (Rodrick 2011; Clapp 2012). The global 
trade rules emphasizing nontariff trade barriers and open markets have infiltrated the global 
biosafety frameworks and U.S. national regulatory policies, where environmental and health 
impacts are given precedence over socio-economic concerns. This is evidenced in the absence of 
public participation in decisions regarding the regulation and approval of biotech and economic 
losses suffered by small farmers due to lawsuits from biotechnology firms because of accidental 
																																																						
1 Until recently, the GMO labeling movement had gained minimal traction on the federal front. A GMO 
federal labeling bill has been introduced into Congress under a variety of different names and different 
sponsors over the last ten years but had usually not made it out of one committee. 
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genetic contamination or loss of export markets (Binimelis and Myhr 2016; Kleinman and 
Kinchy 2003a; Walls et al. 2005; Kinchy et al. 2008; Kleinman and Kinchy 2007; Bonnueil and 
Levidow 2011). In policy discussions and debates on biotechnology regulation, the coupling of 
neoliberalism and scientism discourses have prevented the consideration of broader socio-
economic impacts (Kinchy et al. 2008; Kleinman and Kinchy 2003a; 2003b). Assuming that 
science is value-free and politically neutral, scientism is defined as the “beliefs that policy is best 
dictated by scientific reasoning, since science is presumed to transcend human values and 
interests and to provide answers upon which all can agree” (Kinchy et al. 2008: 156; Jasanoff 
1995; Pielke 2004; Sarewitz 2006; Proctor 1991).  
Kinchy et al. (2008) analyzed the U.S. debates concerning the approval of the genetically 
engineered hormone recombinant bovine growth hormone (rBGH), concluding that socio-
economic risks for small dairy farmers were not considered in the determination for 
commercializing the hormone. The only legitimate justification for keeping rBGH off the market 
would have been scientific evidence that the hormone caused human health harm (Kinchy et al. 
2008). Similarly, in 1996, Vermont called for the labeling of milk made from cows treated with 
rBGH, but the bill was struck down in court because no significant difference was found between 
milk from treated and untreated cows (FDA only requires labeling if there is a significant 
difference in the final products). Additionally, the court ruled that consumer concern was not a 
valid enough reason to warrant a label (Runge and Jackson 2000; Lowe, 2015), implying that 
socio-economic considerations were not deemed legitimate. The ability for “scientism” discourse 
to prevent regulatory oversight in the U.S. has inspired biotechnology proponents to also attempt 
to de-politicize agricultural biotechnology by framing it as a neutral, dispassionate, rational 
scientific tool that follows the natural, inevitable process of scientific discovery (Kinchy et al. 
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2008; Maeseele 2010; Dibden et al. 2013). For example, Maeseele (2010) discusses how biotech 
proponents will “disavow critical reports [on GMOs] because they are not based on ‘sound 
science’ as they are produced by scientific charlatans” (291). By emphasizing the purely 
scientific aspect of the technology, it is removed from political discussions and framed as not 
needing regulation.  
Policy discussions privilege “scientism” and neoliberalism and thus create a political 
arena where free market interests and scientific expertise outweigh others. In policy disputes, 
scientific experts’ testimony and scientific evidence are given greater credence than non-expert 
moral, ethical or socio-economic arguments (Kleinman and Kinchy 2003a; Levidow 1998). 
Policy debates about broad social issues become overshadowed by scientization, where political 
debates take place among scientific experts, separate from the social context in which it occurs 
(Habermas 1970; Kinchy 2012). For example, in Kinchy’s (2012) analysis of the social conflicts 
of GM canola in Canada and GM maize in Mexico, she showed that organic farmers were 
concerned about the loss of their organic certification from the threat of GM contamination and 
the threat on the cultural, symbolic and spiritual significance of corn varieties in Mexico. 
However, in court hearings on the subject, the judge deemed scientists to be experts but not 
farmers. Advocates confronted the scientization of the debate by conducting their own research, 
recruiting their own experts, questioning scientific evidence demonstrated in courts and 
ultimately calling for consideration of social and economic impacts of these technologies. 
Kinchy states at the end of her analysis: 
The persistence of social conflict over GE crops strongly suggests 
that it is time for new ‘rules of the game’ for the governance of 
technology, to reassess what is accomplished when we rule out 
considerations that are not easily categorized as 
scientific…changing the terms of debate is essential to the pursuit 
of a more sustainable, socially just form of agriculture (2012: 164).    
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Thus scientization narrows the discussion to only consider scientific discourse on an issue that 
can be upheld by statistics, risk assessments based on probabilities of likelihood and removed 
from the values and cultural ideals of a community.  
The historical development of biotechnology and its accompanying promotional frames, 
in conjunction with the social movement frames in opposition to its limited regulation, give a 
broad background of biotechnology’s path within the public and political realms. Bolstered by 
the privileging of scientism in policy discussions, biotechnology was able to maintain a 
trajectory of innovation, development and limited regulatory oversight over a twenty-year period 
(1990s-2010s) despite a steady stream of social movement opposition. However, beginning in 
the 2010s, the genesis of the labeling movement in the western U.S. propelled labeling 
movements across the country leading to state labels in the Northeast and specifically in 
Vermont. Subsequently, the issue of GMO regulation shifted to the federal level, which provides 
a rich set of data to examine the federal policy process, the major interests guiding this policy 
process, and the frames driving this debate that ultimately led to the passage of a federal GMO 
labeling law in 2016. The next section discusses the concept of framing in political discourse and 
the role of Congressional hearings in the policy process, thus setting the stage for my analysis of 
congressional hearing testimony on biotechnology regulation. 
 
Framing in Political Discourse 
In policy development, political actors or policy entrepreneurs attempt to recruit support 
for a policy by creating messages or narratives that will sway favor for a particular policy 
decision over alternatives (Chong and Druckman 2007; Baumgartner et al. 2009). These 
narratives or messages can also be considered as frames, defined by Bateson (1972) as 
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“metacommunicative devices that set parameters for ‘what is going on’” (Oliver and Johnston 
2005: 188). The creation of frames by policy entrepreneurs are purposeful, strategic 
assemblages, “to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation 
and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993: 52). Policy entrepreneurs may also reframe 
issues by trying “to raise the salience of a particular aspect of a problem or of a particular 
solution to the problem” (Baumgartner et al. 2009: 167). Frame analysis has been a widely-
practiced method in the social movement literature to understand the mobilization strategies and 
trajectory of various social movements (Walgrave and Manseens 2005; McAdam et al. 1996; 
Haydu 2012; Klintman 2006; Hewitt and McCammon 2005) with a focus on the development 
and impact of “collective action frames” that “inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns 
of a social movement organization” (Benford and Snow 2000: 614).  
Successful collective action frames involve three tasks: 1) diagnostic framing, which 
identifies the problem, 2) prognostic framing, which identifies a solution, and 3) motivational 
framing, which describes the ways in which to solve the problem and motivates people to act 
(Snow and Benford 1988). “Master frames” are collective action frames that have been used 
cyclically throughout social movement history as they resonate with a broad range of interest 
groups and audiences time and time again (Snow and Benford 1992). For example, food security 
and sustainability frames have been identified as “master frames” or “consensus frames” because 
of their ability to unite wide-ranging groups and interests in social movements (Kessler et al. 
2016; Mooney and Hunt 2009). For many issues, stakeholders will identify multiple frames to 
explain a problem or highlight a solution. For example, Rahn et al. (2016) found that supporters 
of raw milk legalization in the U.S. utilized frames such as health benefits, personal freedom, 
anti-big government regulation and support of local food to achieve their policy goals. The 
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authors theorized that these frames were effective in mobilizing broad-based support and getting 
the issue on the political agenda because they aligned with the “master frame” of “individualism, 
anti-statism, and localism” (Rahn et al. 2016: 19). 
While there has been extensive research on the collective action frames used by 
challengers to the status quo in social movement research, scholars have noted there is a lack of 
research in the analysis of “official frames” (i.e. frames promoted by state agencies or powerful 
elites in politics) (Noakes 2005). State agencies and elites in politics usually hold substantial 
influence in the policy development process, have access to greater financial resources and are 
backed by a team of interest groups with more expertise (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Giddens 
1987). Therefore, frames employed by these actors may hold greater weight in policy decisions. 
In general, these actors are also trying to maintain the status quo and as Noakes (2005) states in 
his research on Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI) frames utilized during the communist threat, 
“Familiarity is more likely to breed acceptance than contempt” (102). In the anti-biotechnology 
movement, many biotechnology industry organizations, science advocacy groups, university 
scientists, and food manufacturers have maintained staunch support for the biotech industry and 
call for continued support and deregulation of GMOs, which has been reflected continuously in 
U.S. policy. However, the construction of an official frame does not guarantee its success 
(Noakes 2005). If an official frame does not resonate well with the cultural values or beliefs of 
the public then it could undermine the legitimacy and authority of the ones in power. This could 
create a political opportunity for certain actors to engage and successfully promote a collective 
action frame.  
Recent scholarship has investigated different framing strategies from opposing sides of 
an issue by evaluating variable interpretations of a similar collective action frame. For instance, 
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Fiss and Hirsh’s (2005) analysis of the emergence of globalization discourse adapted Goffman’s 
(1974) concept of “keying” to differentiate between critical views of globalization and positive 
views within the same frame. They evaluated frames based on if they were “positive,” negative,” 
or “neutral” enabling them to identify normative frames within the complex discussion of 
globalization (35). Critical views were deemed “sharp” frames and positive views were “flat” 
frames. Mooney and Hunt (2009) followed a similar method in their analysis of the “master 
frame” of food security. The practice of “keying” can identify normative functions of frames and 
illuminate struggles between institutionalized power and outside challengers (Mooney and Hunt 
2009; Eaton et al. 2014).  
In this study, I employ “keying” to unpack many of the issues associated with the biotech 
debate and help to illuminate different interpretations of a similar frame. In the biotechnology 
debate for example, GM proponents may state the benefits of GMOs such as addressing food 
security issues, helping global development and mitigating environmental deterioration. Through 
these frames, proponents wish to reinforce the dominant institutionalized practices currently in 
place with deregulation of biotechnology, free trade, and the concept that optimal welfare comes 
from market exchange of goods. However, opponents will criticize the very concept of 
unregulated free trade and deregulation to solve social ills, instead focusing on the environmental 
risks from GM crops, the smallholder farmer’s loss of agency in the global corporate control of 
GM crops, and promote the benefits of localized sustainable production. Contained within these 
frames are values and visions of what a “good society” embodies. In science and technology 
studies, these normative frames can also be considered as “socio-technological imaginaries” 
where “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order [are] reflected in the design 
and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects” (Levidow & 
	 49 
Papaioannou 2013: 38). These imaginaries promote certain idealized futures achievable through 
technological developments ultimately fulfilling “the public good” (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009: 12). 
Evaluating frames based on their normative functions and idealized futures can contribute to a 
greater understanding of the proponents’ and opponents’ values in the contentious political field 
of biotechnology in the food system and ultimately which “imaginary” prevails in its codification 
into policy.  
 
Congressional Testimony and Influence on Public Policy 
The policy-making process in the U.S. has evolved to include a greater number of 
participants, thus increasing the influence of outside interest groups involved in policy 
deliberations (Boston et al. 2013). Legislators rely on many government and non-government 
experts in decision-making to evaluate the effectiveness and consequences of a proposed policy 
(McGann and Johnson 2006; May et al. 2016). Congressional hearings are informative venues 
for health and environmental policy development with political actors making decisions 
regarding socially and scientifically complex problems (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Liu et al. 
2011; Oleszek 2013). Information presented at congressional hearings by outside experts, 
interest groups or legislators are organized and presented as causal arguments or claims (i.e. 
frames) to promote a certain policy in a convincing way (Andrews 2011; McCammonn et al. 
2001). Members of Congress find value in holding hearings as it provides them with an influx of 
new information on a topic and a venue where they can attempt to exert influence on a policy or 
bill they may be supporting themselves (Kingdon 1989; Gormley 1998; Mattei 1998). Interest 
groups and other experts who are invited to serve as a witness in a hearing also believe their 
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testimony is influential in policy discussions (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Kingdon 2011; 
Smith 1995).  
Congressional hearings are an “underused phenomenon” in the policy development 
process and can provide insight into measures of influence in the political process (Leyden 1995; 
431). Burstein and Hirsh (2007) found in their content analysis of testimony from 66 hearings 
over 20 years (1973-1999) that information provided by supporters of a policy (specifically as it 
relates to policy effectiveness) will increase the likelihood of that policy’s enactment. 
Subsequently information that focuses on the ineffectiveness of a policy by opponents and 
unintended consequences resulting from implementation of that policy decreases likelihood of 
passage. Past policy development research has found that witness testimony on an issue affects 
specific content in federal bills (Burstein 1998; Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Johnson 1995). 
Therefore, by investigating the current congressional hearing testimony surrounding 
biotechnology regulation, I can explore the influential discourses that led to the shaping of the 
recent passage of the federal biotechnology labeling law. However, the ability to testify at a 
congressional hearing is not necessarily an equal access opportunity. All witnesses who testify at 
congressional hearings (whether through oral testimony and/or written) must be invited by a 
legislator on the committee holding the hearing and majority party leaders hold more power than 
others.2 Hence committee hearing witness lists may be more of a reflection of the majority party 
leader’s preferences and biases rather than a well-balanced perspective on an issue. Also, 
specifically for interest groups’ accessibility, Leyden (1995) found that groups with Washington-
																																																						
2	 The majority party leader and members of the majority party can invite any witnesses of their choosing. 
Minority party members on the committee are allowed at least one hearing day to invite witnesses of their 
choice (Davis 2015). In general majority party leaders have the power to invite whomever they deem 
credible and necessary for the hearing. 
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based lobbyists and supporting staff (i.e. more monetary resources) are more likely to build 
relationships with policymakers, gain access to congressional hearings and have a greater 
measure of influence on the policy process. Hence, one would expect that certain interest groups 
and participants reflecting the majority party’s interests and holding greater resources will have 
the greatest influence on the political process through committee hearings. 
 
Methods 
In order to identify hearings related to the regulation of GMOs, the Congress.gov website 
was used to find congressional bills that were introduced into the House of Representatives and 
Senate over the last three sessions (2011-2016) in Congress related to the regulation and/or 
labeling of biotechnology and GMOs. Search terms utilized in the Congress.gov database 
included “biotechnology”, “genetically engineered” and “genetically modified organism.” For 
each bill that was introduced over these three sessions related to biotechnology, the committees 
where that bill was referred to were noted and cross-referenced with the Government Publishing 
Office (GPO) to find hearings for each committee and year where a bill related to biotechnology 
was referred. The GPO is the federal government repository for official information products of 
the U.S. government, including official publications of Congress and the White House (U.S. 
GPO 2017). In addition to searching congressional hearings from the GPO, information and 
hearings were cross-referenced with Proquest Congressional to search for Congressional 
hearings related to biotechnology that also included unpublished hearings.  
A total of eight hearings from these three sessions in Congress were collected that were 
related to regulation and labeling of GMOs (Table 1). Content analysis was performed 
(Neuendorf, 2001; Liu et al., 2015) on each piece of oral and written testimony and statements 
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within each hearing. Each piece of testimony was analyzed by first reading through the data and 
performing open coding to bring forth the main ideas or themes. After initial coding, focused 
coding was performed to identify the most emergent categories and develop a detailed codebook 
(Charmaz 2014) (the coding scheme can be found in Appendix E). Utilizing frame-analytic 
approaches drawn from Snow and Benford (1992), Noakes (2005), Fiss and Hirsch (2005) and 
Mooney and Hunt (2009), transcripts were coded based on how individuals identified the (non)-
problem of GMOs, if and how GMOs could be the solution for present and/or future problems, if 
other alternatives should be explored to solve future problems, and specifically how the 
government should be involved in these solutions. Overall four main categories were identified 
after the coding analysis: 1) the main benefits or risks of GMOs, 2) rationalizations for support 
or opposition to GMOs, 3) proposed solutions in terms of continued support or opposition to 
GMOs, and 4) perspectives specific to the labeling of GMOs including risks of a label, benefits 
of a label and rationalizations for why a label was (un)necessary. Coding was conducted using 
qualitative data software program Atlas.ti. 
 Before coding each testimony, I categorized each actor giving testimony or opening 
statements within each hearing by their institutional affiliation. For the eight hearings under 
study, there were a total of 44 witnesses that testified (See Appendix F for complete listing of 
witnesses, their affiliation, researcher coded affiliation and hearings where they testified). 
Thirteen witnesses (30%) were representatives of various food and grain industries, nine were 
university scientists (20%) in disciplines such as genomics, international development and 
animal science, eight (18%) were government officials representing local state governments or 
federal agencies such as the FDA, EPA or USDA, seven (16%) were farmers or representatives 
from farmer interest groups, five (11%) were from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), one 
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was an author and one was a medical doctor. In addition to the testimony provided by witnesses, 
65 pieces of opening statements and comments from legislators included on the record were 
analyzed and coded. Frequency of codes was noted throughout the coding process as a measure 
of intensity of concern (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Descriptive statistics were derived from how 
many times certain frames were used throughout all of the testimony together, broken down 
temporally by congressional session and by each actor’s affiliation. These descriptive statistics 
provide insight into which frames were most frequently emphasized throughout the pieces of 
testimony. Noting this emphasis gives insight into which frames policymakers were most 
frequently presented with at these hearings, whether from witnesses or other legislators and 
which frames witnesses and legislators providing testimony thought were most effective and 
important to highlight in their abbreviated time with policymakers. The breakdown of results by 
actor affiliation over time offers valuable insight into the policy-making formation process 
surrounding GMOs and GMO labeling and the roles of certain actors in the food policy process.
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Table 2.1 Congressional hearings in the House of Representatives and Senate related to biotechnology regulation from 2011-2016 
Date Title Branch Committee Subcommittee 
112th Session (2011-2012) 
June 23, 2011 Hearing to Review the 
Opportunities and 
Benefits of Agricultural 
Biotechnology 
House of 
Representatives 
Agriculture  Rural Development, 
Research, Biotechnology, 
and Foreign Agriculture 
December 15, 2011 Environmental Risks of 
Genetically Engineered 
Fish 
Senate Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation 
Oceans, Atmosphere, 
Fisheries, and Coast Guard  
113th Session (2013-2014) 
July 9, 2014 Hearing to Consider the 
Societal Benefits of 
Biotechnology 
House of 
Representatives 
Agriculture Horticulture, Research, 
Biotechnology, and 
Foreign Agriculture 
December 10th 2014 Examining FDA’s Role in 
the Regulation of 
Genetically Engineered 
Food Ingredients 
House of 
Representatives 
Energy and Commerce Health 
114th Session (2015-2016) 
March 24, 2015 Examination of the Costs 
and Impacts of Mandatory 
Biotechnology Labeling 
Laws 
House of 
Representatives 
Agriculture - 
June 18, 2015 Biotechnology Food 
Labeling Standards 
House of 
Representatives 
Energy and Commerce Health 
June 25, 2015 Hearing to Review USDA 
Marketing Programs 
House of 
Representatives 
Agriculture Biotechnology, 
Horticulture. and Research 
October 21, 2015 Agriculture 
Biotechnology: A Look at 
Federal Regulation and 
Stakeholder Perspectives 
Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, 
and Forestry  
- 
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Results 
 
 Appendix E illustrates the coding scheme for the testimony from all eight Congressional 
hearings in percentages divided by actor affiliation within each session of Congress. The 
majority of witnesses (36 out of 44, 82%) who were invited to testify were in favor of GMOs and 
generally opposed to statewide labels. The majority of legislators (56 out of 65, 83%) were also 
in favor of GMOs and generally opposed to statewide labels (Figure 1). Collecting all testimony 
and legislator statements together, out of 109 pieces of individual testimony and statements 
coded, 83% were in favor of GMOs and generally opposed to statewide labels. A total of 19 
(17%) pieces of testimony were in opposition to GMOs and generally in favor of labels, whether 
state or federal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Total number of witnesses who testified in congressional hearings (2011-2016)  
 
Evolution of Frames 
 
Looking at the Congressional testimony frames over time, there is a stark shift in the 
frames utilized in the 112 Congresses for proponents and opponents compared to the 113 and 
114 Congresses (Table 2). 
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Figure 2.1 Total number of witnesses and legislators who testified or commented in 
congressional hearings (2011-2016) related to the regulation of biotechnology by 
affiliation and organized by general support or opposition to GMOs 
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Table 1.2 Most frequently used frames by GMO proponents and opponents categorized by legislative session 
 
 
 
 
 112th Congress (2011-2012) 113th Congress (2013-2014) 114th Congress (2015-2016) 
GMO 
proponents most 
frequently used 
frames 
1) Importance of innovation 
(19.8%) 
 
2) Food security benefits (12.0%) 
  
Scientific evidence shows it is safe 
(12.0%) 
 
3) Environmental benefits (11.2%) 
1) Scientific evidence shows it is 
safe (14.3%) 
 
2) Economic risks with a label 
(10.3%) 
 
3) Farmer Benefits (8.7%) 
 
We need uniformity with a labeling 
system – state labels are confusing 
(8.7%) 
1) Scientific evidence shows it is 
safe (12.1%) 
 
2) Economic risks with a label 
(10.7%) 
 
3) Consumer Rights - A label will 
only confuse consumers (8.2%) 
 
Environmental Benefits (8.2%) 
GMO opponents 
most frequently 
used frames 
1) We need broader oversight and 
better expertise for GMO 
regulation (23.7%) 
 
2) We need to exercise caution 
before approving GE (11.1%) 
 
3) We need more scientific 
evidence (10.4%) 
1) This is a consumer right to know 
issue (36.4%) 
 
2) Environmental risks (12.7%) 
 
3) We need uniformity in a labeling 
system – need a federal label 
(10.9%) 
1) This is a consumer right to 
know issue (23.3%) 
 
2) A label would not be a warning 
– only information (13.7%) 
 
3) Environmental risks (12.3%) 
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The only proponent frame that is consistently used throughout all three Congresses is the 
scientific evidence of safety, utilized most frequently in proponents’ testimony in the 113 
Congress (14.3% of testimony) and 114 Congress (12.1%) and second most frequently (12.0%) 
in the 112 Congress. Hence proponents attempted to depoliticize the issue by focusing on the 
purely scientific aspects of the technology, illegitimate of social regulation. Furthermore, if the 
government was going to pass any sort of policy, it should be based on the best available science. 
Val Giddings, Senior Fellow at the Information, Technology and Innovation Foundation stated 
from the 2015 hearing on H.R. 1599 The Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act: 
 
The bipartisan endorsement supporting the science-based approach 
to regulation that has been in place in the United States for the past 
four decades has been absolutely essential and made it possible for 
this technology to be developed, adapted and disseminated. The 
intention of H.R. 1599, to extend this legacy of bipartisan support 
for science-based regulations, is important as special interests seek 
to undermine its credibility and authority with false claims and ill-
considered policy proposals at every level, particularly the state 
level (Biotechnology Food Labeling… 2015). 
 
Tied within this quote about the primacy of science-based regulations in government policy is 
biotechnology’s dependence on those science-based regulations to thrive as an innovative 
science. 
 
112 Congress (2011-2012) 
For the 112 Congress the importance of innovation was the most popular frame utilized 
by proponents of technology and resonated well as it was a frequently used frame across all 
actors (27.3% for academic, 14% for farmers, 17.4% for industry and 18.2% for legislators). The 
frame contended that if the safety of GMOs was questioned by the federal government (either 
through stronger regulations or blatant statements questioning their safety), innovation would 
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greatly suffer which could have detrimental impacts on the U.S.’s leadership in biotech 
innovation, global rising populations, and a changing climate. In the 2011 Hearing to Review the 
Opportunities and Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology, Charles Conner, the President of the 
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives stated: 
Without a doubt, the next generation of biotech crops will continue 
to increase crop yields helping U.S. producers feed and clothe the 
world. The U.S. must continue to lead the way with innovation, 
product development, and the acceptance of biotech crops (6). 
 
The importance of supporting innovation, science-based regulation and scientific evidence all 
hinged on the major benefits GMOs afforded or could afford for the future. Witnesses and 
legislators proclaimed the food security (12.0%) and environmental benefits (11.2%) of GMOs, 
which again resonated well with witnesses and legislators as these frames were cited frequently 
across all actors. Dr. Claestous Juma states: 
Today, growing human numbers given, the problem is to feed 
them. However, skeptics cast a dark shadow over the prospect of 
using biotechnology to address the global food crisis. The United 
States has been a leading light in agricultural biotechnology and 
continues to serve as an important role model for countries around 
the world seeking to address the challenge of food security 
(Hearing Opportunities and Benefits of Ag Biotech 2011: 18).  
 
Timothy Johnson (R-IL), the Chair of the Subcommittee on Rural Development, 
Research, Biotechnology, and Foreign Agriculture stated: 
In our daily lives, we are inundated with statistics. Among the 
most poignant are those dealing with population projections and 
the resulting demand on our food production systems to provide 
food security into the future. The United Nations is predicting that 
our population will grow by 1/3 by halfway through the century. 
Feeding the 9.1 billion people on the planet would require a 70 
percent increase in ag production (Hearing Opportunities and 
Benefits of Ag Biotech 2011: 1).  
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He goes on to state that our options include producing on “lands with fragile soils and poor water 
resources or we can make the smart choice of increasing the production capacity of plants and 
animals themselves”, essentially reached through biotechnology development (1). GMO 
proponents also cited environmental benefits including decreases in pesticide applications and 
less soil erosion with the growth of biotech crops. 
Opponent frames in the 112 Congress mostly called for increased regulation and broader 
government oversight (23.7%). The hearing from this Congress was focused on the approval of 
GE fish, specifically the commercialization of the AquaAdvantage GE salmon. Witnesses and 
legislators referred to additional governmental bodies who should oversee the approval of the 
fish, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) or the Fish and 
Wildlife Service instead of only the FDA’s Center for Veterinary Medicine, which regularly 
approves animal drugs. Opponents to the approval of the GE fish questioned whether the GE fish 
should be interpreted as an animal drug in the first place and if the FDA should be the sole 
agency to determine food safety and environmental impacts before approval. Senator Olympia 
Snow (ME-R) stated in her testimony, “The FDA is using an approval process originally created 
to review new animal drugs that the agency has interpreted to include genetically engineered or 
modified fish. This is an outdated and inadequate approach to evaluating a technology of this 
magnitude (Environmental Risks GE Fish, 2011: 4). She goes on to recommend that the “FDA 
should be capitalizing on NOAA’s expertise in marine ecology, aquaculture, and the protection 
of threatened and endangered living resources by engaging NOAA in a formal consultative 
process (4). Dr. John Epifanio, a fish conservation geneticist at University of Illinois stated: 
Specific expertise in the biology of the species in question are 
crucial. Certainly FDA has experience with food and drug science, 
where as other Federal agencies and state agencies are more versed 
in salmon biology and the unique qualities on the environment that 
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they generally occupy – specifically NOAA, Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the states (Environmental Risks GE Fish 2011: 30). 
 
Frames also focused on the need to stress caution in the approval of GE fish as this would 
set a precedent for the approval of future GE animals (which many opponents saw as future 
unfettered approval with lax oversight and consideration). Paul Greenberg, author of Four Fish: 
The Future of the Last Wild Food stated in his testimony: 
How Congress and the Food and Drug Administration address the 
application for the first genetically engineered animal destined for 
human consumption will set a precedent for all applications for GE 
fish that follow it. While science cannot predict with certainty what 
the outcomes will be if engineered fish escape into natural 
ecosystems, given what is at stake, considerable caution is 
warranted (Environmental Risks GE Fish 2011: 45).  
 
Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (D-WV), chair of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation stated: 
Hopefully this hearing will serve as a call to reason and bring 
greater attention to these concerns. Because again, it’s not just 
about this one company or this one fish. It’s about the precedent 
that may be set. There is potential in GE animals, but we need to 
make sure that we fully understand the risks involved, so that we 
not live in regret unleashing the environmental equivalent of a 
Pandora’s Box (Environmental Risks GE Fish 2011: 69). 
 
Overall, opponent witnesses and legislators focused their testimony on the need for 
greater oversight and caution in government regulatory processes. These calls for oversights 
were seen by GMO proponents at the time as hindering innovation, investment and the growth of 
the biotechnology sector, further hindering the social progress society could make with 
biotechnology for the future. 
 
	 61 
113 and 114 Congresses (2013-2016) 
As the GMO labeling movement gained momentum, frames utilized by GMO opponents 
in the 113 and 114 Congress began to shift to frames focused on individualized consumer rights, 
transparency, and access to information. The “consumer right to know” frame became the most 
frequently used frame throughout all of the opponents’ testimony for the 113 (26.4%) and 114 
(23.3%) Congresses. These frames resonated well across all witnesses and legislators who spoke 
in favor of GMO labels. For government witnesses and legislators in the 113 Congress the 
“consumer right to know” frame encompassed the majority of their testimony (61.5% and 60% 
respectively). And for all groups of opponents to GMOs across both congressional sessions, the 
consumer right to know frame was most frequently referenced.  
Todd Daloz, Assistant Attorney General for the state of Vermont gave testimony at the 
hearing for the Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act in 2015 that would have set federal 
standards for voluntary labels of GMOs and outlawed any state-mandated labeling laws. Daloz 
stated: 
The proposed bill would deprive American consumers of 
information they want to have when deciding what foods to eat and 
how to spend their money…Insisting that this information be kept 
from consumers is profoundly disrespectful of the American 
consumer’s right and ability to make intelligent, informed choices 
(Biotechnology Food Labeling… 2015). 
 
 Opponents also discussed how inclusion of a label would not be interpreted as a “warning 
label” to consumers (about which many proponents of GMOs and opponents of labels warned). 
Gary Hirschberg, the CEO for Stoneyfield yogurt and the founding member of the “Just Label It” 
campaign stated, “I know from experience that a value-neutral disclosure will not cause sudden 
shifts in consumer behavior. In fact, a recent five-year study of consumer data confirmed that 
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American consumers will not view a GMO disclosure as a warning” (Ag Biotech…Fed. 
Regulation, Stakeholder Persp. 2015: 39). Along with calls for a label and the need to access 
information, opponents also cited environmental risks from GMOs including actual increases in 
herbicide sprayings with the planting of GMOs and the deleterious effect this could have on 
waterways and cropland. 
Witnesses testifying against a GMO label now included representatives from the food 
industry as well as government, academic and science-advocacy groups. The focus of their 
testimony changed from potential benefits GMOs could provide, such as food security or 
innovation leadership in the U.S., to the detrimental socio-economic impacts a label could have 
on local businesses, consumers and farmers. While GMO proponents in the 113 and 114 
Congresses still tried to depoliticize the issue of GMOs by stating that scientific evidence shows 
they are safe, the second most popular frame utilized was the economic risks with a label. Costs 
would increase for manufacturers to repackage products, separate ingredients, and liability would 
increase for a company if an unlabeled product was found on a store shelf accidently. Testimony 
specifically focused on how interstate commerce would suffer with a state label and how these 
increased costs would be passed down to the consumer, increasing the price of food. Witnesses 
highlighted that small local businesses would be impacted the most by the inclusion of a label. 
Thomas Dempsey, President of the Snack Food Association stated in his 2015 testimony, “To be 
clear, the hardest hit by this will be one-plant operators with a single line of production. These 
costs could put family-owned businesses out of business and increase consolidation of the 
industry” (35). Witnesses attempted to make the connection that an increase in manufacturing 
costs with a label would not only be felt by large multinational businesses but the small, local 
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companies as well. Witnesses also discussed how a label would not fulfill any sort of “consumer 
rights” but only create more confusion in the marketplace.  
These statements of economic risks and consumer confusion with state labels paved the 
way for an argument about the need for uniformity in a labeling system, essentially arguing for a 
voluntary federal standard. G.K. Butterfield (R-NC) stated that “a patchwork of differing state 
laws” would “only cause confusion and do little to provide greater transparency” (Biotechnology 
Food Labeling… 2015). He went on to state in his testimony that: 
Without a federal standard, those farmers and manufacturers will 
be forced to comply with uneven, costly and potentially misleading 
and onerous state-by-state mandates. Compliance will require new, 
costly supply chain infrastructure that will disrupt the nation’s food 
supply, cause confusion and uncertainty (2015).  
 
Farmer benefits from GMOs were also cited slightly more prominently in the 113 
Congress. Joanna Lidback, a small dairy farmer from Vermont, was called upon to testify at 
three different hearings within the 113 and 114 Congresses. She spoke twice to the House of 
Representatives Committee on Agriculture (in 2014 and 2015) as well as the Senate in 2015. Her 
testimony mostly focused on the benefits of GMOs to her small dairy farm, such as higher crop 
yields and thus higher income for her family. She stated in her testimony on the benefits awarded 
by biotechnology, “We believe in the science and the capability of biotechnology and its role in 
protecting the sustainability of our farm. Biotech crops are essential to feeding our cows and 
calves [and] GMOs are also key to our economic sustainability” (Hearing…Societal Benefits of 
Biotechnology 2014: 28). She goes on to state, “I am happy to continue to speak up for our right 
to farm in the best way we know possible; which in our case includes biotechnology and the use 
of GMOs” (31). Here farmer benefits were framed in helping a small, local Northeastern farmer 
	 64 
(rather than the large monoculture type farms tied to agribusinesses) and the freedom and 
capabilities GMO practices awarded these types of farmers. 
 
Discussion 
The majority of witnesses invited to testify on the issue of biotechnology were in favor of 
biotechnology and represented the grain or food industry, even as the momentum for GMO 
labeling began to build. In fact, as time went on, the breadth of proponent witnesses increased 
including NGOs, government officials and a medical doctor to supplement farmers, academics 
and industry. This is likely reflective of the preferences and policy opinions of the chairmen of 
each of these committees. Out of the eight hearings under study, seven of the committees (and/or 
subcommittees) were chaired by legislators who made positive claims about GMOs.3 Therefore, 
the ratio of GM supporters to GM critics in these hearings suggests an orchestrated policy move 
by committee chairs who were pushing for the continued deregulation of GMOs. This makes the 
eventual passage of the labeling law that much more significant, because majority opinion in 
committee hearings alone did not equate to policy passage. 
In the 112 session of Congress, proponents of GMOs seemed to control the overall 
discussion of biotech regulation by emphasizing the positive, moral and economic potential 
benefits GMOs held for the future. GMO opponents followed this rhetorical trend with their 
frames and rationales based on the concept that biotechnology would stay on a trajectory of 
continued development and innovation. Therefore, they stated that we need to institute better, 
more thorough governmental oversight to increase accountability. Both proponents and 
																																																						
3 The only hearing where the chairman did not make explicit statements in support of GMOs was the one 
concerning the approval of GE fish where the majority of witnesses in that hearing were against GE 
salmon commercialization. 
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opponents acknowledged the inevitable scientific progress with GMOs. Opponents just 
emphasized the need for a few more checks and balances along the way. However, these “checks 
and balances” never came to fruition as there were no major regulatory changes in approval and 
commercialization of GMOs and the GE salmon (under debate in the 2011 hearing) was 
approved by the FDA in November 2015 with no references to greater or broader oversight by 
other government agencies (Pollack 2015).  
With the success of the state GMO labeling campaigns across the U.S. beginning in 2012, 
labeling began to appear more prominently on the national political agenda. The labeling 
movement was building momentum, sharing resources across states, and mobilizing more 
individuals and interest groups. Social movement actors expressed their grievances through a 
consumer rights frame and increased access to information. This individualized rights frame used 
by critics of GMOs could also be considered a “master frame” that is able to reach a broad range 
of interest groups and can culturally resonate with audiences over time (Snow and Benford 
1992). In Rahn et al.’s (2016) study of frames used in raw milk legalization, individualism was 
found to be a successful master frame used by supporters of raw milk sale legalization. The 
opponents’ consumer/individualized rights frame forced GMO proponents to abandon their 
idealized “socio-technological imaginaries” (Jasanoff and Kim 2009; 120) of biotechnology 
leading to idealized futures (food security and environmental benefits) in GMO debates and 
instead focus on socio-economic risks (on consumers, farmers, and businesses) linked to the 
inclusion of a label. The reframing strategies by GMO opponents changed the terms of the 
debate to consider socio-economic benefits and risks in the greater debate around biotechnology, 
confronting the scientism-only rhetoric in past biotechnology regulation discussions.  
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In this new form of food politics where consumers are turning to the market to 
demonstrate their environmental, social, economic and political preferences through purchasing 
decisions, it is understandable why a consumer rights frame gained such popularity and success 
in the public and political arena. Defined as “reflexive consumption” (Goodman and Dupuis 
2002) or “conscientious consumerism” (Bartley et al. 2015), consumers make purchasing 
decisions based on the environmental or socio-economic characteristics of the product they 
support, such as Fair Trade certified, organic certification or “green” environmentally friendly 
products (Kysar 2004; Neilson 2010; Soper 2004; Micheletti 2003; Bostrom and Klintman 
2008). Consumers can express their “politics via markets” (Lipschutz and Rowe 2005). In order 
for consumers to participate in this new form of food politics, they must have access to 
information about the food product, which requires food manufacturers to be transparent about 
their production methods through labels. Hence a “consumer’s right to know” rhetoric and a call 
for “informative labels only” empower consumers to make better decisions regarding their food 
choices and embody normative notions of larger participation and accountability by citizen-
consumers (Mol 2015). GMO opponents’ shifting of frames from increased regulation to 
increased information through market mechanisms reflect the neoliberalization of food and 
agricultural sectors and the success of the labeling movements in the states. 
The GMO opponents’ reframing of the GMO regulation and safety issue to a GMO 
labeling issue forced GMO proponents to reframe their argument to defend socio-economic 
concerns that had not been deemed legitimate in past biotechnology regulatory debates. In 
previous biotechnology controversies, such as the commercialization and labeling of rBGH 
within the U.S. and specifically Vermont, socio-economic interests of farmers and consumer 
demand were not sufficient to warrant delay in the GE hormone’s approval or to force inclusion 
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of a label, as the principles of scientism were invoked in this regulatory debate (Kinchy et al. 
2008). However, in the 113 and 114 sessions of Congress, socio-economic concerns had become 
the leading concerns for labeling proponents and opponents. While labeling opponents still 
attempted to depoliticize GMOs by highlighting scientific evidence demonstrating safety, they 
also argued that economic interests of businesses, farmers and consumer confusion were enough 
to warrant the absence of a label. In the later sessions of Congress, labeling opponents also 
attempted to highlight farmer socio-economic benefits of GMOs and detrimental economic 
impacts for small farmers if a label was required. Joanna Lidback, a small local dairy farmer was 
invited to testify in three different hearings, rather than the President of the National Council of 
Farmer Cooperatives and the National Corn Growers Association (who had submitted testimony 
in the 112 Congress). In a 2015 hearing, Lidback describes her farm as a “50-cow dairy in the 
beautiful Northeast Kingdom of Vermont. In addition to selling our milk to the co-op we…raise 
Jersey steers to sell beef locally…producing food for our little corner of the world” (Agriculture 
Biotechnology: A Look at Federal Regulation and Stakeholder Perspectives: 35). With the 
inclusion of smaller farmers talking about their local food production and direct-sale marketing, 
labeling opponents may have been trying to highlight how GMOs can benefit small and local 
farmers and their communities, invoking “localism”, a recurrent theme in food activism 
associated with food democracy, civic agriculture and social justice (Hassanein 2003; Lyson 
2004; Barnett et al. 2005; DuPuis and Goodman 2005). “Localism” frames have also been 
identified as “master frames” along with individualism and anti-statism, capable of resonating 
with broad audiences (Snow and Benford 1992). In the 2014 Hearing to Consider the Societal 
Benefits of Biotechnology, Lidback paints a localist, pastoral image, describing her farm as a site 
of “rolling green hills and the cows grazing quietly in the pasture…taking note of the humble 
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nature of our small farm” (30). Labeling opponents may have been attempting to use this type of 
frame to resonate with members of the local food movement and connect with audiences of the 
state labeling movements as well, since many small organic farmers were a significant base of 
grassroots membership and mobilization for the state labeling campaigns (Clark et al. 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
 By looking at the policy process through the analysis of frames within congressional 
hearings, we can observe policy development through a “behind the scenes” perspective that 
illuminates information legislators draw upon to make a policy decision. As committee hearings 
are considered the “principal vehicle for gathering and analyzing information” in the U.S. 
Congress (Arnold 1990: 85), analysis of the frames utilized in these hearings provided an in-
depth look at the strategic discourses employed to influence the policy process. The passage of 
the federal labeling bill in 2016 by Congress demonstrates the power of numerous small-scale 
movements to scale up to the federal level. As evidenced through various education, 
environmental and health care reform policies, changes adopted at the state level can propel or 
expedite changes at the federal level (Clark et al. 2014; Wohlers 2013). The consumer right to 
know frame was a successful collective action frame for change at the state level and was 
strategically utilized at a larger scale in hopes of similar success. The consumer right to know 
frame was also able to undermine the depoliticizing frames that proponents of GMOs and 
defenders of the status quo had used in the past and forced them to adopt new frames to address 
socio-economic issues. Therefore in this federal policy debate about biotechnology, socio-
economic concerns (consumer information, economic impacts on farmers and businesses, 
consumer confusion) became a central point of contention within the halls of Congress.   
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 However, does the passage of S.764 truly “change the rules of the game” in considering 
socio-economic issues in biotechnology regulation? The new law mandates a uniform federal 
standard for the labeling of GM foods through a variety of options (text, QR code, symbol). The 
rhetoric of this law is to provide more information to consumers in a variety of ways to allow 
them to make better-informed decisions. Supporters of GMO labeling have already become wary 
of the idealized promises from this bill, as multiple ways of labeling may confuse consumers and 
discriminate against those who do not own smartphones or have access to broadband internet 
service. Activist groups that were involved in the state labeling initiatives are disappointed and 
frustrated with this federal outcome. Food and Water Watch, an environmental organization 
based out of New York described how the federal bill “undermines consumer choice” and “rolls 
back democracy” (Fried 2016). The Vermont Attorney General Bill Sorrell called it a “very 
industry-friendly proposal” and “a joke” (Bradley 2016). For state labeling activists, this was not 
the federal solution they were hoping for. While the consumer rights frame may have been used 
effectively by GMO opponents to award a federal GMO label, GMO proponents’ use of frames 
focused on the need for uniformity in labels and economic risks with state labels may have also 
been effective to warrant the inclusion of preemption on the federal bill. This particular clause in 
the federal bill preempts any states from passing their own GMO labeling laws or outlaws any 
already passed (i.e. Vermont). Therefore, the federal law appears to have the dual intention of 
requiring uniform labels while simultaneously stopping future passage of state labeling laws.  
Furthermore, standards for this labeling law have yet to be written so it is unclear exactly 
which foods will carry the label. While socio-economic concerns were referenced more often in 
these congressional hearings, the majority of these concerns were centered around an 
individualized consumer right to know rather than collective consumer or farmer welfare. Will 
	 70 
any of these additional socio-economic welfare concerns (while referenced more often in later 
sessions of Congress but still were not the majority) be embedded within the standards for the 
GMO label? Many activists in the movement are concerned with corporate power tied to G 
crops, the diminishment of the small family farm, and the environmental risks with increased 
herbicide and pesticide use associated with herbicide-resistant GMOs. However not all GM 
crops on the market (and future ones in development) are tied to large corporations or result in 
increases in herbicides or pesticides sprayed. For example, the GM Hawaiian papaya was 
developed by public sector scientists to resist the papaya ringspot virus, which destroyed the 
lucrative crop industry in the late 1990s and early 2000s but has since recovered tremendously 
(Voosen 2011). While these types of public-sector GM crops are the minority of GM crop 
production currently in the U.S., similar public-sector projects focused on developing more 
nutritious and productive crops are in the pipeline globally (Hoffman 2016). Would these types 
of GM crops receive the same label as Monsanto-owned, herbicide-resistant corn? While values-
based standards have become prominent to differentiate products and develop alternative 
markets (Bartley et al. 2015; Dupuis and Gillon 2009), standards will usually incorporate more 
technical, scientific language under the guise of easier compliance (especially for larger 
industries) (Timmermans and Epstein 2010; Guthman 2003; Hess 2007; Jaffee and Howard 
2010; Jaffee 2012). This is evident in the organic movement where originally organic standards 
were meant to reflect ecological farming techniques such as crop rotation, biological pest control 
or composting. However, with larger industries wishing to bear the label, the organic standard 
changed to referencing a list of allowable, restricted and prohibited inputs (Guthman 2003). This 
discrete definition allowed many, larger industries to enter into the market achieving the lowest 
common denominator of organic production requirements and less commitment to the full range 
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of ecological farming techniques that were originally espoused at the beginning of the organic 
movement (Hess 2007; Szasz 2007; Guthman 2003). Can the standards for a GM label take into 
account the social, economic and environmental concerns voiced throughout these biotechnology 
debates?  
This trend toward reliance on technical scientific standards has been observed in the Non-
GMO Project, the third-party certification label which bases its standards on thresholds from 
genetic testing to observe the percentage of GM DNA contained in the food product. Under the 
guise of transparency and accountability, the Non-GMO Project legitimizes its standard through 
testable technoscientific norms while the organic industry has criticized these standards for 
undermining the holistic environmental practices reflected in the organic label (Bain and Selfa 
2017). Moore et al. (2011) state, “Operating within a framework of scientistic regulation can 
result in policy changes advocated by activists but it can also mean accepting a narrowly defined 
basis for technology regulation…the strategy can unintentionally contribute to scientiziation” 
(524). The neoliberalization in the food and agriculture sector appears to limit the strategies and 
goals of activist groups to those that favor continued neoliberalization of the food industry such 
as those promoting individualized shopping practices. However activist groups did not only cite 
consumer right to know issues in their testimony against GMOs. Activists cited environmental, 
sustainability, human health and socio-economic risks with the use of GMOs, none of which may 
be addressed with the new labeling law. Future scholarship should examine the standards of 
S.764, the prominent players writing the standards, and which features of GM crops are 
considered in the label. 
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Chapter 3: Local Frames, Local Success: Case Studies of Genetically Modified Organism 
(GMO) Labeling Initiatives in the Northeast, US. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The introduction of biotechnology into the food system through genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) has ignited fierce debate about the moral, ethical and safety issues behind the 
application of this technology. Critics of the technology and a concerned public, have called for a 
mandatory GMO label on all food products. While a U.S. federal labeling bill was stagnant in 
Congress, initiatives for GMO labeling emerged throughout the U.S. on a state-by-state basis. In 
this paper, I examine state specific case studies in the Northeast including Vermont, Connecticut, 
Maine, Massachusetts and New York, where there has been a range of activity surrounding the 
formation of GMO labeling policy. I take a mixed-methods approach, combining interviews with 
key informants and content analysis of oral testimony from statewide public hearings to gain an 
understanding of the ways in which various stakeholders and the public frame the issue of GMOs 
and GMO labeling in their specific state. I examine framings, that is, ways in which individuals 
formulate arguments to convey specific meanings, to identify connections between types of 
framing and success in passage of a labeling law. Results indicate that frames focused on civic 
agriculture in Vermont enhanced community solidarity and led to more effective strategies in the 
state to pass a GMO labeling law. Framings tied to state socio-economic concerns may resonate 
within the community most effectively to advance small-scale progressive policy change.   
 
 
Introduction  
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or food produced with genetic engineering (GE) 
have become contentious for the social, economic, cultural, environmental and health 
implications they encompass. The biotechnology industry, as well as some scientists and farmers 
proclaim the many benefits of biotechnology, such as labor efficiencies for farmers (field-wide 
spraying rather than weed-by-weed efforts), decreases in pesticide use, and the potential to feed 
an ever-growing population in a changing climate (drought-resistant, disease-resistant, and 
nutritionally-enhanced crops, etc.) (Saletan 2015; NAS 2016; Asis 2017; Curchoe 2017). 
However, opponents contend that GMOs in fact increase herbicide/pesticide use, lack a body of 
independent scientific research verifying safety, contribute to loss of cultural traditions, further 
concentrate the role of corporations in the agricultural sector, erode farmer agency and contribute 
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to weed and pest resistance thus increasing the use of evermore toxic chemicals (Benbrook 2012; 
Kaur et al. 2013; Thompson 2014; Consumer Reports 2015; Cassidy 2016; FOE 2017). 
Public sentiment surrounding GMOs has also remained skeptical. According to a poll 
conducted in 2016, 52% of the public believe GMOs are unsafe and 93% of the public believe 
the government should require the labeling of GMOs (ABC 2016). Due to the public’s 
uncertainty and distrust towards the proclaimed benefits of GMOs and a lack of movement in the 
legislative or regulatory domains for GMO moratoriums or bans (Walsh-Dilley 2009; Pechlaner 
2012), state initiatives emerged in the early 2010s to address the need to label foods containing 
GMOs or produced through GE. Early movements in the West (California, Oregon, Washington, 
Colorado) saw limited success with ballot referendums to label GMOs, failing by relatively close 
margins. However, the labeling movement began to see some success in legislative campaigns in 
the Northeast following the partial passage of labeling bills in Connecticut and Maine and full 
passage in Vermont in 2014. As these Northeast states provide a unique set of case studies in 
which to examine the mixed outcomes of success, failure, and stagnation in GMO labeling 
legislation, I look at the labeling initiatives in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New York and 
Vermont. Using a frame-analysis approach, I examine the discourses used by the public and 
stakeholders involved in GMO labeling initiatives to understand how labeling activists and 
opponents are framing the issue of GMOs and GMO labeling and what types of frames in each 
policy-making arena led to policy change or stagnation. I apply a mixed-methods approach, 
combining content analysis of over 700 pieces of public testimony from the state-wide hearings 
on the issue of GMO labeling, supplemented by fifty-six interviews with diverse stakeholders 
(environmental groups, consumer advocacy organizations, farmer advocacy groups, 
biotechnology representatives, state legislators, and the food industry) involved in the state 
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labeling debates. Together this data set is used to explore how GMOs are framed across these 
different states, which frames resonate with the public, and if different frames led to distinct 
outcomes in terms of statewide labeling policies.  
In this paper, I argue that Vermont’s ability to utilize frames focused on the state’s 
agricultural identity and maintaining the viability of its “civic agriculture” was an effective 
strategy for enactment of a GMO labeling bill. Lyson (2004) coined the term “civic agriculture” 
to describe locally based food production “tightly linked to a community’s social and economic 
development” and “characterized by networks of producers who are bound together by place” (1, 
63). Civic agriculture can be manifested in farmer markets, community supported agriculture 
(CSA) programs, community gardens, food co-ops, food hubs or “pick your own” operations. A 
key feature of civic agriculture is the opportunity for community embeddedness within 
agriculture and food production (Hinrichs 2000; Jacques and Collins 2003; Schnell 2007). In a 
time of greater uncoupled production and consumption in agricultural production, civic 
agriculture provides the opportunity for “forums where producers and consumers can come 
together to solidify bonds of local identity and solidarity” (Lyson 2004: 7). Therefore, frames 
focused on Vermont’s unique social and agricultural identity tied to its small farms and 
community based livelihoods, ultimately created a “gap or conflict discourse” of Vermonters 
versus GMO agriculture (Walgrave and Manseens 2005: 122) that resonated well within the 
state. While the four other states in this study reflect varying levels or characteristics of civic 
agriculture, activists for labeling did not as readily draw upon these frames in their arguments for 
a GMO label, instead focusing on the widespread and more mainstream frames of a consumer 
right to know and public health risks. I explore why these frames may not have resonated as well 
with state legislators to enact additional state labeling laws. This paper is organized as follows. 
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In the next section, I discuss the analytical framework that guided my methods and data 
collection, followed by an overview of frames used in the biotechnology debates. I then give a 
summary of past state labeling initiatives followed by a description of the methods I employed, 
and the analysis of public testimony and interviews. Drawing upon my data, I illustrate how 
Vermont’s distinctive use of frames focused on alternative, sustainable agriculture in their state 
and the threat of GM corporate power on their democratic rights helped personalize the issue of 
GM agriculture in the state, thus leading to the passage of a state GMO labeling bill. In the final 
sections, I discuss my conclusions and the implications for the future of GMO labeling in the 
context of a new federal labeling law. 
 
Framing and Policy Development 
Political actors, including advocacy organizations, legislators, environmental groups and 
interest groups, attempt to recruit members of the public to favor a particular policy decision 
over alternatives by creating messages or narratives. When political actors believe that a policy 
change is necessary they may attempt to frame the issue by trying “to raise the salience of a 
particular aspect of a problem or of a particular solution to the problem” (Baumgartner et al., 
2009, 167). If political actors are able to identify a new or different definition of the problem (i.e. 
frame the issue in a new or different way), it may help to justify a different solution to the 
problem (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Baumgartner et al. 2009). Frames can be defined as 
“mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” (Entman 
1993; 53) and serve as interpretive frameworks that allow people to make sense of a situation 
(Goffman 1974). Research has shown how social movements will frame issues to effect 
motivation to mobilize (Feindt and Netherwood 2011). Successful frames must not only identify 
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the problem and solutions but specifically must resonate with people to motivate them to act 
(Tarrow 1994; Johnston and Noakes 2005). Frames that successfully resonate with the masses 
and motivate them to act can be referred to as “collective action frames” (Benford and Snow 
2000). Collective action frames are “action-oriented beliefs and meanings that inspire and 
legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Benford and Snow 
2000, 614).	In social movement research, collective action frames are of interest because they 
must be powerful and influential enough to motivate individuals to act in opposition to elitist 
frames expressed by authoritative actors that usually reinforce the status quo (Noakes 2005). One 
area of particular interest for this study is the creation and strength of “master frames,” defined 
by Snow and Benford (1992) as collective action frames at a much larger scale that are able to 
resonate with broader audiences. If a master frame is more inclusive then it can appeal to a much 
wider audience. They write, “We assume that the more central the ideas and meanings of a 
proffered framing to the ideology of the targets of mobilization, the greater its hierarchical 
salience within that larger belief system and the greater its ‘narrative fidelity’” (141).	For 
example, food security and sustainability frames have been identified as “master frames” or 
“consensus frames” because of their ability to unite wide-ranging groups and interests in social 
movements, as have the frames of individualism, anti-statism, and localism (Mooney and Hunt 
2009; Kessler et al. 2016; Rahn et al. 2016). When an issue is able to resonate with a broad 
audience, irrespective of context in time or place, it may have a greater likelihood of remaining 
on the political agenda and lead to mobilization or action. 
Framing is a process also utilized by powerful actors to maintain their hegemonic 
positions (Maeseele 2010), considered “official frames” (Noakes 2005). While “official frames” 
usually enjoy a privileged position of acceptance among legislators or decision makers due to 
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greater control over financial or authoritative resources (Giddens 1987; Noakes 2005) and 
“familiarity is more likely to breed acceptance than contempt” (Noakes 2005: 12), construction 
of an official frame does not guarantee success if the frame does not resonate with the cultural 
values and beliefs of the public (Noakes 2005). Therefore, in evaluating the trajectory of any 
social movement or policy change, it is important to evaluate powerful actors’ “official frames”. 
In the GMO labeling debates were these “official frames” able to maintain their privileged 
position of acceptance among legislators and the public, or were opponent activists able to garner 
enough public support to upend the status quo and pursue their respective policy goals? 
In the social movement and policy change literature, past studies have shown that 
stakeholders identifying multiple frames to explain a problem or highlight a solution increases 
the likelihood of successfully resonating with the public. Rahn et al. (2016) found that supporters 
of raw-milk sale legalization in the U.S. drew upon multiple frames to gain widespread support 
including health benefits, personal freedom, anti-big government regulation and support of local 
food. Haydu (2012) used the term “frame brokerage” to demonstrate how broad coalitions 
accommodating diverse framing help translate movement goals into the languages of different 
audiences and can help draw them to action based on the identity and mission of that particular 
group. Utilizing multiple, integrative frames can provide a multidimensional “package” of 
frames that can appeal to a wider audience (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Haydu 2012; Mondou et al. 
2014) rather than diluting messages that become too broad and ineffective.  
This study’s comparative analysis connecting different framings to policy change 
explores a novel phenomenon that adds to social movement and policy studies literatures. 
Science communication research has looked at the effect of framings, particularly in climate 
change communication, on the public’s climate-related beliefs, concerns and behavior, but not 
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necessarily on the passage or failure of a particular climate change policy (Akerlof et al. 2010; 
Myers et al. 2012; McComas et al. 2015). Since minimal research has been conducted on 
movement actors’ frames and the frames available to them through stakeholder groups 
(Steinberg 1998), this research helps fill that gap by identifying major stakeholder frames 
through interviews as well popular frames utilized by the public through public testimony. And 
while it may be difficult to identify distinct social movement outcomes (Diani 1997), Lubitow 
(2013) found that focusing on particular campaigns and policy outcomes can help to understand 
the influence of a movement. Therefore, my unique case studies in the Northeast can be scaled 
up to help understand the larger social movement for GMO labeling across the United States. 
Looking at public testimony data allows us to evaluate the resonance of particular frames for the 
public as well as the effect of different frames on distinct policy developments across states. 
 
Frames Utilized in the Biotechnology Debate: Let’s Give Them Something to Talk About 
With the advent of biotechnology in the 1980s, many scientists and the biotechnology 
industry framed the technology as a “win-win” approach to fulfilling current and future social, 
agricultural, human health and environmental needs. Biotech proponents believed that transgenic 
crops would address present and future moral and environmental problems such as global hunger 
from increasing population levels, scarce resources, a changing climate, and rising food prices 
(Paarlberg 2000; Herring 2007; Mooney and Hunt 2009; Glover 2010; Schurman and Munro 
2010; Dibden et al. 2013; Motta 2015). Biotechnology in agriculture was portrayed by 
proponents as a quick technological fix for environmental, social, economic and nutritional 
problems without any tradeoffs to be found. Individuals wary or unaccepting of this technology 
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were deemed Luddites who threatened future U.S. innovation and leadership (Maeseele 2010; 
Schurman and Munro 2010). 
On the other side of the debate, those individuals first concerned with the overly zealous 
acceptance and global commercialization of the technology referenced the global north’s ill-
informed domination on the global south, citing past mistakes of the Green Revolution and thus 
dubbing this the Gene Revolution (Stone 2002a; Buttel 2005; Schurman and Munro 2010). 
Critics contended that the adoption of GM crops in the global south drastically altered rural 
communities and livelihoods, reducing jobs for rural inhabitants and switching land ownership 
and control to biotech companies, thus uprooting residents to migrate to urban areas (Scharper 
and Cunningham 2006; Leguizamon 2014). Anti-biotechnology activists also emphasized the 
“unnatural” practice of inserting genes into plants, “playing God”, the environmental risks (loss 
of biodiversity, genetic contamination, etc.), and unknown human health risks (Buttel 2005; 
McKibben 2003; Motta 2015).  
Some activist organizations have strategically linked GM crops to the negative 
implications of conventional, industrial agriculture, thus emphasizing the threat GM crops pose 
to local socially embedded agricultural production (i.e. civic agriculture). In her study of anti-
GMO campaigns in Mendocino County, California, Walsh-Dilley (2009) showed how activists 
successfully banned the propagation of GMOs by framing them as a social threat to the 
community’s economy and livelihood. Since the majority of agriculture in this county is organic, 
community members were specifically concerned about GM crops contaminating their organic 
crops. With agricultural production tied so directly to the community, contamination was not 
only an environmental concern but an economic and social one. In Mendocino County, the issue 
also became one of “biodemocracy” due to big business threatening the desires of the people 
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(Pechlaner 2011). Similar strategies and outcomes occurred in Europe as well, where “GMO-
free” zones were established after GM crops were framed as a contamination threat to other 
types of farming, specifically to organic and sustainable farming and to the region’s rural 
development (Levidow and Boschert 2008). While the agricultural biotech industry attempted to 
promote a discourse where GM crops could “coexist” with sustainable agriculture, 
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) stigmatized them as contaminants. With 
a rural area’s economic development tied directly to their sustainable and/or organic agriculture, 
the threat of contamination by GM crops was not only a physical threat, but also “local 
environments were framed as cultural-economic assets under threat from GMOs” (Levidow and 
Boschert 2008: 18).  
While biotechnology proponents have attempted to frame GMOs as a sustainable solution 
to growing populations and diminishing natural resources (especially arable land and water) 
(Asis 2017; Curchoe 2017) other authors have contended that GM crops address only technical 
sustainability aspects in agricultural production (environmental and economic), but do not 
address social equity and participatory aspects (democratic participation and/or decision-making) 
inherent in the concept of sustainability (Ervin et al. 2010). As GMO regulatory requirements 
(crop moratoriums, required safety testing, and incorporation in trade laws) failed to gain 
momentum in policy development, activists turned to required labeling of GM products as a way 
to control the spread of the technology (Schurman and Munro 2010; Wohlers 2013; Bain and 
Dandachi 2014). Within a “neoliberalizing” activism landscape, in which activists focus on 
reforming the agricultural market through individual consumption patterns rather than 
government-mandated policy, social movements were focused on ways to enhance consumer 
power in addressing problems in the agri-food system (Bain and Dandachi 2014). Beginning in 
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the early 2010s, a collection of states and counties on the West coast began introducing GMO 
labeling bills on to the legislative agenda. The issue of genetic modification of food transformed 
into a consumer “right to know” issue replete with slogans like “informed decision”, “consumer 
choice” and “transparency in the food system” (Caswell 2000; Klintman 2002; Bain and 
Dandachi 2014).  
 
GMO Labeling at the State Level  
The issue of GMO labeling at the state level gained national attention when Proposition 
37 was introduced as a referendum ballot measure in California in 2012. While it failed 53% to 
47%, it led to a cascade of other ballot referenda across the West including Washington Initiative 
522 in 2013, Oregon Measure 92 and a Colorado measure in 2014 (Westervelt 2012; Weise 
2013; Runyon 2014). All the ballot measures failed by relatively narrow margins, but continued 
to propel the movement forward with increased information and resource sharing across the 
county (Clark et al. 2014).  
In the Northeastern U.S., Connecticut was the first state to pass a statewide GMO 
labeling law in 2013, however it came with a contingency provision. That is, attached to 
Connecticut’s labeling law was a “trigger clause” which required four other states to enact 
labeling laws--one must border said state, and the combined population of all states must total 
more than 20 million (Wilson 2014). Maine followed with a passage of a state labeling law with 
a similar trigger clause attached in 2014. While these states’ laws remained stagnant, relying on 
other state initiatives to act, Vermont became the only state in the country to pass a labeling law 
without a trigger clause, with an effective date of July 1, 2016. However, as a small state with a 
population of only 626,562 citizens, Vermont could not fulfill Connecticut’s and Maine’s trigger 
	 94 
clauses. States such as New York and Massachusetts (with populations of 19.75 and 6.75 million 
respectively) could set in motion the enactment of Connecticut and Maine’s state labeling laws. 
Both New York and Massachusetts were active in labeling campaigns with several bills 
introduced over multiple sessions, public hearings held on the issue, and demonstrations or 
rallies within the state. However, neither was able to get a bill enacted before the federal labeling 
law S.764, The Biotech Labeling Solutions Act, passed in July 2016, preempted all current and 
future state labeling bills. This unique mix of success, failure, stagnation and interdependency in 
state policy in the Northeast provides a rich set of case studies to examine labeling discourse and 
policy development within and across states.  
 
Methods 
Public Testimony 
I analyzed written and oral testimony from statewide hearings in the Northeastern states 
related to a statewide GMO labeling bill. Public hearing testimony was available via the state 
government websites for Connecticut and Maine. Public hearing testimony from Massachusetts 
was requested via their state government archive office as text. Vermont public hearing 
testimony was requested via the state government archive office as audio files, which were then 
transcribed. Connecticut testimony was collected for the years of 2012 and 2013 (as the state 
held two different hearings related to GMO labeling) with a total of 242 individual testimonies, 
which comprised 34% of total testimony data. Maine testimony was collected for the year 2013 
with a total of 78 testimonies, comprising 11% of total data. Massachusetts testimony was 
collected from 2015 with a total of 230 testimonies, comprising 33% of total data. Lastly 
Vermont testimony data was collected for their two public hearings on GMO labeling bills in 
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2012 and 2014 with a total of 153 testimonies, comprising 22% of total data. The testimonies, 
which are deemed public records, include the name and town association for each witness. New 
York held a public hearing in 2013 but the data were excluded from analysis since the hearing 
had a very distinctive format, in that it only contained testimonies from 14 expert witnesses who 
were invited to speak on the issue of GMO labeling and contained no public or citizen testimony. 
Initially testimony was categorized into support or opposition for a label, and further 
categorized into four groups based on group identity: (1) non-governmental organization (NGO), 
(2) citizen, (3) industry, (4) government legislator. Content analysis was conducted on each piece 
of testimony within each state hearing (Neuendorf 2001; Liu et al. 2015). Each piece of 
testimony was analyzed by first reading through the data and performing open coding. After 
initial coding, focused coding was performed to identify the most emergent categories and 
develop a codebook (Creswell 2013; Emerson et al. 2013; Charmaz 2014). Coding was 
conducted with the qualitative data software program Atlas.ti. Testimonies were coded based on 
how individuals were identifying (non)-problems of GMOs and the (non)-solution of a GMO 
label. The emerging codebook grouped codes into four main categories: 1) Risks or benefits of 
GMOs, 2) Rationale for opposition/support with GMOs, 3) Perspectives specific to the labeling 
of GMOs including risks of a label, benefits of a label and rationalizations for why a label was 
(un)necessary, and 4) Proposed solutions in terms of continued support or opposition to GMOs. 
The entire coding scheme is included in Appendix G. The presence of a topic was coded as 1 and 
the absence or no mention as 0. Descriptive statistics were performed to indicate the frequency of 
certain risks identified by the testimonies and offered a glimpse into the main frames utilized by 
the public and stakeholders in the GMO labeling debates. 
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Interviews 
 Confidential semi-structured interviews were also conducted with 56 individuals active in 
the statewide (CT, MA, ME, NY, VT) GMO labeling initiatives including state legislators, 
farmers, and representatives of environmental groups, farmer groups, biotech industry, food 
industry and consumer rights organizations. All interviews were confidential and were assigned 
pseudonyms for purposes of presenting findings in this study (See Appendix C for complete list 
of interviews). Questions pertained to identifying the (non)-risks of GMOs, why these 
individuals/organizations supported or opposed labeling and their perspectives on a federal or 
state-mandated label. A standard interview protocol was used for all interviewees with slight 
modification for activist organizations and trade associations. Supplemental questions for activist 
and trade groups included if they formed any partnerships with other organizations within and 
across states, the main audience they represented and how they incited action or recruitment 
among members. Interviews took place between May 2015 and August 2017. Interviews were 
conducted in-person or by telephone. All interviews were recorded with permission from the 
participants, transcribed verbatim, given an identifier code and coded using the same methods 
used for coding public testimony data.  
 
Results 
Public Testimony Summary 
The coding scheme and data are organized by the four main categories, broken down by 
overarching frames and specifically into sub-codes in percentages, divided by state (See 
Appendix G). Table 1 lists the distribution of public testimony statements by affiliation. The 
overwhelming majority of testimony was in support of a GMO labeling bill (94.9%).  
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Table 2.1 Distribution of public hearing testimony statements (CT, ME, VT, MA) by affiliation 
 
Interview Data Summary 
 The distribution of individual interviewees is depicted in Table 2 (See Appendix C for 
complete list of interviewee codes with state and/or national association and stance on labeling).  
Table 3.2 Number and distribution of interviewees by stance and affiliation 
Proponents of labeling 34 
Farmer advocacy 11 
Legislators 8 
Consumer advocacy 5 
Environmental advocacy 5 
GMO labeling advocacy 4 
Law clinic 1 
Opponents of labeling 16 
Biotechnology industry 6 
Food industry 5 
Farmer advocacy 4 
Science advocacy 1 
Neutral 6 
Food industry 4 
Third party certification  1 
Science advocacy 1 
 
Support for Label 
Consumer Rights 
I identified in both testimony and interview data that the main reason proponents called 
for a label was the “consumer’s right to know”. The consumer rights frame was the most popular 
frame referenced in public testimony data across all four states (Table 3). Witnesses reasoned 
that consumers needed this information so they could make informed decisions within the 
marketplace. Joey, from Massachusetts stated, “I, and all Massachusetts residents deserve the 
Citizens 625 
NGOs 40 
Industry (biotech and food) 29 
Government representatives  9 
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right to make informed decisions about the food we purchase…Consumers should be allowed to 
decide for themselves what purchases they make and what foods they consume” (Hearing on 
H.3242 2015). Interviewees similarly identified GMO labeling as a “right to know” issue that 
emphasized the principles of full disclosure, transparency, and dissemination of information. 
Ellen, a representative from an New York environmental organization stated: 
We felt from a consumer perspective, this was really a consumer 
right to know issue. People want to know what they’re eating. 
They have a right to know….I think for a long time consumers 
have thought that when something is on the store shelf, it has been 
tested, it has been thoroughly vetted and it is safe. And I think 
more people are waking up and realizing that’s not true…I think 
more and more people are becoming enlightened consumers and 
there is this desire to know what they are putting in their bodies 
(GMO 123). 
 
Many stakeholders stated that companies should be forthcoming about all information 
surrounding a food product and any limitation on this access to knowledge was a direct affront to 
consumers’ abilities and rights to make a decision. 
Table 3.3 Most frequently cited frames in support of labels in public testimony within and across 
four states 
Connecticut Maine Massachusetts Vermont Total 
Consumer Rights  Consumer Rights  Consumer Rights  Consumer Rights  Consumer Rights  
Lack of 
Independent 
Scientific Data 
Lack of 
Independent 
Scientific Data 
GMO Human Health 
Risk 
Democratic Right GMO Human 
Health Risk 
GMO Human 
Health Risk 
GMO Human 
Health Risk 
GMO Corporate 
Power Risk 
GMO Corporate 
Power Risk 
Lack of 
Independent 
Scientific Data 
 
GMOs and Human Health Risks 
Within the public testimony, the potential human health risks caused by GMOs was a 
popular frame across the states as well (Table 3). Citizens expressed concerns about all different 
kinds of diseases that could be related or caused by consuming GM foods. Across public 
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testimony GM foods were associated with infertility (Whitney Hearing on H.B.6519 2013), 
cancer (Patricia Hearing on H.3242 2015), increased allergies (Sue Hearing on H.722 2012) and 
attention deficit disorders (Kelly Hearing on H.3242 2015). Many citizens cited independent 
studies that showed negative health effects from GM crops such as mammalian damage to the 
kidney, liver and bone marrow (Michael Hearing on H.B.6519 2013). Interviews with 
stakeholders across the states and nationally did not reference health concerns as readily as 
public testimony, but Eli, a representative from a Massachusetts organic farming advocacy group 
mentioned “all kinds of inflammatory issues, allergies, and autism, and a lot of other things that 
have been associated with it” (GMO 110). Some interviewees and a collection of public 
testimony witnesses discussed the risk of health problems with the increased use of herbicides 
and pesticides associated with the planting of GM crops. Brenda from Massachusetts described 
GMO foods as “poison” that is “full of glyphosate, a carcinogen, and even more toxic pesticides. 
Breast milk contains it. Male hormones are damaged by it. We cannot avoid this poison unless 
we know where it is” (Hearing on H.3242 2015).  
 
GMO Risk of Corporate Power 
In interviews with stakeholders fighting for GMO labeling, many organizations across the 
states were concerned about the power that companies producing GMOs held over the public and 
farmers specifically. Bob, a farmer from Maine described biotech companies as “self-interested 
corporations whose motivation is profit and they don’t care about human health or human rights” 
(GMO 115). To many of these groups GMOs were inherently tied to corporate domination that 
undermined and threatened democracy, the public’s access to information, as well as human and 
environmental health. The corporate power frame also made references to industries’ ties to “this 
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chemical corporate controlled government” (Bob, GMO 115) and the subsequent threat to 
democracy. In public testimony, Vermont and Massachusetts citizens prominently cited concerns 
with GMOs linked to corporate power (Table 3). Ben from Vermont stated, “The voice of the 
people is being drowned out by the corporate cash who is coming into our government” (Hearing 
on H.112 2014). Bob seconded that sentiment describing a family member who fought and died 
in World War II:  
He did not go down so that Monsanto could screw us over as a 
society and that is exactly what we’re having to face. This is not 
what we have worked for 250 years; developing an imperfect 
democracy so these corporations could trample us (GMO 115).  
 
There was an overall sentiment that corporations and the government were interlinked 
and the regulatory structure in charge of overseeing current GM crops on the market and 
approving new crops was corrupted or held captive by industry. Bob, the same farmer from 
Maine stated: 
The USDA…they are a captive agency which serves industrial 
agriculture and screws any family farmer that wants to be able to 
farm on their land...The problem is you have corruption in the 
three branches of government… Monsanto has got all of those in 
their hip pocket. So to try to do anything through normal 
government procedures does not look too promising. So enter the 
idea of GMO labeling (GMO 115).  
 
According to these interviewees, because these large industries held power over information 
access for the public and safety regulatory procedures by the government, then the only solution 
was for the government to at least require companies to provide information via a label. That 
would then put the power back into the public (more specifically the consumer) to decide how 
they wanted to act upon this information. If the government was not going to look out for the 
wellbeing of the public then it was necessary to require a label so individuals could decide on 
their own if they wanted to purchase a product produced through genetic engineering.  
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Lack of Independent Scientific Data 
The lack of trust in the corporations producing the products and conducting the studies 
proclaiming their safety ties in directly with another popular frame among interviewee supporters 
of GMO labeling: The lack of and therefore need for more scientific studies on the 
environmental, human and animal health effects of GMOs. Paul, a representative of an 
environmental organization stated, “…without independent long-term human health studies, we 
just don’t know enough. And in the absence of that, how can you be excited about it?” (GMO 
122). Since there was an absence of independent studies, interviewees stated that at the least 
GMOs should be labeled so that 1) consumers could avoid them if they were wary and 2) 
independent scientists could start testing differences between these products now that they would 
be labeled for the general public. This was another prominent frame cited in the public testimony 
as well (Table 3). Ethel from Connecticut states, “I find it shocking that these GMO foods have 
been approved for public consumption without any rigorous testing for safety or long-term 
effects and are sold to the public without letting the public know that these foods have been 
genetically altered” (Hearing on H.B.5117 2012). Many citizens from the hearings called on the 
government to require more testing before blindly approving these products, invoking the 
concept of the precautionary principle prevalent in many European countries specifically 
concerning GMOs. 
 
Opposition to Label 
	 Consumers Rights  
 Labeling opponents agreed with the importance of upholding consumer rights and 
providing information to consumers. However, interviewees and public testimony witnesses 
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stated that GMO labels would only be more confusing to customers, would in fact provide them 
with less choices in the marketplace and would be unnecessary because an organic label already 
exists (Table 4). Industries discussed how this labeling law would ironically place an added 
burden on the consumer (limiting choice) that proponents of the bill argued a labeling bill would 
enhance (ability to choose). A spokesperson for the Massachusetts Food Association testified: 
consumers may see a decline in the number of products that they 
are used to choosing from when purchasing groceries, because 
manufacturers may choose to take their products off the store 
shelves in Massachusetts rather than have to go through a 
complicated scientific process to prove or disprove that their 
products are free from genetically modified organisms (Hearing on 
H.3242 2015).   
 
Many interviewees also stressed the importance of providing accurate information to consumers. 
In their views, a GMO label would not be providing any actual helpful or accurate information. 
Jennifer, a crop industry representative stated: 
To me if you have a label on a product, produced with GE food or 
GM ingredients, it doesn’t tell you a whole lot. It doesn’t tell you 
what crop it was, what the gene did, was it an herbicide tolerant 
gene, was it insecticidal for yield benefits… (GMO 145).  
 
Many labeling opponents emphasized that the GE issue was so complicated that the 
complexity could not be addressed with a one-line statement. Therefore, when asked about the 
recent passage of the federal labeling bill, many opponents to statewide GMO labels endorsed 
the potential benefits of the federal bill through QR code labeling (which allows customers to 
scan the product with their mobile device, directing them to a webpage with additional 
information on the product). Carson from a national science advocacy organization stated: 
What this QR code does, it allows the people who are making and 
selling these different foods, allows them to have more direct in-
depth conversations with the customer or potential customer where 
they can actually have it lead to a page and say our sugar comes 
from GMOs and here’s why. Here’s an interview with a farmer 
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who says why they use it and why they’re buying it from them. 
And now there’s a lot more information you can get and they can 
get some of those nuances that a ‘contains GMOs’ doesn’t really 
tell you (GMO 146).  
 
For GMO proponents, there was a bigger story they wanted to tell-- a more complete picture of 
the benefits associated with GMOs. A simple two- or three-word label would not adequately 
provide the information consumers so adamantly called for. 
 
Economic Risks with a Label 
 Another popular frame utilized by opponent stakeholders (Table 4) was the economic 
risks with a GMO label. Rachel, a statewide grocery and retailer representative highlighted the 
major economic disadvantages her statewide companies would face with the addition of a state 
label. She states: 
I would say 98% of our value-added food producers needed 
products to move across state lines to stay in business. We just felt 
that it was unfair that they would be saddled with having to label 
their products differently than others outside the [state] market. 
And we also felt we are part of a regional marketplace and were 
very concerned about the isolation and the impacts of the business 
community (GMO 118).  
 
Statewide opponents specifically emphasized how the companies most impacted by this labeling 
law would be the small, family-owned businesses, not necessarily the large conglomerate 
businesses and supermarkets. 
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Table 3.4 Most frequently cited frames in opposition to labels in public testimony within and 
across three states4	
Connecticut Maine Massachusetts Total 
Economic Risks with 
Label 
Consumer Rights Risks 
with Label 
Consumer Rights Risks 
with Label 
Economic Risks with 
Label 
Consumer Rights Risks 
with a Label  
Solution: No Changes 
Needed 
Economic Risks with a 
Label 
Consumer Rights Risks 
with Label 
Solution: No Changes 
Needed 
Economic Risks with 
Label 
Solution: No Changes 
Needed 
Solution: No Changes 
Needed 
 
 
Differences Between States 
 The major outlier in terms of rationales and frames utilized in support of a GMO label 
was Vermont. In public testimony data, Vermont drew upon a broader array of rationales that 
other state witnesses did not reference as regularly. Over 20% of witness testimony referenced 
the benefits from agro-ecological and organic farming (compared to GM agriculture). They 
called upon legislators to stand up to the bullying industry (17.7%) and identified themselves as 
farmers, referencing their personal expertise in farming in the state (16.3%) (see Appendix G). 
Citizen witnesses testified that they were organic farmers themselves and feared that GM 
agriculture would undermine their preferred type of farming and livelihoods. Rick, an organic 
farmer from Vermont stated “My biggest fear concerning GMOs is that we are propelling our 
food supply into the future but our bodies and the natural environment are still in the present” 
(Hearing on H.112 2014). Joe stated “The reason I am an organic value-added producer is 
because I don’t want to aid the proliferation of GMOs in the world. I am here in Vermont 
because I feel this is the safest place to pursue my passion and my dreams” (Hearing on H.722 
																																																						
4 Vermont public hearings did not include any witnesses in opposition to GMO labeling. 
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2012). Vermonters explicitly called on their legislators to stand up to the bullying of corporations 
tied to GM agriculture and testified that a label was not only a consumer rights issue but a 
democratic rights issue. Paula testified: 
I have never encountered an issue that every single Vermonter 
wants. You [the legislators] have the means to stand up for us, 
against the power of the biotech industry…This is just a common 
sense, civil rights issue. We are depending on you and we will 
gratefully be here to back you up when you pass this bill. (Hearing 
on H.112 2014). 
 
By describing the biotech industry as “bullying” legislators and vowing to stand with 
legislators in support when they pass this bill, in Vermont, there was a stronger sense of 
community opposition to the biotech industry and support for this bill. As Barry stated: 
We want you [legislators] to stand and make a firm stance, a 
committed stance and we will stand with you and we will not allow 
you to be bullied without us being bullied too. And by walking 
together, being together, we can have some ethical standards which 
will bring to the state of Vermont a huge thank you from the rest of 
America (Hearing on H.112 2014). 
 
Stakeholders in Vermont made consistent reference to the promotion of sustainable agriculture 
within the state. Stakeholders and legislators stated that Vermont needed to focus on 
“regenerative agriculture” for the future of farming, not on biotechnology. Kate, a farmer 
advocacy group stated:  
The bulk of our farmers are small, diversified farmers that follow 
practices that are incredibly protective of the environment and 
quality of the food, and we believe in the face of all the other 
challenges out there with climate change, with economics, this 
type of farming is the methodology that is going to be sustainable 
over the long term and it’s going to give us a sustainable food 
supply and it’s also going to be give us the ability to maintain the 
economic viability of our planet (GMO 132).  
 
Interviewees also stated how this sustainable agricultural heritage is engrained within the culture 
and values of Vermont. Vermont has “a culture and a citizenry that are incredibly engaged and 
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care a lot about their food and farming practices and where their food comes from and how it’s 
produced” (Kate, GMO 132).  
Members from other states’ activist organizations confirmed this point as well about 
Vermont’s citizenry, with Jessica, a member of a farmer advocacy group from Maine stating, 
“The culture of farming is well-within the fabric of their [Vermont’s] society, much better than 
Maine” (GMO 114). For a citizenry so engaged and tied to agriculture in their state, GMO 
agriculture was considered a threat to this alternative type of farming (sustainable, regenerative). 
Because agricultural heritage is so tied to the community, GM agriculture could be seen as a 
distinct personal threat to the people of Vermont that legislators and the community would come 
together to fight against. 
 
Discussion 
Many scholars have critiqued the contemporary influence of neoliberalism, where market 
efficiency is of utmost importance and a self-regulating market will produce the most optimal 
social outcomes (McCarthy 2006; Guthman 2008; Rodrick 2011). Under the neoliberal 
paradigm, heightened hostility towards state intervention and regulation causes increased 
reliance on civil society to address and redress market failures (McCarthy 2006; Roff 2007; 
Rodrick 2011; Clapp 2012). Within the agri-food system in this era of neoliberalism, “politics of 
food” centers around how much knowledge consumers have on a food product, which will 
inform their purchasing decisions (Schweikhardt and Browne 2001; Goodman and DuPuis 2002; 
Guthman 2008), also deemed “politics via markets” (Lipschutz and Rowe 2005). Therefore a 
consumer rights frame resonates well with audiences wishing to have more control in the 
marketplace and greater participation in politics surrounding food. A new role emerges for these 
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“conscientious consumers” to purchase products with environmental or socio-economic 
characteristics they support such as Fair Trade certified, organic certification or “green” 
environmentally friendly products (Murdoch et al. 2000; Micheletti 2003; Soper 2004; Bostrom 
and Klintman 2008; Neilson 2010; Bartley et al. 2015) and relies on a company’s accountability 
and transparency of information concerning their products (Mol 2015). Phrases such as 
“informed decision” and “freedom to choose” that reflect these consumer roles are evidenced in 
the testimony and interviews. Even opponents of labeling used the consumer rights frame by 
emphasizing that a label would hurt consumer rights by increasing consumer confusion and 
limiting consumer choice in the marketplace. 
While the “consumer right to know” frame is by far the most popular frame utilized by 
labeling proponents, there are some limitations to this framing. Oliver and Johnston (2005) 
discuss how frames used in social movements are not meant to change anyone’s beliefs but 
rather to optimize on existing beliefs, where “movement intellectuals perform the marketing task 
of packing their issue” to make it attractive and acceptable to the target public (195). Movement 
entrepreneurs will draw on symbols, rationales and themes found in the “cultural stock” of a 
target audience (Snow and Benford 1988; Naples 2002; Johnston and Noakes 2005). When 
frames overlap with the “cultural stock” of the members of society, they are considered 
“culturally potent” (Noakes 2005: 15). While individualism and freedom of choice can be 
considered “master frames” because of their ability to resonate with a broad audience (Snow and 
Benford 1992), they may not be culturally specific enough to warrant change or action at the 
state level. Vermont drew on specific frames related to their state culture and identity, which 
created a rhetoric or “gap discourse” between “the other” [GM industrial agriculture, biotech 
companies] versus “us” [small agriculture, VT community] (Walgrave and Manseens 2005). 
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Calling upon legislators to stand up to the powerful industry threatening to sue the state of 
Vermont creates another “us” versus “them” narrative. By creating a common enemy or villain 
in the biotech companies threatening the livelihood of Vermont farmers and the greater rural 
identity of Vermonters, a community of dissent rises against biotechnology and GM agriculture. 
While a policy for mandatory labeling will not directly block the influence of biotech companies 
or the planting of GM crops (as a ban or moratorium would), the way in which citizens and 
activists frame the problem of GMOs and the solution of a label, allows Vermont GMO 
opponents to associate passing a labeling law with rescuing their community from the threats of 
GM agriculture. Susan from Vermont stated, “Vermont is synonymous with quality alas GMO 
seeds end up harming soil quality, producing herbicide tolerant superweeds, increasing disease 
susceptibility in crops, disrupting ecosystems, reducing biodiversity. Vermont farmers deserve to 
know wherein lies their true economic security” (Hearing on H.112 2014). Another citizen, Judy 
states, “…it’s time to look up and wake up before organic farming becomes a thing of the past. 
We must be constantly aware of what is going on in order to protect our assets and our wonderful 
heritage here in Vermont” (Hearing on H.112 2014). The GM labeling issue was consistently 
framed as an issue of sustainability, rights of farmers, economic security of the state and 
maintaining the overall rural and democratic identity Vermonters hold so dear.  
 
So, What’s so Unique about Vermont?  
Hinrichs (1998) analyzed motivations for involvement in small-scale maple syrup 
production in Vermont and found that sugar making was tied to a rural identity deemed valuable 
despite the low, unstable income garnered through this regional enterprise. Working in maple 
syrup production helped establish, demonstrate and reinforce “regional rural identity” (524) tied 
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to a “cultural economy” (527). Other studies have found that motivating factors for small 
regional production include self-reliance, a physical challenge or the formation of a personal 
identity tied to nature (McGoodwin 1990; Fitchen 1991; Bliss and Flick 1994). Vermont’s large 
amount of underdeveloped land has helped foster the economic vitality of rural recreation, 
tourism and direct marketing in the state’s agri-food sector, thus helping maintain these rural 
identities many Vermonters embody (Hinrichs 1998; Albers 2000). The Council on the Future of 
Vermont (2009), a project conducted by the Vermont Council on Rural Development found 
through public forums, focus groups and public polls that Vermonters highly value the natural 
environment and the agrarian heritage of Vermont. Furthermore, they see the potential for 
multifunctional agricultural landscapes as the future of local food production in the region. 
Erickson et al. (2011) discovered overwhelming support from Vermont landowners in 
Chittenden County in enrolling part of their land in a cooperative land management program for 
local food production. Vermont has also enacted legislation to increase direct marketing in terms 
of food production and consumption in their Farm to Plate legislation passed in 2009, which 
outlined actions and goals to achieve greater local food consumption (Kahler et al. 2011). As 
such, Vermont exemplifies the tenets of civic agriculture by emphasizing local production and 
consumption embedded within the socio-economic vitality of the community. 
Civic agriculture has also been found to enhance social capital, revitalize rural 
landscapes, improve environmental quality in an area and ultimately contribute to long-term 
sustainability efforts (Berry 1996). Orbach and Tobin (2014) found in their study on a 
community in New York State that members who engaged in civic agriculture through shopping 
at farmers’ markets, patronizing local food retailers, and becoming members of CSAs led to 
higher levels of social and political engagement within the community. Those most engaged in 
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civic agriculture were most engaged in the community. And stronger community engagement 
can lead to greater political engagement as well. As Lyson (2004) states, “Civic agriculture 
flourishes in a democratic environment” (76). Since civic agriculture is tied to the economic and 
social development of the community, civic agriculture allows food consumers to be elevated to 
positions of food citizens where they are not only making decisions about which foods they wish 
to purchase but about the practices and regulations of companies that produce and process their 
food. Hence, representatives from Vermont not only stated that a GMO label was a consumer 
right but also a democratic right. Here citizens identify themselves as not only consumers, but as 
active citizens engaged in a democratic process. Emboldening the power of the citizen in policy 
discussions through participation, transparency and accountability enhances the democratic 
legitimacy within the policy process (Clapp and Fuchs 2009). Thus, Vermont citizens solidified 
their legitimacy in the local GMO labeling legislative debates, increasing their power and voice 
in the policy process. 
What is interesting to note is that Vermont in fact is not the only state in this study to 
exhibit characteristics of civic agriculture. For example, Massachusetts contains the fourth 
highest number of farms in the U.S. (28.4%) that sell directly to the public (which has been used 
as a quantitative measure of civic agriculture, see Lyson and Guptill 2004), followed by Maine, 
Vermont and Connecticut (Table 5). Massachusetts has the highest percentage of farms that 
participate in CSAs and Vermont and Maine are the top two states with the highest percentage of 
organic farms in the nation (Table 5). Therefore, civic agriculture and organic farming are not 
characteristics unique to Vermont, but activists in other Northeastern states have not tied GMO 
labeling to their state farming, instead relying on “master frames” of individualism and consumer 
rights. When frames focus around agricultural embeddedness in the state economic sphere, 
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threats of corporate power become much more of a personal, direct threat on specific livelihoods 
rather than an ambiguous threat of large industrial cooptation. 
Table 3.5 Select agricultural statistics from USDA Census of Agriculture, states included in 
study in bold (USDA 2012) 
Rank in the 
US 
% of farms that sell directly to 
the public 
% of CSA member farms % of organic farms 
1st Alaska (31.6) Massachusetts (5.6) Vermont (9.0) 
2nd New Hampshire (30.7) Alaska (5.5) Maine (8.3) 
3rd Rhode Island (30.2) Maine (5.0) New Hampshire (5.4) 
4th Massachusetts (28.4) Vermont (4.5) California (5.0) 
5th Maine (28.3) Rhode Island (4.0) Hawaii (3.7) 
6th Vermont (28.2) New Hampshire (3.9) Massachusetts (3.6) 
7th Connecticut (23.8) Connecticut (3.7) Alaska (3.4) 
8th Hawaii (23.0) Hawaii (2.0) New York (3.2) 
9th New Jersey (19.7) New York (1.63) Rhode Island (2.7) 
10th Oregon (18.8) Nevada (1.62) Washington (2.6) 
 
The Power of the Local, Small-scale Frame 
Framing the issue in terms of small-scale, state agricultural identity and economic 
embeddedness of statewide agriculture may also have been more effective in challenging the 
GMO labeling opponents’ frames. In fact, GMO labeling opponents utilized frames focused on 
risks to their state’s economy if a GMO labeling bill passed. They argued that state food 
manufacturers, producers, and retailers would suffer from higher costs due to segregating and 
labeling ingredients, costly lawsuits if they did not abide by the complicated rules, and deter 
future biotechnology infrastructure investment for the state. There was even fear that a labeling 
law would impede the state’s access to food. Ann, a Connecticut legislator stated, “There were 
major food brands who were saying ‘we can’t just label what is in CT. We won’t even send the 
food to you guys anymore’ so then there was this big thing, ‘oh we’re not going to have food.’” 
(GMO 103). These opponents were just as successful in blocking a labeling law by focusing on 
the state-specific economic and social impacts if a labeling law was passed. By keeping the 
frames structured around local, state-specific effects (such as the future of economic 
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development and food access) opponents took control of the policy discourse on GMO labeling. 
Similar to the county level GMO bans in Mendocino County, California, “abstract concerns must 
be made relevant to local people in order to mobilize them” (Walsh-Dilley 2009:104). While 
“master frames” of individualism and public health resonated with the public across all states, 
framing the issue in terms of local benefits or risks appears to have resonated more with state 
legislators leading to policy change. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have drawn on frame analysis in policy studies to understand the 
trajectory of statewide GMO labeling laws in the Northeast. We see that Vermont’s use of 
frames tied to small-scale, sustainable agriculture in the state and the democratic right to know 
created an effective discourse leading to the passage of a GMO labeling law. By coupling GM 
agriculture with large industrial agribusiness companies capable of exerting power and control 
over a state and/or community, proponents of labeling created an effective “gap discourse” of 
“us versus them” further strengthening community solidarity in the state. The small-town 
agriculture and local community frames created a powerful imagery capable of resonating with 
the public and legislators, that have been evidently powerful in driving other food policy debates 
(Rahn et al. 2016). In the GMO labeling debates, these frames proved to be more effective than 
public health risks or consumer right to know frames alone, which have been popular amongst 
the anti-biotechnology and GM labeling movements nationwide but may have lacked in local 
resonance and cultural compatibility in Vermont. In the other state case studies, frames 
concerning broad-based consumer rights and public health concerns were not strong enough to 
confront frames highlighting local socio-economic risks of adding labels to products. While the 
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master frames of consumer rights or public health may be successful in broad-based movements 
attempting to mobilize a wider group of people, I found that master frames focused on 
individualism, consumer rights and public health in fact did not affect state policy development. 
Rather, frames focused on local socio-economic impacts led to policy change. 
However, discourse and framing strategies are not the only factors influencing policy 
development. The institutional venues available for the concerned public or interest groups to air 
their grievances may also influence if these concerns are even acknowledged and addressed 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Kingdon 2011). In Vermont, 
interviewees highlighted the extremely accessible “citizen legislature” in the state. Joe, a 
Vermont farmer and prominent participant in the GMO labeling campaigns stated, “The 
legislators are in session about 4 ½ months every year…The cafeteria for the statehouse is open 
to the public…Very few states you can just go into the cafeteria and accost them. We’re very 
lucky with that” (GMO 133). Beth, a VT legislator affirmed that point stating, “People know 
how to get ahold of me. We’re very accessible. My home phone number is published…People 
know where I live…We are very in touch with our constituents and I think they realize that” 
(GMO 137). In contrast, a New York legislator talked about the immense lobbying effort by 
biotech companies to block the labeling bill in New York that had a major role in the bill not 
passing out of committees. She states, “There was a large role lobbyists played in opposing this 
bill and they shook some legislators’ stand on it. They did all sorts of tricks to them off the bill, 
not get on the bill or not to vote for the bill” (GMO 126). 
Despite other external factors at play, discourse and framing of problems and solutions 
still have a major influence in policy development, such as determining what issues arise on the 
political agenda (Stone 2002b; Kingdon 2011; Hayes 2013; Schneider 2013). This study 
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highlights the importance of framing in policy development, and through comparative analysis 
draws conclusions about which frames were used most prominently and effectively in state 
policy development, and how they aligned with the state policy’s subsequent successes, 
stagnations and failures. Collective threats at a small scale – in this case – in terms of state 
identity or state socio-economic vitality, may have more potential to elicit state action rather than 
broad-based individualistic ambiguous threats. These findings suggest a greater likelihood of 
success when framing the scale of effects to the proposed scale of action. For future food 
movements focused on social justice, equitable distribution and sustainability, areas embodying a 
civic agricultural identity may be able to benefit from frames highlighting the importance of 
maintaining these identities to warrant political action in their favor. However, as the GMO 
labeling issue is now at the national scale given the passage of S.764, future studies can assess 
whether localized, place-based frames can be scaled-up to the national level to effect policy 
change or if they are present and only effective at the local small-scale level. 
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Chapter 4: “We’re a Feisty Little State”: Understanding State Level Genetically Modified 
Organism (GMO) Labeling Policy Change with the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article I apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) with components of 
Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) to analyze the initiatives in the Northeast around 
genetically modified organism (GMO) labeling to understand the diversity of policy outcomes 
across five states. I use a comparative case study approach to look at policy core beliefs across 
coalitions within and between states drawn from interviews with activists and legislators 
involved in each state’s initiative. I also evaluate each coalition’s political capacity and political 
opportunity structures to understand external factors which could influence a coalition’s ability 
to pursue and achieve their policy goals. The results show that policy core beliefs among labeling 
activists and labeling opponents were relatively uniform across all states with the exception of 
Vermont whose coalition for labeling drew upon collective civic agricultural benefits with the 
addition of a GMO label. All states differed in their coalitions’ political capacity and political 
opportunity structures. Vermont’s citizen legislature, responsive legislators and absence of 
lobbyists created a favorable political environment for the grassroots labeling coalition’s success. 
 
Introduction 
One of the most contentious debates in agriculture and food production to emerge in 
recent years in the United States and worldwide as has been the regulation of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs). Beginning with the introduction of herbicide tolerant and insect 
resistant crops in 1996, the percentage of GM crops planted in the U.S. has increased 
exponentially. Over 90% of corn, soybeans and cotton crops in the U.S. are genetically modified 
(USDA ERS 2017). Proponents of GMOs cite the many benefits of GM agriculture including 
labor efficiencies and increased profits for farmers, environmental benefits with decreased 
spraying of pesticides and moral arguments of introducing nutrient-enhanced crops to nutrient-
poor areas (Asis 2017; Curchoe 2017; Saletan 2015; NAS 2016; Glover 2010). However, the 
public has remained skeptical of the mass adoption and commercialization of these crops citing 
risks to human health, degradation of the natural environment, and further concentration of the 
corporate agricultural sector (Benbrook 2012; Kaur et al. 2013; Thomas 2014; Cassidy 2016; 
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FOE 2017). According to a poll conducted in 2016, 52% of the public think GMOs are unsafe 
and 93% think the government should require labeling (ABC 2016). With an uncertain and 
distrustful public, state ballot initiatives for GMO labeling emerged in the early 2010s beginning 
in the West (California, Oregon, Washington, Colorado) with no success. However, beginning in 
2013, the Northeast began to see partial success with legislative campaigns for the labeling of 
GMOs, beginning with a partial passage of a labeling law in 2013 and 2014 in Connecticut and 
Maine respectively and complete passage in Vermont in 2014. Despite repeated attempts by 
activist groups and legislators, Massachusetts and New York were never successful in the 
passage of a GMO labeling law. 
I apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to analyze the GMO labeling policy 
developments across multiple states in the Northeast within a five-year period (2012-2017). The 
ACF is one of the most established frameworks with which to study conflict and public policy 
development and has been used to assess a range of contentious political battles including 
climate change, energy and public health issues (Elgin and Weible 2013; Fischer 2014; Lodge 
and Matus 2014; Steinman et al. 2017). In this article, I explore the conflict narrative of 
stakeholders involved in these labeling initiatives to understand how they influenced the policy 
process across the states. I compare the perceptions of policy actors in Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New York and Vermont to emphasize differences in these perceptions among 
stakeholders within and across the five states, who supported GMO labeling relative to those 
who opposed it. I also draw on the political opportunity structure concept, which has been used 
in conjunction with the ACF (Kubler 2001) to emphasize the broader political system within 
each of these distinct policy development cases. The political opportunity structure concept has 
informed social movement research by arguing that social movement success is dependent upon 
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opportunities afforded by the institutional structures within a policy-making context (McAdam et 
al. 1996). In comparative policy studies, analysis of political opportunity structures provides 
another factor through which to compare across case studies. In descriptively comparing 
perceptions of policy actors involved and the politics in and across these five states, I intend to 
understand why there was a diversity of policy outcomes (passage, failure and stagnation) in 
GMO labeling in this region. My research is guided by the following four research questions: (i) 
Who are the policy actors involved in the GMO labeling initiatives? (ii) What are their 
perceptions of the problem of GMOs? (iii) What are their potential policy solutions? (iv) What 
are the political opportunity structures within each state and how do they enhance or obstruct 
the political capacity of certain policy actors? I first present the analytical framework that guides 
my research, followed by a comparative summary of the GMO labeling policy situations across 
the five states. I then describe methods for data collection and analysis with the framework. I 
then discuss these findings and implications for future agri-food policy development. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) was originally developed by Paul Sabatier 
and Hank Jenkins-Smith in the 1980s and has become one of the most utilized frameworks to 
analyze the policy process within policy development research (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). The 
ACF uses a policy subsystem as its primary unit of analysis in which to understand policy 
processes (Sabatier 1988; Weible and Nohrstedt 2013). Policy subsystems are composed of a 
policy issue, a geographic area and a group of policy actors hoping to influence policy affairs 
within the subsystem (Sabatier 1988). These subsystems can be nested within each other, such 
that a local subsystem policy issue is nested within the regional subsystem of the same issue. 
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Actors within this policy subsystem could be legislators, interest groups, government agencies, 
scientists, the media, etc. These actors are motivated by shared belief systems consisting of 
normative deep core beliefs, subsystem specific policy core beliefs and narrow secondary beliefs 
(Putman 1976; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). The ACF organizes 
this belief system into a three-tiered structure. The first and broadest is deep core beliefs based 
on normative values and not tied to any specific policy subsystem. Next is policy core beliefs 
that are values based on a specific policy subsystem. These beliefs identify the problem, the 
underlying cause of the problem and example solutions. Lastly, is secondary beliefs that will 
specifically identify policy instruments to alleviate the problem outlined in the policy core 
beliefs. These belief systems influence how individuals interpret information and strategies they 
will invoke for change (Munro et al. 1997; Munto et al. 2002; Ripberger et al. 2014). Groups of 
actors with shared belief systems (most notably policy core beliefs) will be drawn to work 
together to form policy networks or advocacy coalitions to turn their shared policy core beliefs 
into actual policy (Weible and Sabatier 2005; Henry et al. 2010; Henry 2011; Ingold 2011; Matti 
and Sandstrom 2011).  
Advocacy coalitions are defined as groups of actors that share policy core beliefs who 
attempt to pass policies that align with their beliefs before actors in coalitions with contradictory 
beliefs attempt to do the same (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Policy subsystems are often composed 
of one to five advocacy coalitions attempting to change policy (Weible et al. 2009). Shared 
beliefs among advocacy coalitions have been found to be related to an advocacy coalition’s 
stability in policy development over time. Even when new beliefs emerge within coalitions due 
to changes in the subsystem that make them more salient to coalition members, a core set of 
shared beliefs will maintain a coalition’s stability over time (Pierce 2011). “Biased assimilation” 
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describes the process whereby actors will interpret new policy-relevant information in a way that 
supports their existing belief system (Innes 1978; Lord et al. 1979; Munro and Ditto 1997; 
Munro et al. 2002).  
I also draw upon aspects of resource mobilization theory (RMT) to evaluate external 
resources available to coalitions, strategies employed and overall political climate within each 
state. RMT is notable for focusing on influences outside the social movement under study 
(Johnson 2000). With effective use of resources and optimization of political opportunities 
groups can achieve social movement success (Flynn 2013). Authors utilizing the ACF have 
termed the access to resources such as formal legal authority, public opinion, financial resources 
and leadership as “political capacity” (Weible and Heikkila 2016). Weible and Heikkila (2016) 
define “political capacity” as the “ability to access and use resources that allow coalition 
members to influence the policy process [and] can shape the effectiveness of coalitions in the 
policy process” (234). A coalition’s “political capacity” will greatly affect a coalition’s success 
or failure in achieving respective policy goals (Kubler 2001; Sabatier and Weible 2007; 
Nohrstedt 2011; Pierce 2016; Weible and Heikkila 2016; Steinman et al. 2017). RMT has been 
criticized for solely focusing on external institutional structures and discounting motivations or 
collective identity among groups attempting to achieve social movement success (Beuchler 
1993; Jenkins 1983) and the ACF’s inclusion of coalition policy core beliefs analysis addresses 
this limitation to provide a comprehensive analysis addressing a wide range of factors affecting 
policy change. 
 In this study, I use the principles of the ACF to guide my analysis of the diversity of 
outcomes in the GMO labeling policy initiatives across five states within the Northeast (Table 1). 
The comparative analysis relies on semi-structured interviews with coalition members and policy 
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actors to examine coalition structure and membership and to evaluate problem perceptions and 
policy positions related to GMO labeling across all five states. I also conducted document 
analysis on materials published by the coalitions themselves including mission statements and 
newsletters to understand coalition membership and structure. In the ACF, issues will become 
problems when they are selected and filtered through lenses based on an actor’s normative 
orientation (Sabatier 1988). Policy actors will then form arguments that contain their policy core 
beliefs (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Thus, how coalition members frame the (non)-problem of 
GMOs and policy solutions can illuminate their belief systems which, according the ACF, is 
what binds these coalitions together (Weible and Sabatier 2005; Henry et al. 2010; Henry 2011; 
Ingold 2011; Matti and Sandstrom 2011). Policy core beliefs, the second tier in the belief system, 
will distinguish between coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Weible and Sabatier 2005; 
Sabatier and Weible 2007; Matti and Sandstrom 2011; Jenkins-Smith 2014). Through interviews, 
I also evaluate each coalition’s “political capacity” based on their narrative account of their 
involvement in the policy debate, who they formed partnerships with, overall public opinion, and 
access to financial resources. I lastly compare the political landscape within each state, looking at 
external institutions or political opportunity structures available to advocacy coalitions to pursue 
their policy goals. The political opportunity structure concept derives from the argument that the 
success or failure of social movements is dependent upon the institutional structure and greater 
political environment in which it takes place (McAdam et al. 1996; Kubler 2001; Giugni and 
Grasso 2016; Cisar 2017). The ACF has rarely been applied comparatively using similar 
methods of data collection and analysis (Leach and Sabatier 2005; Weible et al. 2010). 
Therefore, my methods offer a new approach to comparative analyses using the ACF and can 
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help identify case-specific insights and bring forth patterns across cases in the context of GMO 
labeling policy development at the state level.  
Table 4.1 Evaluation methods for each ACF principle under study 
ACF Principle Method of Evaluation 
Coalition structure Categorization of members within each coalition through interviews with 
coalition members and document analysis of coalition self-published materials 
(newsletters, mission statements, etc.) 
Shared belief system Framing of (non)-problem of GMOs and potential solutions through interviews 
with coalition members 
Political capacity A coalition’s access to resources, legal authority, finances, etc. through 
interviews with coalition members 
Political landscape Identification of external institutions and political opportunity structures within 
each state and interviews with state legislators 
 
Setting the Stage: GMO Labeling Across the Northeast  
Connecticut 
Connecticut was the first state in the U.S. to pass a GMO labeling law in 2013. HB-6527 
An Act Concerning Genetically-Engineered Food was first introduced in February 2013 and 
required certain foods for human consumption that are entirely or partially genetically-
engineered to be labeled as such. It was referred to the Joint Committee on Children first, then to 
the Joint Committee on Public Health in April and next the House Committee on Judiciary at the 
beginning of May 2013. The Governor signed the bill into law on June 25, 2013. The bill had 
over 65 cosponsors and in the House received 134 votes in favor with only 3 against and 13 
absent or choosing not to vote (CGA 2013a). In the Senate, 34 senators voted in favor with 0 
against and only 2 absent or not voting (CGA 2013b). While Connecticut was the first state to 
pass a GMO labeling law, the law did not go into effect immediately. An important facet of the 
bill was the attached “trigger clause” which stated that before Connecticut’s law could go into 
effect, a similar law must be enacted in four neighboring states, one of these states must border 
Connecticut and the total population of states must be 20 million (CGA 2013c). Connecticut 
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legislators has been introducing GMO labeling laws to the state legislature since 2011 with HB-
5868 An Act Requiring the Labeling of Genetically Modified Food introduced by Rep. Diana 
Urban but only had two co-sponsors listed and never made it out of the Committee on Public 
Health (CGA 2011). GMO labeling began to gain a bit more traction in 2012 with the 
introduction of HB-5117, introduced in February 2012 with 25 cosponsors and a public hearing 
held on the subject and was favorably voted out of the Environment committee but never 
received a floor vote (CGA 2012). 
 
Maine 
Maine was the next state in the U.S. to pass a GMO labeling law in January of 2014. LD-
718 An Act to Protect Maine Food Consumers’ Right to Know about Genetically Engineered 
Food was signed by Governor Paul LePage with the similar trigger clause requirement as 
Connecticut’s law. Maine has a history of introducing state laws concerning the regulation of 
genetically engineered products. In the 124th legislature (2008-2010) three bills were introduced 
on regulating the planting of genetically engineered plants (in efforts to prevent contamination of 
other non-GE seeds) and establishing farmers’ rights in instances of intellectual property rights 
theft claimed by GE seed companies. An Act to Establish Annual Reporting for Genetically 
Engineered Crops was passed and signed by the Governor in 2009 requiring that manufacturers 
selling GE crops report acreage to the Commissioner of Agriculture (Maine Legislature 2009). In 
the 126th legislature (2012-2014) LD-718 was introduced to the Committee on Agriculture, 
Conservation and Forestry in March 2013 with a public hearing held on April 23, 2013. Maine’s 
House passed the bill with a vote of 141 to 4 and the Senate unanimously supported the decision 
as well. Ultimately the bill was enacted in January 2014 (Maine Legislature 2014).	
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Massachusetts 
In Massachusetts, acts related to the labeling of GMOs (food and seed) were introduced 
into the state legislature starting in the 2013-2014 session. In the following session (2015-2016) 
three bills were introduced, notably House No. 3242 by Ellen Story (D) and Todd Smola (R). In 
January of 2015 the bill was referred to the Committee on Environment, Natural Resources and 
Agriculture (The General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2016a) and a public 
hearing was conducted in September of 2015. The bill contained 154 cosponsors and was 
reported favorably out of the Committee on Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture 
and was referred to the committee on House Ways and Means in April 2016. However, it was 
reported as “no further action taken” in January of 2017 (The General Court of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2016b) due to the passage of the federal GMO labeling law in 
July 2016 which preempted any current and future statewide labeling laws. 
 
New York 
Between the House and the Senate, in 2016, New York introduced six bills related to the 
labeling of GM foods. Bills were also introduced concerning a GMO registry to track seeds sold 
throughout the state, labeling for vaccines with GMOs, and conducting a study on health and 
environmental effects from GMOs (NCSL 2016). Labeling of Genetic Engineering Products, A. 
617, filed by Assembly Member Linda Rosenthal (D) and S.485, filed by Senator Kenneth 
LaValle (R) were initially referred to the Consumer Affairs and Protection Committee in January 
2015 and ultimately voted out the following year (February 2016) with a vote of 9-7. The bill 
contained 48 co-sponsors and GMO labeling activists held a NY GMO Labeling Rally and 
Lobby Day at the State Capitol in Albany, NY on March 8, 2016 to garner attention and support 
	 133 
for the bill (GMO Free NY 2016).	The bill next traveled through the Codes Committee, Ways 
and Means Committee and Rules Committee in June 2016 but stalled in the legislature, never 
receiving a floor vote (NYS General Assembly 2016). New York had been introducing GMO 
labeling bills over the last couple of legislative sessions, with relatively similar strong support 
(the 2013 labeling bill introduced by Rosenthal had 42 co-sponsors as had a similar bill in the 
Senate under Lavelle) and a public hearing was conducted on the subject in New York City in 
2013, but did not allow citizens to testify; only to observe (NYS General Assembly 2013). 
 
Vermont  
Vermont has a history of labeling legislation related to biotechnology as the first and sole 
state to pass a recombinant bovine growth hormone (rBGH) labeling law for milk made with the 
genetically engineered hormone in 1994 (Maine passed a law the same year requiring labels on 
products not produced from cows treated with rBGH) (Schneider 1994). However, the law was 
deemed unconstitutional, and Vermont was forced to remove its labels since the court 
determined there was no difference between milk from treated and untreated cows (a label is 
only required when there is a significant difference between the final products as mandated by 
the Food and Drug Administration) and “consumer interest” was not deemed valid to warrant a 
label (Runge and Jackson 2000; Lowe 2015). Popular among Vermont dairy products has been 
the use of voluntary, value-added labels such as “rBGH free” or “Dairy not treated with rBGH” 
including the Vermont-based ice cream chain Ben and Jerry’s, that has been a vocal opponent of 
the use of rBGH in dairy products and was active in the rBGH labeling push in the 1990s (Ben 
and Jerry’s 2017).  
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In the 2011-2012 legislative session three bills were introduced to require the labeling of 
GE food. While these bills only travelled through a few of the committees and never received a 
floor vote, H. 722 An act relating to the labeling of food produced with genetic engineering 
introduced by Rep. Kate Webb had a multitude of witnesses testify to the House Committee on 
Agriculture and a public hearing was held for citizens to testify as well. Witnesses ranged from 
small Vermont businesses and farms to national biotechnology firm representatives, local and 
national government officials and medical professionals (Vermont General Assembly 2012). In 
the following session (2013-2014) House (H.112) and Senate (S.89) bills were introduced related 
to the labeling of GMOs. H.112 An Act relating to the labeling of food produced with genetic 
engineering had five sponsors with 45 additional cosponsors. The bill was first introduced in 
January of 2013 and travelled through multiple committees and passed through many House roll 
call votes with amendments added over the year. In April of 2014, it passed through the Senate 
the final time with a vote of 28-2 and in the House of 114-30 (Vermont General Assembly 2014). 
The Act was signed into law by Governor Peter Shumlin in May 2014. This bill contained no 
trigger clause and was set to go into effect July 1, 2016 with the intention of a two-year delay to 
give food companies time to adjust their package labeling. An interesting facet of the bill was the 
establishment of a Genetically Engineered Food Labeling Special Fund which was set up in 
anticipation of costs and liabilities incurred by the Attorney General in implementing this bill 
(i.e. legal costs when the state of Vermont was sued for the constitutionality of the bill). 
Immediately following the passage of the bill the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) 
and others sued Vermont, claiming the law violated the commerce clause (a clause in the 
Constitution granting Congress the authority to regulate trade among states) and preempted by 
federal law. However, a couple of months after the lawsuit was introduced, a judge ruled that the 
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GE disclosure requirement was “reasonably related to the State’s substantial interests” and was 
therefore constitutional (Judge Christina Reiss as quoted in Falko 2015) which differs from the 
previous ruling on the rBGH labeling. The Environmental and Natural Resources Law Clinic 
(ENRLC) from the Vermont Law School with co-counsel from the Center for Food Safety 
represented the State of Vermont throughout the legal proceedings over the following year but 
ultimately the federal labeling law S.764 The National Biotech Disclosure Law passed in mid-
July 2016 (only two weeks after Vermont’s labeling law went into effect), which pre-empted 
state labeling laws and Vermont’s law became null and void.  
 
Methods 
 The data for this study were drawn primarily from semi-structured in-depth interviews 
with forty key stakeholders involved in the GMO labeling initiatives across the five states, with 
additional research analyzing coalitions’ self-published materials on their websites including 
newsletters and mission statements. Interviews conducted included 6 in Connecticut, 5 in 
Massachusetts, 8 in Maine, 9 in New York and 12 in Vermont. All interviews were confidential 
and were assigned pseudonyms for purposes of presenting findings in this study (See Appendix 
C for complete list of interviews). I used a modified snowball technique (Birkland 2004; 
Michaels et al. 2006; Weible et al. 2010; Anderson and MacLean 2015) to identify individuals 
and organizations involved in GMO labeling in each of the five states. Key stakeholders were 
identified through a review of witness testimony from statewide public hearings on GMOs, 
online sources and news media as well as recommendations from other interviewees. Interviews 
were conducted between May 2015-August 2017 via telephone or in person and lasted about 30-
45 minutes. All interviews were recorded with permission from the participants, and transcribed 
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verbatim. Questions pertained to identifying rationales for why GMOs should or should not be 
labeled, positions on the current policies surrounding GMOs, recommended policy solutions, 
strategies employed and resources used in the initiative, as well as partnerships formed among 
groups across and within states. 
Using a thematic analysis approach (Daly et al. 1997; Boyatzis 1998; Braun and Clarke 
2006) I developed a list of inductive codes that emerged from the data. After coding I 
summarized the coded text by ACF constructs (policy core beliefs, resources, strategies) to 
highlight key themes and subthemes within the framework to better organize my findings (Miles 
et al. 2014). Thematic content analysis has been recognized as an effective way in which to 
analyze the data to bring forth policy core beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). The 
qualitative software program Atlas.ti was utilized to analyze the data.  
 
Results 
To map and compare the politics of GMO labeling across the five states, I first present 
the structure of the different advocacy coalitions within each state. I follow with a summary of 
the major perceptions of the problem of GMOs and potential solutions within each state, 
gathered from thematic analysis of interviews with stakeholders involved in the initiative to 
bring forth policy core beliefs. I then discuss the unique political opportunity structures 
composed within each state and differences in political capacity for different actors.  
 
Advocacy Coalition Structures in the Policy Subsystem 
Proponents of GMO labeling across all five states included consumer advocacy 
organizations, organic and/or small farming associations, environmental groups, and specific 
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“GMO free” or GMO labeling groups. Opponents of labeling mostly included statewide grocers’, 
retailers’ and food producers’ associations, regional biotechnology trade associations and select 
farm advocacy groups. Within each state, opponents and proponents were represented by a 
handful of these types of organizations. In Vermont’s labeling coalition, there was a much larger 
representation of small, local farm groups. The labeling proponent coalition was started and led 
by a small farmer which brought in other local farmers as well as Vermont farmer advocacy 
groups5. Maine had a relatively high representation of farmer organizations as well. An organic 
farming group led the state labeling initiative in Maine, joined by the state’s farm bureau and 
local food advocacy groups as well. While the New York labeling coalition did contain 
consumer rights groups, labeling groups and farmer advocacy groups, there was a strong 
representation of environmental organizations. For the most part, the opponent labeling 
coalitions were relatively uniform across all five states, however it was noted from interviews 
with members of New York advocacy coalitions and legislators, that the farming industry in 
New York was a sizable and influential opposition force in the state against labeling. That 
sentiment was not expressed as strongly when talking with members and legislators within the 
other states. 
 
Why should GMOs be labeled? 
Interviews with proponents of GMO labeling stated that their main reasons for wanting 
GMOs labeled was because it was a “consumer’s right to know.” Across all five states GMO 
labeling was tied to the consumers’ right to access to information about their food, to make better 
																																																						
5 If you reference their coalition website “Vermont Right to Know”, the majority of members represent 
small Vermont organic farms (Vermont Right to Know 2017).  
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informed decisions and the need for greater transparency in the food system. Ellen, a member of 
an environmental group in New York stated: 
From a consumer perspective, this is a right to know issue. 
People want to know what they’re eating, they have a right 
to know. And people can have different reasons for why 
they want to know, they could be religious, they could be 
environmental, they could be simply they want to be an 
informed consumer (GMO 123). 
 
For some advocacy groups, mostly based out of Vermont, they tied the consumer’s right to 
information to a basic human right for information. Taking away access to information about 
food was seen not only as an affront to the rights of a consumer but also to those of citizens. 
Kate, a member of a farmer advocacy group in Vermont stated, “It [food] is one of the most 
fundamental choices we make as human beings, what we are going to put in our mouths, what 
we are going to put in our body and what we’re going to feed our kids…People just wanted to 
know” (GMO 132). 
Another popular reason stated for why GMOs needed to be labeled was the risk of 
corporate concentration and control associated with GMOs in the food industry. Biotechnology 
companies controlling the seed and the herbicides used in conjunction with the seed, held too 
much power over farmers and the greater public. The industry’s lack of transparency in opposing 
these GMO labels only heightened the public’s distrust and fear of these companies. The GMO 
labeling issue became one tied to corporate domination and control in the food system. Don, a 
founding member of a labeling group in Massachusetts stated, “Food companies and chemical 
companies have built a business model around the lack of transparency in the food economy. 
Their business model relies on people not knowing and consuming their product” (GMO 108). 
Proponents of labeling also referred to the relationship between industry and the government as 
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corrupt. The current regulatory framework for GM crops requires the company producing the 
crop to demonstrate that the final GM product is “substantially equivalent” to its non-GM 
counterpart. If this comparison is demonstrated then the government does not require any further 
regulation or oversight. Labeling proponents have viewed this governmental regulatory system 
as a clear example of a lack of regulation, only increasing the power the industry holds over the 
public and embodying a threat to democracy. Bob, a farmer from Maine stated: 
These multinational mega corporations are scared to death of 
competition and free flow of information. And free flow of 
information is required in a democracy, not that these corporations 
have any use for democracy. Democracy stands in their way of 
power and money…Who do they serve? Do they serve the 
commons or do they serve their own selfish self-serving position? I 
think you can get social progress if you combine wise use of food 
dollars with good legislation that restrains these corporations from 
screwing people over because that’s what they’re doing. They have 
to be restrained because they will just keep running people over 
(GMO 115). 
 
Where legislative mandates were lacking, GMO labeling was seen as a market solution to 
give the public information they needed to take back some of the power these corporations had 
acquired from the people over the past 20 years. GMO labeling was giving the people the right to 
know, and for some advocacy groups, that information would empower the public while 
simultaneously weakening the industry.  
Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut and New York members of the labeling coalition 
also stated the need for more scientific studies to demonstrate GMO safety. Since many of the 
scientific studies submitted to the government to demonstrate “substantial equivalence” between 
the GM crop and non-GM counterpart are conducted by the industries marketing these products, 
certain labeling proponents do not trust the results. They called on more independent scientists to 
conduct their own studies before the U.S. government and public embrace these products so 
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readily. Brianna, a member of a labeling advocacy group in Connecticut stated, “There hasn’t 
been much testing of GMOs, they haven’t been proven to be safe…so more testing is needed to 
consider if they should be consumed. Other countries do take the precautionary principle, our 
country doesn’t seem to do that so certainly labeling is warranted” (GMO 101). With the lack of 
independent scientific studies demonstrating safety, a label was considered a stop gap measure 
until their safety could be confirmed by scientists who did not work for the companies marketing 
these products. Not surprisingly, based on the representation of their coalition membership, New 
York labeling proponents referenced the environmental risks of GMOs the most when asked why 
they wanted GMO labeling. Environmental risks included the increase in herbicides being 
sprayed with the planting of GMOs and the proliferation of herbicide resistant weeds with the 
overuse of these herbicides, which now resulted in increased use of more toxic herbicides thus 
polluting land and water.  
  The advocacy coalition members from Vermont were the only members out of the five 
states to mention that part of their reason for pushing for GMO labeling was to refocus attention 
on alternative agricultural solutions for future food production. Many members discussed their 
goal of revitalizing sustainable or “regenerative agriculture” defined by Kate, a representative of 
a farm advocacy group in Vermont as “focusing primarily on the health of the soil, creating 
nutrient-dense foods, whole foods” (GMO 132). Kate went on to discuss that with issues of 
pollution from increased herbicide use with GMOs, they were hoping to shed light on these risks 
and work on sustainable solutions for their farmers. She stated: 
We believe in the face of all the other challenges out there with 
climate change, with economics, this type of farming is the 
methodology that is going to be sustainable over the long term and 
it’s going to give us a sustainable food supply and it’s going to 
give us the ability to maintain the economic viability of the planet. 
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And that’s really crucial to the state’s agricultural history, our 
culture and our topography (GMO 132). 
 
Vermont coalition members cited problems with the whole industrial, technological-driven, 
monoculture agricultural system and hoped that GMO labeling would bring greater awareness to 
these issues. Joe, a farmer from Vermont stated that GMO labeling was a “vehicle to wake 
people up about what is going on in the food system…our argument is not just GMOs, it’s like 
enormous toxicity in the foods, high use of antibiotics, high use of hormones…” (GMO 133). 
Vermont members also made references to farmer risks and specifically organic agricultural risks 
with GMOs, (for example farmers being forced to buy new seed and more pesticides each year 
and GMO contamination problems) much more prominently than any other states’ coalition 
labeling proponents.  
 
Why should GMOs not be labeled? 
For opponents of GMO labeling, the responses were relatively uniform across the five 
states. Opponents to labeling did not want a label because the economic risks would be too high, 
the label would in fact inhibit consumer rights by causing further confusion, and if there was 
going to be a label, it should be at the federal level to ensure consistency and uniformity in 
labeling. Dan, from a local manufacturing trade association in Maine stated, “So there is a certain 
labeling law in Maine and there is a certain one in Vermont and there is a different labeling law 
in Connecticut but no labeling law in Illinois. That creates for companies doing business in more 
than one state, a regulatory environment that is literally impossible to navigate” (GMO 119). 
Other food manufacturers referred to a statewide labeling regulatory structure as a “distribution 
nightmare” (John, GMO 111) or an “operational and regulatory nightmare” (Dan, GMO 119). 
George, from a New York farmer advocacy group echoed the same concerns: 
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If you have a patchwork of state mandates across the country that 
have different criteria, different standards, that makes it very 
difficult for farmers who sell directly to consumers, food 
processors and food companies to distribute their products across 
state lines…because the regulatory dynamics are too difficult for 
them to navigate (GMO 128). 
 
George goes on to state how this then directly hurts farmers by forcing some to switch to non-
GM crops, which ultimately “reduces options for our farmers for what they grow. It takes tools 
out of their basket in terms of finding crops that are best for them and what they choose to grow” 
(GMO 128). This then negatively affects a farmer’s profit margins, reduces choices for 
consumers in the marketplace, and could increase the price of food for consumers. Many 
opponents to the mandatory labeling law called for the use of a voluntary labeling law. They 
reasoned that the decision to practice non-GM agriculture was a business decision. If a farmer 
wanted to grow non-GM crops then they could advertise this with a value-added label. A 
voluntary label would promote free market ideals; if someone wanted to take on the added 
expenses of growing non-GM crops then they could market their product at a higher price to 
offset that added cost. Diana, a member of a farmer advocacy group in Connecticut states: 
My way of looking at it is, it’s the cost of doing business. It’s no 
different than if you have to pay for your licenses, your fees, 
permits, whatever you need. If you feel that strongly enough about 
this issue and if you feel there’s a benefit to your consumers or 
your customers having this information...there’s a cost of doing 
business and the producer has to pass that on and the consumer 
pays for it (GMO 105). 
 
Opponent interviewees highlighted that for smaller farmers, producers or retailers this 
added cost is significant. While large corporations may be easily able to change labels for 
regional distribution or switch a subset of their ingredients to non-GMO, those hit hardest by 
the increased costs would be local, small farms and businesses, which would negatively 
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impact the statewide economy as well. In Connecticut, a local biotechnology firm that 
opposed labeling explained how scientific studies did in fact demonstrate GMO safety and 
that GMO labeling could inhibit biotechnology innovation in the state. Christopher, from the 
biotechnology advocacy group stated: 
 
We’re trying to nurture a biotech life sciences, this sector, this 
cluster [in CT]. The science behind GE foods is very similar to 
what is going on in labs and biotech companies making 
medicine….We can’t be anti-science when it comes to very similar 
science that improves food (GMO 106). 
 
The bioscience council from Connecticut appeared optimistic that if the public had more 
education on the science of bioengineering (open discussion of risks and benefits) rather than just 
adding a label to food products, the public may be more accepting of the technology. The 
acceptance and support for biotechnology could lead to growth in the biotechnology sector 
within the state, thus benefitting the industry and the state’s economy overall. Here a label was a 
hindrance to a potential economic opportunity in a burgeoning field in the state. 
 
Political Capacity and Political Opportunity Structures  
The ACF looks at policy change over time in relation to the formation, resources and 
strategies of advocacy coalitions. External events on the policy subsystem will determine certain 
constraints and resources for these advocacy coalitions. Since the GMO labeling case studies 
take place within five different policy subsystems containing different actors and different 
political structures, it is important to compare differences across these structures. Political 
opportunity structures will influence an advocacy coalition’s political capacity (i.e. their ability 
to achieve their policy goals).  
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The National Conference on State Legislatures (NCSL) categorizes the capacity of state 
legislatures to function as independent branches of government by evaluating the time legislators 
spend on the job, the amount they are compensated and the size of the legislature’s staff. 
Massachusetts and New York are considered by the NCSL (2017) as “Green” and “Green Lite” 
respectively, signifying full-time, well-paid legislators with large staffs. However, a fully 
functioning state legislature does not equate automatically to a political opportunity structure 
amenable to progressive policy change. Both GMO labeling bills introduced into these state 
legislatures never received a floor vote nor came to fruition before the enactment of the federal 
labeling bill. Peter, a Massachusetts legislator described the difficulty and time it took to gain 
overall legislator support on the bill and acquire a significant number of cosponsors. The key to 
gaining support for passage was to make the bill bipartisan. In order to get to the support they 
obtained in the beginning of 2016 for the state labeling bill, they had to work on streamlining 
their argument so it was comprehensive and agreeable to the widest population of legislators. He 
states: 
The mission was to label things with GMOs. I had to tell all of 
these groups who wanted us to preach that GMOs were terrible… 
‘let’s focus on what brought us here and that is to label products 
that have GMOs in them’. We even eliminated some of the more 
radical arguments of whether or not people thought GMOs were 
healthy for you or not…You can use that advocacy as an argument 
but at the end of the day we want to see this pass so let’s not try to 
get down into the weeds of it (GMO 109). 
 
According to Peter the key to getting the bill passed was simplicity. The way in which to gain the 
widest support was to stick to the simple argument of the need to give consumers information 
about a product. This was an argument that could attract members from both sides of the aisle. 
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For New York, GMO labeling appeared to be an uphill battle right from the start. 
Barbara, a New York legislator discussed the immense number of statewide and national 
lobbyists present in the Capitol building fighting in opposition (mainly farming and biotech 
interests) to the state labeling bill. As Barbara stated, “Anytime New York passes something it 
gains attention around the country just because we’re New York” (GMO 126). With a population 
of 19.75 million (the 4th largest in the U.S.), New York’s passage of the bill would have fulfilled 
neighboring states’ trigger clauses and would also have most likely propelled a cascade of other 
states to pass their own statewide labeling bill. With opponents attuned to this possibility, 
opposition interests determined to prevent this bill from passage employed an influx of lobbyists 
to convince legislators to not support the bill. And they were essentially successful at their job. 
Barbara said lobbyists “were everywhere” and “did all sorts of tricks to get them [legislators] off 
the bill” and even got small businesses to come out against the bill, which she believed “were 
ginned up by the lobbyists” (GMO 126). Furthermore New York’s diverse population, 
geographic landscapes and communities across the whole state bring a broad array of concerns 
into the public policy arena. As Barbara stated, “There is always that problem of balancing 
upstate and downstate concerns” (GMO 126). Referencing rural, farm-populated communities 
and rust-belt cities in central and upstate New York versus urban areas downstate, it can be 
difficult to find common ground on certain policy issues, especially those in which the farm 
bureau has a stake in the outcome. As Barbara warned, “For some people, the Farm Bureau can 
go against you and then your seat is in jeopardy” (GMO 126). For full-time legislators with 
highly paid staff present in Massachusetts and New York legislatures, this was a beneficial 
opportunity structure for advocacy coalitions with greater financial resources (ability to hire 
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lobbyists) to gain access and influence in their local policy-making arenas, whereas coalitions 
lacking these resources could not gain [easy] access. 
 Connecticut is considered a hybrid of the traditional citizen legislature and the “green” 
full-time, well-paid, large staff legislatures. Connecticut legislators typically spend about 2/3 of a 
full-time job working as a representative, usually require supplemental income and have an 
intermediate-sized staff (NCSL 2017). Since Connecticut was the first state in the U.S. to pass a 
GMO labeling law, there was great fear that Connecticut would become isolated, incapable of 
encouraging new business and hindering interstate trading of food. The trigger clause became a 
necessary component for passage. Ann, a legislator from CT stated how major food brands 
threatened to not ship food to the state because “we can’t just label what is in CT” (GMO 103). 
She went on to explain that the Governor stood staunchly against the bill without a trigger 
clause. Ann states, “He said, ‘No way. I’m vetoing anything that comes out because we’re not 
going to be the only state in the nation besides VT that has a labeling law and we’re not doing 
it’” (GMO 103). While advocates were unhappy with the inclusion of a trigger clause, they also 
expressed their understanding that a compromise would get the bill passed. As Jamie, an 
advocate from Citizens for GMO labeling stated, “You can’t let perfect be the enemy of good. 
And there is a time to compromise” (GMO 102). Connecticut also held two public hearings on 
the GMO labeling issue and had major momentum from grassroots activist groups advocating for 
the labeling bill. Many activist groups and legislators interviewed from CT referenced Tara 
Cook-Littman as one of the great leaders in the movement. She was one of the founders of GMO 
Free CT and a past prosecutor for New York City who ran for state representative in 
Connecticut. Due to her experience in law and politics, she was well-versed in the area of public 
policy and became a key spokesperson for the coalition, and was able to gain access to state and 
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even federal legislators in the GMO labeling discussions. She was a key resource for the 
coalition for labeling as she increased their political capacity in her access to government 
officials, legal authority and connections with other political allies (Weible 2007; Elgin and 
Webible 2013).   
With a NCSL categorization of “Part time Lite” legislature, meaning low pay and small 
staffs, usually found in rural states with small populations, Vermont was the only state in which 
the advocacy coalition in support of labeling was truly successful. A GMO labeling law passed 
in 2014 and went into effect in July 2016 without the need of a trigger clause to be fulfilled. 
While interviewing stakeholders active in the labeling campaigns, many referenced the very 
accessible “citizen legislature” in Vermont. Legislators are in office for five months out of the 
year and will usually have secondary jobs in their home communities, which Bill, part of a 
consumer advocacy group in Vermont, stated, “makes them really really responsive to 
constituents” (GMO 135). A farmer, Joe, one of the founding members of the coalition for 
labeling in Vermont, discussed how accessible the Vermont statehouse is for the public: “They 
[legislators] don’t have offices, they just have committee rooms and the cafeteria is open to the 
public. Very few states you can go into the cafeteria and basically accost them. We’re lucky with 
that” (GMO 130). The Vermont General Assembly website also lists the home address, home 
phone number and personal email contact for each legislator. Beth, a legislator stated, “People 
know where I live. You can Google Earth my address and you’ll see my garden and my animals 
out in the pasture. So we are very in touch with our constituents and I think that they realize that” 
(GMO 137). The combination of access points for engaged citizenry in the Vermont General 
Assembly as well as representatives directly tied to their home communities creates institutional 
structures amenable for civic engagement (Abel and Stephan 2000). Vermont held two public 
	 148 
hearings on the GMO labeling bills where citizens overwhelmed the courthouse (over 100 people 
attended the 2012 hearing and over 200 in the 2014 hearing) traveling from across the state to 
have their voices heard on the issue (Farm Aid 2012; Victory 2014). With direct democratic 
practices such as public hearings and open-access to the statehouse, citizens can feel they have 
direct access and influence on bills coming through the state legislature. Compared to other 
states, specifically in New York, Vermont legislators stated how they were surprised by the 
absence of lobbyists in the Vermont statehouse. Tom, a legislator in Vermont states: 
I was expecting that the opposition would be a lot more 
visible in the statehouse but this wasn’t the case with the 
labeling bill. I later found out that the industry conceded 
that Vermont was going to this pass this law but they would 
have a chance in court of defeating it…They kind of 
stepped back and let it happen because they thought it was 
going to win in court (GMO 135). 
 
Even at public hearings, opponents to the bill were wholly absent. It also appeared that 
Vermont was excited about the potential of being a leader on this labeling bill for the rest of 
country, which explains the absence of a trigger clause in their legislation. Unlike the other 
states, there was no need for a compromise to get the bill passed. As Beth states, “We just did it. 
We just said, ‘the hell with it’” (GMO 137). Activist groups distributed articles on the defects of 
a trigger clause to legislators emphasizing the leadership potential, highlighting the “we want to 
be first” sentiment (Joe, GMO 133). Vermont has often led the way on progressive policy. As 
many legislators articulated when asked why they thought Vermont was the first and only state 
to pass and enact a labeling law, Vermont has a history of progressive legislation such as being 
the first state to ban slavery, the first to legalize gay marriage through legislation and the first 
state to legalize recreational marijuana (even though it was later vetoed by the governor). As 
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Joanne, another legislator from Vermont stated, “We’re a feisty little state and we’re willing to 
go out there” (GMO 138).  
Maine is also categorized as a “Part-time Lite” legislature by the NCSL (2017). Similar 
to Vermont, their legislature website lists legislators’ home addresses (absent though of personal 
email and phone number). However, unlike Vermont, legislators and stakeholders from Maine 
did not reference the ease of access to Maine’s representatives. In fact, many activist labeling 
organizations in Maine referenced the varied impediments to getting the bill passed, with the 
major one being the Republican Governor’s approval. One farmer, Bob stated, “We knew the 
biggest job was to get it past our maniac governor who has last year called himself ‘little Donald’ 
and there is a shocking similarity in terms of disregard for truth, hotheadedness, the simple 
mindedness…” (GMO 115). Multiple interviewees stated that the Governor would only sign 
something if it had Republican support on the bill. Lance Harvell, a Republican from 
Farmington, Maine was one of the main co-sponsors on the bill and many deemed a champion in 
the legislature for GMO labeling. Mary, from an organic farming group in Maine stated how 
Lance was:  
…amazing. He just believed so strongly in it. He was amazing in 
the way that he was able to educate people about the issue and 
bring a lot of people who either were suspicious of this kind of 
legislation or not really convinced that there was really a problem 
(GMO 117). 
 
And while Rep. Harvell was able to gain strong bipartisan support for the bill and gain support 
from the Governor, a trigger clause was a necessary component. Jill from an environmental 
organization in Maine stated: 
The reality is we have a very closely divided legislature…in order 
to get the rest of his [the governor’s] republican colleagues on 
board, they ran with this trigger. So it wasn’t our preference but 
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we’re also political realists and we knew the bill wasn’t going to 
pass unless we had it (GMO 112). 
 
Also present in the Maine’s legislature but absent in Vermont, were the lobbyists. And as some 
observed, they were ever-present. Jessica, from a local food advocacy group in Maine described 
how national and state groups were present many times in the statehouse, specifically the 
Grocery Manufacturer’s Association (GMA) and dairy farmers. Jessica states, “The woman who 
is the GMA lobbyist is one of the biggest players in Augusta. When she walks down the hallway, 
all of the legislators pay attention to what she says. She and the dairy industry were fighting us 
tooth and nail” (GMO 114). With financially powerful and influential forces from the anti-
labeling coalition, a divisive bipartisan legislature, and with less opportunities for direct access, 
the pro-labeling coalition was not able to gain as much traction and influence in the state of 
Maine compared to Vermont.  
 
Discussion 
This comparative approach in policy development across five states helps to illuminate 
case-specific insights as well as identify patterns across cases. Findings from this research 
highlight differences in advocacy coalition membership, perceptions among supporters and 
opponents to GMO labeling, and political opportunity structures across states. Below I discuss 
the main findings from the  analysis of comparisons of coalitions and comparisons across states.  
 
Belief Stability among Coalitions 
The ACF suggests that individuals are motivated by belief systems and will form 
coalitions with others who share common beliefs (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Belief systems are 
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the causal link for explaining network structure of advocacy coalitions (Henry 2011; Matti and 
Sandstrom 2011) and the stability of coalitions overtime (Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair 1993; 
Zafonte and Sabatier 2004). Across all coalitions in all states in support of GMO labeling, 
individuals stated that a common rationale for labeling was the consumer’s right to know in 
conjunction with distrust of large powerful corporations tied to GM crop production. These 
rationales can be tied to policy core beliefs that embody the importance of individual rights, 
accountability, free-flowing access to information and freedom of choice in the marketplace. 
Corporations should be held accountable to provide information to the public, which the public 
can use to make a purchasing decision. The only way to guarantee that corporations would be 
held accountable and provide that information would be through government-mandated 
requirements. While these policy core beliefs espoused the tenets of individualism, labeling 
advocacy coalitions relied on the government to ensure corporations’ transparency. Many 
advocacy groups stated that voluntary labeling “was not enough.” Corporations were already 
demonstrating their inability to be transparent when it came to GMO production exemplified 
through patent laws on GMOs barring access to scientific research data and by their actions 
deliberately blocking this labeling bill. After asking Peter, the legislator from Massachusetts why 
private labels could not offer a solution on their own, he stated:   
Practically speaking they [corporations] are not going to do 
something unless we tell them they should do it. They wouldn’t be 
labeling their product now if there wasn’t some sort of requirement 
to do so by an authority within the government that makes rules 
and regulations for people’s daily lives (GMO 109). 
 
Advocacy coalition members’ main rationales against labeling included the economic 
risks and consumer confusion associated with adding a GMO label. These policy core beliefs fell 
under ideals of laissez-faire capitalism. Private companies should be able to make their own 
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production or marketing decisions for profit and the government should not interfere by creating 
unfair advantages and disadvantages for certain states or production practices. These policy core 
beliefs also included the importance of individual rights. If an individual is concerned about a 
certain characteristic of a product then that individual can choose to avoid those products (i.e. a 
common argument for non-labeling activists was the fact that the organic label already exists 
which will tell a consumer whether or not the product is made with GMOs). Even though the 
advocacy coalitions across the five states included a diversity of members (biotechnology 
industry, scientists, farmers, food industry), they were all bound together by these common 
policy core beliefs. As articulated in the previous section by a farmer from Connecticut, if 
farmers or businesses wanted to become certified and advertise their non-GMO certification then 
that was their business decision with the added costs, risks, and benefits. The government should 
not be interfering in these business decisions attempting to sway a farmer, producer, 
manufacturer or retailer in choosing one type of production over another.  
 Vermont was the only state where advocacy coalitions in favor of labeling were 
successful. Can we draw any insights from their policy core beliefs to understand why? Vermont 
had a greater representation of farmer advocacy groups within their coalition, particularly 
focused on small-scale, sustainable and/or organic farming in the state. The two groups who 
started the labeling coalition in Vermont included a farm and a farmer advocacy group. While 
they shared similar rationales with advocacy groups in the other states focused on consumer 
rights and fear of concentrated corporate control, they also addressed the need for sustainable 
farming initiatives for the future of farming in the state. This advocacy coalition included many 
more members who either were small farmers themselves or represented the interests of small 
farmers who worked to build a healthy, local, sustainable food system in Vermont. Therefore, an 
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additional policy core belief for this coalition was the collective goal of sustainable, local food 
production for the state. This type of local, sustainable agricultural production would increase the 
economic vitality of farmers in the state and community overall. This policy core belief was not 
just about increasing profits for farmers within the state (similar to the policy core belief for the 
coalitions against labeling) but enhancing state economic and social development. Lyson (2007) 
has coined this type of agriculture as civic agriculture where local food and agricultural 
production function “as engines of local economic development and are integrally related to the 
social and cultural fabric of the community” (19). This practice is usually manifested in direct-
marketing operations such as farmer markets, community supported agriculture (CSA) programs, 
community gardens, food co-ops, or “pick your own” practices. These are also usually more 
sustainable and environmentally friendly compared to the environmentally, economically, and 
socially destructive practices associated with the current global industrial agri-food system 
(DeLind 2002; Lyson 2004; Obach and Tobin 2014). Therefore, Vermont’s advocacy coalition 
policy core beliefs also included the enhancement of local, sustainable (environmentally and 
economically) agriculture within the state, a belief absent from coalitions in the other states. In a 
state with a population with a very pronounced environmental and food ethic, connecting GMO 
agriculture to issues within the greater food system including environmental toxins in the soil 
resonates well with citizens in the state, gaining greater public support (an imperative resource 
for advocacy coalitions). By tying GM agriculture to the larger industrial food system as a way 
to differentiate Vermont’s sustainable agricultural practices, GMOs are seen as a threat to the 
economic vitality and community development in the state. 
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Coalition Resources, Political Capacity and Political Opportunity Structures  
A coalition’s ability to succeed or fail is dependent upon the openings in political 
opportunity structures in which to strategize and engage within a particular political landscape 
(McAdam et al. 1996; Kubler 2001). Certain types of political opportunity structures will 
increase a coalition’s ability to capitalize from these different opportunities. For state legislatures 
that employed full-time legislators with large staffs and larger salaries, coalitions with greater 
financial resources (ability to employ lobbyists) had a much easier time infiltrating the 
legislature and influencing legislators. Barbara, the New York legislator discussed how lobbyists 
were ever-present in the statehouse and had the ear of many legislators. She states: 
They shook some legislators’ stand on it. They did all sorts of 
tricks to get them off or not get on the bill. Or not to vote on the 
bill. I had a lot of difficulty with the lobbying groups filling the 
minds of legislators with falsehoods…and then some legislators 
believing them (GMO 126). 
 
Sabatier and Weible (2007) found that coalitions with greater resources had the greatest 
impact on policy. However, resources do not always have to encompass financial or the ability to 
hire lobbyists. Pierce (2016) found in his analysis of hydrofracking policy in Colorado that the 
winning coalition had more public support despite the other (losing) coalitions’ greater financial 
resources. Nohrstedt (2011) has concluded that certain resources (such as pubic support) matter 
more in policy change than others and that financial resources may be a nonfactor in successful 
coalitions (Kubler 2001; Pierce 2016). Maintaining a strong coalition was found to the most 
important strategy for policy change for certain areas (Crow 2008; Gupta 2014; Pierce 2016). 
Based on findings from this comparative research study it appears that financial resources and 
the presence of lobbyists do matter. Both Maine and New York interviewees attested to the 
strong anti-labeling lobbyist pressure in their respective statehouses and Vermont interviewees 
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testified to the apparent absence of said lobbyists. However, it also appeared that Maine, 
Connecticut and Vermont had actors with considerable political capacity involved in the labeling 
movement that gave them elevated access to government officials, legal authority, public support 
and connections with other political allies (Weible 2007; Elgin and Weible 2013). Maine’s 
labeling movement was spearheaded by a Republican who was able to gain Republican support 
(specifically the Governor’s) on the bill which increased its chances of and led to its passage in 
2014 with a compromise trigger clause attached. Connecticut’s movement was founded and led 
by Tara Cook-Littman, firstly identifying herself as a “food blogger and PTA mom” but also a 
past New York City prosecutor and Democratic candidate in the Connecticut House of 
Representatives race in 2014 (Pazniokas 2014). While Tara ended up not winning the House of 
Representatives seat in Connecticut, her experience and proficiency in law and state politics 
increased her political capacity in the labeling law fight. Lastly, Vermont had the assistance of 
the Environmental and Natural Resources Law Clinic from Vermont Law School in helping 
write the law and then defend the law in court when Vermont was sued by the Grocery 
Manufacturer’s Association and others. Kate from one of the advocacy groups in Vermont 
stated, “They ended up being absolutely crucial in terms of pulling together all of the legal and 
legislative arguments we needed to make in order to persuade them and also helping us improve 
the language of the bill” (GMO 132). As stated earlier in the literature, public support and 
maintaining strong coalitions have shown to be crucial in coalitions successfully achieving their 
policy goals (Crow 2008; Nohrstedt 2011; Gupta 2014; Pierce 2016). Activist groups and 
legislators from all states in the study commended the work that labeling coalitions had done on 
the initiatives. Specifically, stakeholders from Vermont expressed the immense public support 
behind the issue and the “amazing and skilled” coalition that worked together to educate and 
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inform the public and legislators (Helen, GMO 131). Jamie, from Citizens for GMO Labeling 
and active in the Connecticut campaign discusses the importance of an “inside/outside game” in 
advocacy. She states: 
Whenever you have a legislative campaign you need to have both. 
If you have a really good inside game and you’re doing really good 
lobbying but you have no outside pressure from constituents then 
you’ll fail. And same if you flip it. If you have a lot of power on 
the outside with your constituents that you’re pushing on the state 
legislators but you don’t have anybody on the inside working that 
angle, you’ll fail. Fortunately for us, we had both (GMO 102).  
 
  While the full-time legislatures appeared to benefit lobbyists and coalitions with greater 
financial resources, the “citizen” part-time legislatures appeared to benefit grassroots, citizen-led 
coalitions organized from the ground-up. In Vermont, having legislators that spent the majority 
of their time in their home districts (instead of at the Montpelier statehouse) made them more 
actively involved in their communities. They were a part of the community itself, and directly 
accountable to their constituents (i.e. neighbors). In Vermont there were many avenues for 
regular citizens to voice their concerns to their legislators and affect legislation through direct 
democratic procedures (easy access to legislators in the statehouse, open committee meetings, 
public hearings). Laura, a member of an organic advocacy group stated: 
I think we are really fortunate here in Vermont that our democracy 
in general is pretty intact and functions well compared to a lot of 
other places throughout the U.S. For example, when we were 
working on the labeling legislation here, it was really apparent that 
people did have connection to their legislators and felt confident 
that they could reach their legislators and share their thoughts and 
let them know they really wanted this legislation passed and this 
was an important issue to them. I think the people of our state 
really have the greatest impact on our legislators whereas in 
Washington I think there is so much lobbying pressure on the hill 
constantly and there’s so much money being spent on lobbyists I 
think the voice of the people often gets drowned out (GMO 139). 
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Along with examples of direct democratic opportunities for citizens, Vermont’s history of 
progressive legislation creates a political climate that endorses revolutionary citizen initiatives.  
External political institutional structures within each state create opportunities and 
barriers for certain groups to advocate their position and influence policy-making at the state 
level. For New York and Maine, lobbyists were able to gain traction and influence within the 
policy-making arena which hindered complete passage of a labeling law. Massachusetts also 
struggled to gain bipartisan support for the bill and the development of a clear, concise message 
advocacy groups and legislators could endorse collectively. In Maine, having a Republican push 
the bill forward may have helped bridge the partisan gap (and gain the Republican Governor’s 
support on the bill) to lead to a partial passage with a compromised labeling law. The 
involvement of a knowledgeable and influential policy entrepreneur holding great political 
capacity in the Connecticut initiative may have helped lead Connecticut to a compromise bill as 
well, despite lobbying pressure from outside food industries threatening to end interstate trading 
of food. In Vermont there was, in a sense, the “perfect storm” of a combination of factors, 
including a citizen legislature, accessible legislators, history of progressive legislation, and a 
citizenry notorious for their “strong food and environmental ethic” (Laura, GMO 139) that led to 
the passage of the first and only state-level GMO labeling law. Furthermore, Vermont’s 
advocacy coalition for labeling drew upon policy core beliefs that also addressed strengthening 
civic agriculture in the state by supporting sustainable agricultural practices, absent in GMO 
agricultural production. 
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Conclusion  
This research, I sought to explore the policy beliefs, resources and strategies employed by 
advocacy coalitions in the GMO labeling movements across five Northeastern states with a 
diversity of policy outcomes. In addition, I analyzed the political landscape within each state and 
institutional structures that advanced or inhibited certain advocacy coalitions in attaining their 
policy goals. The results show relatively uniform policy core beliefs of the advocacy coalition 
for labeling and against labeling across the five states. However, the advocacy coalition for 
labeling in Vermont held policy core beliefs reflecting collective benefits of state-supported civic 
agriculture, referencing sustainable, and agro-ecological practices in farming, which were absent 
from other coalitions’ rationales for support for a GMO label. Vermont’s coalition membership 
containing mostly small farms and farmer advocacy groups explains why this would be one of 
the founding core beliefs. In a state where the public greatly values local, sustainable food 
systems and environmental stewardship, this policy core belief resonates and is shared by the 
wider public. Therefore, Vermont was able to create a broad coalition with wide public support 
to affect policy change, which has been deemed an effective factor in past studies on policy 
developments (Breton et al. 2006; Johnson et al. 2012; Ulmer et al. 2012; Steinman et al. 2017). 
It is important to consider that Vermont’s ability to garner broad public support through 
articulation of civic agricultural benefits may be reflective of their relatively small population 
and homogenous landscape. Vermont with a population of just over 600,000 and a relatively 
uniform rural landscape is strikingly different from New York or Massachusetts that hold 
considerably larger populations and include a diversity of urban, suburban and rural areas. There 
are many more interests, livelihoods and beliefs to consider in these larger, more diverse states 
that may not be so concisely expressed or easy to achieve consensus in policy debates.  
	 159 
Vermont’s advocacy coalition also had access to important resources in policy 
development and increased political capacity. Vermont’s coalition had access to formal legal 
authority with the assistance of a law clinic, and public support, deemed legitimate resources in 
advocacy coalition success (Nohrstedt 2011; Pierce 2016). Vermont also contained political 
opportunity structures much more conducive to grassroots policy mobilization. Vermont even 
holds “Town Meeting Day”, the first Tuesday of every March where citizens in each town come 
together to discuss and vote on local rules and budgets, a specific example of direct democracy at 
work (Markowitz 2003). Vermont’s citizen legislature, accountable and responsive legislators, 
past progressive legislation and direct democratic processes impelled the labeling bill through the 
legislature to the Governor’s desk for signing, compared to the other states who either never saw 
a floor vote or received a stagnant compromise bill.  
These findings provide valuable insights into political behavior and collective action by 
examining how individuals advocated for or protested a government-mandated GMO label. From 
the perspective of policy actors and advocacy groups, this study can help inform future work in 
how to gain traction and support in their respective policy arena. Having an individual who 
understands the “inside and outside game,” gaining bipartisan support on a bill and access to 
legal authority could greatly benefit advocacy groups who may be lacking in funds to hire 
professional lobbyists. Furthermore, forming arguments and rationales that may highlight socio-
economic benefits to a community and/or state may gain better traction with legislators and 
activists intimately connected to their community.  
Theoretically, I utilize the ACF to help describe and compare the political landscape of 
GMO labeling in five states within the Northeastern region. This framework has been rarely 
applied comparatively (Leach and Sabatier 2005; Weible et al. 2010) and this study provides an 
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example for future comparative research. Advocacy coalitions can vary across locations on the 
same issue and within the same time frame. Therefore, as this framework is applied to other 
policy issues nationally and globally across different topics, more comparative analysis can bring 
forth concepts and ideas that may be hidden within the context of a specific place. Application of 
comparative case studies at different scales can also illuminate interactions between local, state, 
national and international policy actors and how they diffuse ideas and strategies. As GMO 
labeling policy continues to evolve at the national and state level, understanding the past political 
processes, influences, and barriers to certain coalitions can help inform policymakers, 
stakeholders and interested citizens wishing to engage in and influence GMO labeling or other 
agri-food policy in the future. 
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Chapter 5: Synthesis of Results and Conclusion 
 
 
Overview and Corroborated Findings  
 
This dissertation project attempted to understand how stakeholders and the public framed 
the issue of genetic modified organisms (GMOs) and policy surrounding the labeling of GMOs. 
With the recent passage of a state followed by a federal GMO labeling bill, the political arena 
has seen a burst of activity surrounding the regulation and labeling of GMOs that creates a 
unique time and place in history to be studying the discursive and external influences on the 
policy process. While there has been extensive study on the discourse surrounding GMO 
regulation at the national and global level (Colina and Montpetit 2018; Binimelis and Myhr 
2016; Kinchy et al. 2008; Kleinman and Kinchy 2003a; 2003b) and analysis of small-scale, 
county-level social movements on GMO moratoriums (Gupta 2018; Pechlaner 2012; Walsh-
Dilley 2009), a gap in the literature remained on the evolution of GMO discourse on labeling at 
the federal level and in-depth comparative case studies on recent GMO labeling policy 
development at the state level. My approach here has been to analyze and understand the various 
influences (internal and external) that led to a diversity of outcomes in GMO labeling policy at 
the national and state scale.  
Studies on the analysis of discursive influences on GMO policy development nationally 
and globally greatly informed how I approached the analysis of discourse on GMO regulation 
and labeling in the U.S. congressional committee hearings, considering concepts of scientism, 
neoliberalism and scientization in biotechnology policy development (Colina and Montpetit 
2018; Bruce 2017; Wenzelburger and Kong 2017; Maeseele 2010; Glover 2010; Newell 2009; 
Kinchy et al. 2008; Kleinman and Kinchy 2007; Levidow et al. 2007; McAfee 2003). These 
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authors have contended that in biotechnology policy discussions and in the final regulations, 
scientific evidence and experts will prevail while socio-economic considerations of the 
technology are dismissed or deemed irrelevant in policy discussions. My findings corresponded 
to findings in these previous studies specifically in the evocation of “scientism” and subsequent 
result of scientization in GMO policy development. In Chapter 2, I found throughout all three 
sessions of Congress that proponents of GMOs continued to rationalize that there was no need 
for increased regulation or labeling of GMOs due to the scientific evidence demonstrating safety. 
Proponents continued to evoke the tenets of scientism through “depoliticizing” the issue of 
GMOs by identifying scientific evidence demonstrating no increased risk of harm from 
consuming GMOs, thus eliminating GM agriculture from political debate. This was especially 
evident in earlier sessions of Congress where GMO proponents also warned of the tenuous 
leadership position the U.S. held in biotechnology innovation and development, who suggested 
that if the government were to call for increased regulation of GMOs, this would only hinder 
further investment in biotechnology development for the country, causing it to “fall behind” in 
global biotechnology development competition. This discourse of scientific optimism and 
importance of innovation leadership has been found in analyses of other countries’ policies 
toward GMO liberalization (Colina and Monteptit 2018; Wenzelburger and Kong 2017). 
However, in the later sessions of Congress, I found through my analysis that the scientism 
rhetoric began to be accompanied by consideration of socio-economic impacts of the technology 
(profits/losses for farmers, consumer knowledge/confusion, information access/loss) by 
opponents and proponents of the technology. While past studies had found that scientism 
trumped and completely eliminated discussion of socio-economic concerns with biotechnology, 
here both were argued concurrently. Specifically in the later sessions of Congress (113 and 114), 
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I found that these socio-economic considerations mattered. Opponents of GMOs in general and 
those in support of GMO labeling framed the majority of their arguments in terms of consumer 
rights (a right to know, uniformity in labeling, access to information). Previously in the 112 
Congress, opponents of GMOs called for more scientific studies and broader oversight and 
increased regulations. These arguments were completely abandoned in favor of transparency and 
rights of consumers. Proponents of GMOs and opponents to labels followed this same change in 
framing by emphasizing the economic risks with a label (specifically increased costs for farmers 
and food prices for consumers) and heightened consumer confusion with a label. Consumer 
interests and economic concerns then became the focal points of debate within the Congressional 
hearings and were the main considerations in the passage of S.764, The Biotech Labeling 
Solutions Act that emerged from these hearings. 
Scholars have argued that policies at the state level likely lead to similar changes at the 
federal level (Clark et al. 2014; Wohlers 2013). In this study we also see that rhetoric and 
discourse utilized at the state level was “scaled up” to attempt a similar national level policy 
change. It is evident when examining the discourse from the state-level debates on GMO 
labeling that activists attempted to use the similar frame of a “consumer’s right to know” when 
advocating for a federal mandated label. Results from Chapter 3 and 4 demonstrated that 
“consumer right to know” was the most popular frame GMO labeling supporters drew upon 
across all five states (derived from public testimony and interviews with stakeholders). Chapter 2 
also indicated that when GMO labeling arose on the federal political agenda due to grassroots 
consumer movements and ballot initiatives occurring in the West in the early 2010s, a “consumer 
right to know” became a prominent argument for labeling on the federal level as well. In this 
case, state social movements served as laboratories to test the effect of particular discourses and 
	 172 
framings to equate policy change. The “consumer right to know” frame was a rallying cry at the 
state level and the federal level, also the most popular frame utilized by supporters of GMO 
labeling in the later sessions of Congress.  
However, we saw in my comparative case study of frames in the GMO labeling 
movements in Chapter 3 that a “consumer right to know” frame was not the stand-alone 
discursive influence for policy passage. Vermont GMO labeling movements drew upon 
additional frames that emphasized the socially-embedded local agricultural production within the 
state and the subsequent threats to this communal identity and livelihood from GM production 
within the state, which Lyson (2004) has coined “civic agriculture.” In Vermont, GM agriculture 
was tied to corporate domination, greed and an environmentally damaging form of monoculture 
agriculture. A GMO labeling bill was not seen as just a form of consumer access to information 
but rather a democratic stance against corporate greed and corruption. These findings support 
similar results found in county-level GMO bans in California, Hawaii and rural areas in Europe 
where activists framed GMOs has a social problem that could negatively affect their locally-
embedded organic agriculture (Gupta 2018; Pechlaner 2012; Walsh-Dilley 2009; Stephan 2015; 
Levidow and Boschert 2008). For these cases, activism discourse focused on the detrimental 
community impacts from the planting of GMOs whether that be the loss of profits for local 
farmers due to GM contamination, loss of cultural and native seed varieties or the devaluing of 
community rural identity and/or livelihood founded upon its local agricultural food production. 
Stephan (2015) wrote in his comparative analysis of GMO regulation between the U.S. and 
Europe that Europe’s rejection of GM technology is associated with their deep-rooted 
agricultural traditions and food cultures. Activists in Europe linked GM foods and crops to the 
decline of the family farm and the spread of fast food (Ansell et al. 2006; Kurzer and Cooper 
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2007), which resonated well with European citizens that embrace regional food production 
systems and traditions (Stephan 2015). Comparatively, the majority of Americans have a 
utilitarian attitude towards food and are most concerned with health, diet, nutrition and a clean 
environment, all aspects that can be achieved through biotechnology (Stephan 2015). Hence 
resistance to GM production in Europe compared to the U.S. can also be attributed to differences 
in cultural identity tied to food and landscape. Stephan (2015) notes that the recent upsurge in 
GM resistance in New England states can be associated with stronger identification with food 
and agriculture, since New England is more reminiscent of Europe compared to the rest of the 
U.S. (Tokar 2009). My findings in this study corroborate this conclusion since Vermont’s strong 
food and environmental ethic linked to their local alternative agricultural production created a 
cultural identity threatened by the proliferation of GM crops. Vermont activists were able to 
frame GMOs as a social-environmental-economic risk that resonated well within the community 
that valued the local, alternative small-scale agricultural production. This analysis also 
demonstrated that this type of discourse can have political ramifications as well as Vermont was 
the only state to pass a GMO labeling bill. In other states, activist frames did not draw on these 
social-environmental-economic concerns as readily, most likely due to the lack of cultural 
resonance it would have had in the state. 
Chapter 4 of this research study utilized the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to 
consider other factors besides discourse and framing that may have been influential in the 
passage of a state-wide GMO labeling bill. This study evaluated the four major principles of the 
ACF in each state (a coalition’s structure, shared belief system, political capacity and the 
political landscape within each state) to understand how they influenced a state’s passage or 
failure of a GMO labeling bill. My findings support similar research that has drawn on the ACF 
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to find that that broader coalitions are more successful in reaching a larger audience and building 
wider support (Breton et al. 2006; Johnson et al. 2012; Ulmer et al. 2012) and that a coalition’s 
increased access to resources, legal authority and public support (i.e. political capacity) increased 
likelihood of success (Kubler 2001; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Nohrstedt 2011; Pierce 2016; 
Weible and Heikkila 2016; Steinman et al. 2017). The policy studies literature has established 
that social movement success or failure is dependent upon the political opportunity structures 
within each subsystem (local, statewide, regional, national) (McAdam et al. 1996; Kubler 2001; 
Giugni and Grasso 2016; Cisar 2017) and I found that a political landscape that included a 
citizen legislature with increased access for citizens to be active in statewide policy change is 
more amenable to grassroots progressive policy change. Furthermore, legislators who are closely 
tied to their home communities (i.e. they are present in their home districts often, like Vermont 
legislators who only spend a little over half a year at the state capitol) will also be more attuned 
to needs and wants of their constituents and first and foremost may identify as a citizen over a 
legislator. As Zurkek (2007) states, “Policymakers will often respond to existing cultural or 
political preferences either because they feel compelled to do so for electoral reasons or because 
they broadly share the public’s concerns” (as quoted in Stephan 2015: 126). For Vermont 
legislators, the latter appears likely as many interviewed shared the same sentiments as citizens 
for the want of a label. When cultural identities and values can permeate throughout the 
community coupled with institutions amenable for civic engagement, political activism can gain 
traction and evoke change. 
There is concern in the study of food politics that activism focused on consumer rights, 
freedom of choice and purchasing power could increase “individualization of responsibility” 
(Maniates 2001) within a movement and have little impact on the greater social and 
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environmental systemic problems within food systems currently (Szasz 2007; Skocpol 2003; 
Guthman 2003; 2004a; b; 2007; Hinrichs 2000; Sclove 2000). How can those claims be 
addressed with findings from this study? This dissertation research demonstrates that frames 
focused on consumer rights and freedom of choice in the marketplace did resonate well with the 
public and became the focal point of social movements across the Northeastern states and 
nationally. However, these findings also demonstrate that framings tied to empowering 
consumers do not stand alone and in the state movements were not enough to warrant policy 
change. When GM agriculture was considered a social threat to a state population, these frames 
were more powerful and impactful at the state level. Moreover, throughout the rest of the states, 
while consumer rights was the most popular frame utilized, many states discussed 
environmental, human health and social risks from GMOs as well. While a labeling law 
ultimately increases the power of the consumer in their purchasing decisions, citizens drew upon 
non-economic and non-consumer power reasons for the demand for a label and thus brought 
forth social, public health and environmental concerns. By and large this labeling movement 
increased awareness about many risks identified with GMOs (social, environmental, economic, 
moral, ethical, public health) that could be pursued further through different policy avenues. 
Many representatives of activist organizations I interviewed stated that now that GMO labeling 
would move to federal responsibility (with the passage of S.764 preempting state laws), they 
were going to shift their focus to mobilization against the dangers of pesticides (one of the main 
environmental and public health risks associated with GMOs). Activism for decreasing 
pesticides will likely be tied to GMOs, and the previous labeling movements may help build a 
strong activist base for the future anti-pesticide movement as well. And to the point that 
movements focused around “conscientious consumerism” (Bartley et al. 2015) could cause 
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“political anesthesia” (Szasz 2007), one could look to the state activists’ marches, public 
demonstrations and public hearings focused on the dangers of GMOs and the need for labels. 
Citizens were just as politically engaged as ever in these labeling movements and their 
participation in this movement may encourage future participation in solving some of the other 
broad structural problems associated with GMOs in movements down the line.  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Moving forward, I think another interesting point drawn from this study is a reflection on 
the prevalence of scientism and scientization within policy discussions and policy development 
concerning biotechnology. We saw in Chapters 2 and 3 that scientism is still present in policy 
discussions concerning biotech even when social and economic issues are discussed as well. In 
both the national and state debates, GMO proponents stated there was enough scientific research 
to warrant deregulation, while opponents called for more scientific research to prove safety. 
There appears to be an irreconcilable tension when debating the merits and breadth of scientific 
studies. While more science is meant to reduce uncertainty about a particular phenomenon, this 
notion can be misguided (Sarewitz 2004). By implicating that uncertainty can be reduced with 
more scientific research, “the scientific community assures that the phenomenon of uncertainty 
remains located in our imperfect (but always-improving) understanding of nature, and not an 
attribute of nature itself” (396). The result is that we have debates where individuals from each 
side of the aisle talk past one another, relying on similar arguments and never reaching a true 
consensus or understanding. Debates about scientific merit on GMOs seem to get us nowhere. 
For example, the documentary Food Evolution was released in 2017 which explored the 
controversy surrounding GMOs, food, the “emotions and the science driving one of the most 
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heated arguments of our time” (iTunes 2018). Critics noted its “soft tone, respectful to opponents 
but insistent on the data…’Food Evolution’ posits an inconvenient truth for organic boosters to 
swallow: In a world desperate for safe, sustainable food, GMOs may well be a force for good” 
(Gold 2017). GMO opponents were not convinced stating, the movie “ignore[s] any 
science/scientists that oppose them [GMOs]” (Kimbrell 2017) and “This film’s credibility suffers 
from their choice to embrace only the science and scientists who side with the chemical industry 
players who profit from GMOs and their chemicals used on them, while ignoring science and 
data that doesn’t fit that agenda” (Malkan 2017). I think the most notable point was made by 
Keith Floor from Slate: “This film is an attempt to inject science into a debate that is shaped by 
values” (2017). As we saw in this research study, individuals care about the social and economic 
concerns with GMOs and citing these concerns while invoking cultural values into policy 
debates can make change happen. If opponents only focused on the lack of science and if 
proponents only focused on the mass volume of science, we would be stuck in a political 
standstill. Bruce’s recent study (2017) evaluated the discourse surrounding the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval of the AquaAdvantage salmon (the first GM fish) for 
consumption. She found regulatory debates to be dominated by scientism and the public was 
even instructed to not address economic, social, environmental or human health issues outside of 
the legal, scientific framework in their comments. The fish was ultimately approved and Bruce 
contends that the public’s rejection to the technology may be due to the scientistic practices of 
the FDA, as the public distrusts these institutions and industry, rather than the technology itself 
(Freudenburg 1988; Lang and Hallman 2005; Sapp et al. 2013; Bruce 2017). If the public are 
citing broader risks with the technology outside of the purely scientific framework, then how can 
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they trust a government agency that only makes regulatory decisions solely based on a scientific 
framework?  
Debates about GMOs are debates about values, and policy discussions related to 
biotechnology are starting to address these socio-economic concerns. It may be prudent for both 
sides of the issue to abandon discussions related to the science and instead focus on the issues up 
for political discussion: the social, environmental, economic, ethical and moral implications with 
GMOs. This would also broaden the discussion to differentiate between GMOs created through 
public-sector science (and therefore not tied to corporate firms), or that address specific public 
health crises (such as nutrient deficiencies or drought-resistance) while still considering the 
social and cultural implications of each of these. By legitimizing these values within political 
debates, equity and justice can be considered in future decisions related to biotechnology. This 
dissertation research project demonstrates that socio-economic considerations matter for the 
public and when tied to cultural values and identities, they can have greater resonance 
throughout the community and can evoke policy change.  
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Appendix A. Interview Contact Letter  1 
Hi [Name],  
 
My name is Sara Velardi and I am a PhD student at the State University of New York College of 
Environmental Science and Forestry (SUNY-ESF). My research is focused on GMO labeling at 
the state and federal level. For the last couple of years I have been following the state labeling 
initiatives in the Northeast and conducting interviews with different activist organizations, 
environmental groups, consumer rights groups and farmer groups to learn about the work they 
did, why they wanted labeling and their thoughts on the new federal bill that just passed. 
 
] If possible I would really appreciate the opportunity to chat with you to hear about the work 
your organization has done on the issue your thoughts on labeling. 
 
Thank you very much for your time! 
 
Sara Velardi 
PhD Candidate in Environmental and Natural Resource Policy 
State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry 
Syracuse, NY 13210 
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2 Appendix B. Informed Consent for Interviews 
You have been invited to take part in an interview about your organization's role in the state-
wide GMO labeling initiative. This interview is for a dissertation research project focused on the 
role of citizen activist groups in social movements for GMO labeling. You will be asked 
questions about the role you and your organization took in the initiative and partnerships you 
formed with other organizations. Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary and 
you can withdraw from this study at any time without penalty. Individual identifying information 
will be kept confidential. If you have any questions about this research you may contact Sara 
Velardi at shvelard@syr.edu. By agreeing to participate in this interview you indicate that you 
understand the information I have read to you, you voluntarily agree to participate and you are 
least 18 years of age.  
Would you like to participate in the interview? 
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3 Appendix C. Complete List of Interviews 
Code Pseudonym State/ 
Federal 
Organization type Stance on GMO 
State Labeling 
GMO 101 Brianna CT Labeling Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 102 Jamie CT Labeling Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 103 Ann CT Legislator Proponent 
GMO 104 Aaron CT Organic Farmer Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 105 Diana CT Farmer Advocacy Opponent 
GMO 106 Christopher CT Biotechnology Advocacy Opponent 
GMO 107 Angela MA Consumer Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 108 Don MA Labeling Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 109 Peter MA Legislator  Proponent  
GMO 110 Eli MA Organic Farmer Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 111 John MA Food Producer, Manufacturer, 
Retailer Advocacy 
Opponent 
GMO 112 Jill ME Environmental Policy 
Advocacy 
Proponent 
GMO 113 Carl ME Farmer Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 114 Jessica ME Farmer Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 115 Bob ME Farmer, Farmer Advocacy Proponent  
GMO 116 Justin ME Legislator Proponent 
GMO 117 Mary ME Organic / Farm Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 118 Rachel ME Food Producer, Manufacturer, 
Retailer Advocacy 
Opponent 
 
GMO 119 Dan ME Food Producer, Manufacturer 
and Retailer Advocacy 
Opponent 
GMO 120 Emma NY Consumer Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 121 Krista NY Environmental Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 122 Paul NY Environmental Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 123 Ellen NY Environmental Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 124 Heather NY Labeling Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 125 Betty NY Organic Farmer Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 126 Barbara NY Legislator Proponent 
GMO 127 Jackson NY Food Industry Advocacy Opponent 
GMO 128 George NY Farmer Advocacy Opponent 
GMO 129 Alexandra NY Farmer Advocacy Opponent 
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GMO 130 Bill VT Consumer Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 131 Helen VT Farmer/Environmental 
Advocacy 
Proponent 
GMO 132 Kate VT Farmer/ Environmental 
Advocacy 
Proponent 
GMO 133 Joe VT Farm / Farmer Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 134 Vicki VT Law Advisory Proponent 
GMO 135 Tom VT Legislator Proponent 
GMO 136 Kevin VT Legislator Proponent 
GMO 137 Beth VT Legislator Proponent 
GMO 138 Joanne VT Legislator Proponent  
GMO 139 Laura VT Organic Farmer Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 140 Fred VT Farmer Advocacy Opponent 
GMO 141 Michael VT Food Producer, Manufacturer, 
Retailer Advocacy 
Opponent 
GMO 142 Taylor National Environmental Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 143 Denise National Environmental Advocacy Proponent 
GMO 144 Brayden National Environmental/Consumer 
Advocacy 
Proponent 
GMO 145 Jennifer National Biotechnology Industry Opponent 
GMO 146 Carson National  Science Advocacy Opponent 
GMO 147 Andrew National Biotechnology Advocacy  Opponent 
GMO 148 Karen National Biotechnology Advocacy Opponent 
GMO 149 Conner National Biotechnology industry Opponent  
GMO 150 Ben National Farmer Advocacy Opponent 
GMO 151 Ron National Food Industry Neutral 
GMO 152 Tom National Food Industry Neutral 
GMO 153 Brian  National Food Industry Neutral 
GMO 154 Leonard National Industry Neutral 
GMO 155 Alexandra National Science Advocacy Neutral 
GMO 156 Phil National Third Party certification Neutral 
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4 Appendix D. Interview Protocol 
1) Can you describe how your organization became involved in the GMO labeling debate?  
2) When did this occur?  
3) What are some reasons as to why_ wants GMO labeling?  
4) Was there a particular trigger event or impetus for involvement in the issue?  
5) Has _ _ been involved in other labeling coalitions or any anti-GM movements in the past?  
6) Did you have a personal reason for involvement in the issue?  
7) What do you think are some of the main issues with GMO labeling?  
8) What is your overall policy goal (label or elimination)?  
9) Does your organizations advocate for voluntary labels or mandatory? Would you be satisfied 
with one over the other? Do you think either/or has different meanings?  
1 0) Is there something or someone you are fighting specifically against or for? i.e. an issue?  
11) What are the best methods (arguments and action) you believe are the way to achieve your 
goals?  
12) Who is your target constituency?  
13) Did you work with any specific politicians on the issue?  
14) Did you work with any other organizations on the issue?  
15) Are there some organizations you wished were more involved?  
16) Do you have partnerships with organizations in other states for GMO labeling or did you 
look to other states for guidance or advice?  
17) Have you worked with any corporations on the GMO issue? Is that of interest?  
18) How large is your organization?  
19) How exactly did you get members involved? How did you promote individual action?  
20) For New York organizations only: You just had a march in Albany for GMO labeling, how 
did you say it went?  
21) What do you think about the future of GMO labeling, do you see this becoming a nation-
wide issue? 
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5 Appendix E. Coding scheme and data summary for Congressional hearings 
 
Support for GMOs 
 112th Congress (2011-2012) 113th Congress (2013-2014) 114th Congress (2015-2016) 
Coding scheme 
To
tal
 %
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ic 
% 
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rm
er 
% 
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 %
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ors
 %
 
To
tal
 %
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To
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O 
% 
Go
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l D
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tor
 %
 
Le
gis
lat
or 
% 
Support for 
GMOs 
100 15.3 15.3 30.8 38.5 100 16.0 8.0 8.0 4.0 64.0 100 1.9 5.8 11.5 7.7 7.7 1.9 63.5 
Benefits of GMOS 
Environmental – 
decreased 
pesticides, soil 
erosion 
11.2 5.2 16.0 11.0 22.7 8.3 10.0 16.
7 
2.8 0 6.6 8.2 11.5 7.5 5.1 9.7 12.1 9.1 9.1 
Farmer – 
increase farmer 
profits, farmer 
choice 
8.1 6.5 20.0 2.8 13.6 8.7 6.3 16.
7 
19.4 0 3.9 7.1 2.9 15.1 10.7 5.4 3.0 0 4.6 
Food Security – 
feed growing 
populations 
12.0 10.4 14.0 9.2 27.3 4.4 2.5 7.1 0 16.7 3.9 4.9 11.4 3.8 0 8.0 1.1 18.2 2.3 
Economic – 
reduced food 
prices 
5.8 1.3 0 4.5 4.5 2.8 5.0 2.4 0 0 2.6 1.9 2.9 0 1.7 2.2 0 0 2.9 
Sustainable – 
agricultural land 
efficiency 
6.6 3.9 4.0 11.0 0 4.4 6.25 2.4 0 0 6.6 2.4 11.4 3.8 0.6 2.2 0 4.5 2.3 
Health – future 
crops could 
address vitamin 
deficiencies 
1.9 3.9 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.9 2.9 1.9 1.1 9.7 0 9.1 4.6 
Nutrition – can 
provide better 
nutrition for 
consumers 
0 0 0 0 0 5.6 6.25 0 0 0 11.8 1.2 0 1.9 1.1 0 0 9.1 1.1 
Trade – reduced 
regulation of 
3.5 
 
1.3 4.0 4.6 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0 0 0.6 2.2 0 0 0.6 
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GMOs will help 
free trade 
Global 
Development – 
help countries 
achieve self-
sufficiency 
1.9 2.6 0 2.8 0 2.0 5.0 16.
7 
19.4 0 3.9 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 4.5 0 
Social Justice – 
increased food 
costs will affect 
impoverished 
citizens the most  
0 0 0 0 0 0.4 1.3 0 0 0 0 1.5 2.9 5.7 1.7 1.1 0 0 0.6 
Climate Change – 
GMOs will lower 
the carbon 
footprint 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.4 2.9 2.8 0.6 0 0 9.1 1.1 
Consumer 
Benefits – offer 
accessible food 
types for 
consumers 
0.8 1.3 0 0.9 4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Biological – GM 
salmon will not 
become invasive, 
biological 
containment 
measures 
0.8 0 0 1.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rationales for continued support of GMOs 
Science says they 
are safe 
12.0 20.8 10.0 9.2 0 14.3 11.3 14.
3 
2.8 16.7 22.4 12.1 20.0 11.3 5.6 12.9 15.2 13.6 16.0 
Importance of 
innovation 
19.8 27.3 14.0 17.4 18.2 7.1 13.8 2.4 0 0 7.9 6.3 11.4 5.7 6.2 5.4 6.1 0 6.9 
Deception by 
opponents of 
GMOs 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.9 14.3 3.8 0 6.5 0 0 2.3 
We can control 
the technology 
4.3 0 0 10.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Perspective on GMO Labels 
Economic – label 
increases costs 
0 0 0 0 0 10.3 6.3 9.5 27.8 0 9.2 10.7 0 13.2 23.2 0 0 0 8.6 
Consumer Rights 
–transparency 
important, but 
label will 
0.4 
 
0 0 0.9 0 7.1 5.0 9.5 13.9 5.6 5.3 8.2 0 3.8 13.6 2.2 3.0 0 10.9 
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decrease 
consumer choice, 
organic label 
exists 
Uniformity –state 
labels confusing 
0 0 0 0 0 8.7 0 7.1 16.7 33.3 9.2 7.3 0 7.5 11.9 2.2 3.0 0 8.6 
If label – needs to 
be only 
information 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 0 0 0 2.2 0 0 1.7 
A non-GMO label 
gives market 
access 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 1.9 1.7 0 9.1 0 1.7 
GMO label 
unnecessary but 
states’ rights 
matter 
0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 1.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Solutions / Perspective on future regulations  
surrounding GMOS 
Need to provide 
accessible 
information to 
public about 
GMOs 
0 0 0 0 0 7.5 12.5 9.5 0 0 6.6 5.1 5.7 7.5 1.1 8.6 9.1 9.1 5.1 
Regulations – 
keep same 
0.8 0 0 1.8 0 4.4 1.3 2.4 8.3 27.8 1.3 4.8 0 1.9 0.6 12.9 27.3 13.6 1.1 
Regulations – 
lessen 
9.3 16.9 14.0 2.8 4.5 2.0 6.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Regulations – 
voluntary labels 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.7 0 0 6.8 2.2 0 0 1.1 
Regulations – 
strengthen, 
mandatory 
premarket testing 
0 0 0 0 0 0.4 1.3 0 0 0 0 1.9 0 0 1.1 9.7 0 0 0 
Educate the 
public 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 0 0 0 2.2 3.0 0 1.1 
Corporate 
concentration 
risks if 
regulations too 
expensive 
0 0 0 0 0 1.2 0 0 8.3 0 0 0.9 0 0 2.8 0 0 0 0 
Need more public 
input 
0.8 0 0 1.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 9.1 0 0 
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Opposition to GMOs 
 112th Congress (2011-2012) 113th Congress (2013-2014) 114th Congress (2015-2016) 
Coding scheme 
To
tal
 %
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% 
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t %
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r %
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 %
 
To
tal
% 
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% 
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ors
 %
 
To
tal
 %
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try
 %
 
Go
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t %
 
Le
gis
lat
ors
 %
 
Opposition to GMOs 100 25 12.5 12.5 50 100 25 25 50 100 16.6 16.6 66.8 
Risks with GMOS 
Environmental – increased 
herbicides, resistance 
5.9 5.7 0 0 11.8 12.7 0 18.9 0 12.3 18.8 11.4 9.1 
Salmon industry – GM salmon 
could hurt the wild salmon industry 
8.1 4.3 28.6 16.7 5.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sustainable – GMOs will not 
address sustainability, we need to 
focus on other agricultural 
solutions 
5.2 2.9 0 8.3 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Health – GMOs linked to illnesses  0.7 0 14.3 0 0 1.8 0 2.7 0 6.8 18.8 2.9 4.5 
Biological – GMO species could 
become invasive 
4.4 2.9 14.3 0 8.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Economic – Managing GMOs will 
increase taxpayers costs 
3.0 2.9 0 8.3 0 0 0 8.3 1.5 0 0 0 0 
Trade – certain countries do not 
biotech, could hurt trade 
3.0 1.4 0 8.3 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Farmer – farmers lose agency, 
forced to buy from large 
companies 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.7 6.3 2.9 0 
Organic Industry – contamination 
issues; could hurt organic farmers 
0.7 0 0 0 2.9 0 0 0 0 1.4 0 0 4.5 
Religious – certain religions do not 
support changing composition of 
living things 
0 0 0 0 0 1.8 7.7 0 0 1.4 0 2.9 0 
Rationales for opposition 
to GMOs 
Lack of scientific evidence  10.4 14.3 0 4.2 8.8 1.8 0 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 
We cannot control the technology 8.1 8.6 0 0 14.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GE is not the answer 7.4 1.4 0 33.3 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Deception by GMO supporters 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.4 0 0 4.5 
Perspective on GMO  
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Labels 
Consumer Rights – Right to Know 3.0 1.4 14.3 8.3 0 36.4 61.5 24.3 60.0 23.3 18.8 17.1 36.4 
Information on label only 0 0 0 0 0 9.1 15.4 8.1 0 13.7 12.5 22.9 0 
Uniformity – with federal label 0 0 0 0 0 10.9 7.7 10.8 20.0 6.8 12.5 0 13.6 
States’ rights – support state label 0 0 0 0 0 3.6 7.7 2.7 0 11.1 0 22.9 0 
Economic – label will not increase 
prices 
0 0 0 0 0 5.5 0 8.1 0 9.6 12.5 8.6 9.1 
Innovation will not be affected by a 
label 
0 0 0 0 0 9.1 0 10.8 20.0 0 0 0 0 
Democracy – public wants label 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.1 0 5.7 4.5 
Labels help a market economy 0 0 0 0 0 5.5 0 8.1 0     
Solutions / Perspective on  
future regulations  
surrounding GMOS 
Need greater oversight in approval 
of GMOs 
23.7 35.7 14.3 4.2 14.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Need to be more cautious in 
approval of GMOs 
11.1 14.3 0 12.5 5.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Need more public input  5.2 4.3 14.3 0 8.8 0 0 0 0     
Need to provide accessible 
information to public about GMOs 
0 0 0 0 0 1.8 0 2.7 0 2.7 0 0 9.1 
Educate the public 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.4 0 2.9 0 
Regulations – other countries 
label, we should 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.4 0 0 4.5 
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6 Appendix F. Name and affiliation of witnesses invited to testify at Congressional hearings related to the regulation and 
labeling of biotechnology in the food system 
Name Self-identified Affiliation Coded 
Affiliation 
Type of 
testimony 
given 
Hearing(s) testified 
Charles Conner President and Chief Executive 
Officer of the National Council of 
Farmer Cooperatives, Washington 
DC 
Farmer Oral and 
written 
How to Review the Opportunities and 
Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology 
(2011)  
Roger Beachy President Emeritus, Donald 
Danforth Plant Science Center, 
Professor of Biology, Washington 
University in St. Louis, St. Louis, 
WA 
Academic Oral and 
written 
How to Review the Opportunities and 
Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology 
(2011) 
Calestous Juma Professor of the Practice of 
International Development, Belfer 
Center for Science and 
International Affairs, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, 
MA 
Academic Oral and 
written 
How to Review the Opportunities and 
Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology 
(2011) & 
Hearing to Consider the Societal Benefits 
of Biotechnology (2014) 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Organization 
Biotech Trade Association Industry Written How to Review the Opportunities and 
Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology 
(2011) & 
Environmental Risks of Genetically 
Engineered Fish (2011) 
CropLife 
America 
National trade association 
representing manufacturers, 
formulators and distributors of 
pesticides 
Industry Written How to Review the Opportunities and 
Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology 
(2011) 
	 195 
National Corn 
Growers 
Association 
Represents corn growers 
nationwide 
Farmer Written How to Review the Opportunities and 
Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology 
(2011) 
Ron L. Stotish President and CEO, Aquabounty 
Technologies, Inc. 
Industry Oral and 
written 
Environmental Risks of Genetically 
Engineered Fish (2011) 
John Epidanio Fish Conservation Geneticist, 
Illinois Natural History Survey and 
University of Illinois 
Academic Oral and 
written 
Environmental Risks of Genetically 
Engineered Fish (2011) 
George H. 
Leonard 
Aquaculture Program Director, 
Ocean Conservancy 
Academic Oral and 
written 
Environmental Risks of Genetically 
Engineered Fish (2011) 
Paul Greenburg Author of “Four Fish: The Future 
of the Last Wild Food” 
Author Oral and 
written 
Environmental Risks of Genetically 
Engineered Fish (2011) 
Sean Parnell Governor of Alaska Government Written Environmental Risks of Genetically 
Engineered Fish (2011) 
David Just Professor, Co-Director, Cornell 
Center for Behavioral Economic in 
Child Nutrition Programs, Charles 
H. Dyson School of Applied 
Economics and Management, 
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 
Academic Oral and 
written 
Hearing to Consider the Societal Benefits 
of Biotechnology (2014) 
Olga Bolden-
Tiller 
Associate Professor, Animal 
Science, Tuskegee University, 
Tuskegee, AL 
Academic Oral and 
written 
Hearing to Consider the Societal Benefits 
of Biotechnology (2014) 
Joanna Lidback Owner, The Farm on Wheeler 
Mountain, Westmore, VT on behalf 
of Agri-Mark, Inc., National 
Council of Farmer Cooperatives 
Farmer Oral and 
written 
Hearing to Consider the Societal Benefits 
of Biotechnology (2014) & Examination 
of the Costs and Impacts of Mandatory 
Biotechnology Labeling Laws (2015) & 
Agriculture Biotechnology: A Look at 
Federal Regulation and Stakeholder 
Perspectives (2015) 
Michael M. 
Landa 
Director, Center for Food Safety 
and Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) 
Government Oral and 
written 
Examining FDA’s Role in the Regulation 
of Genetically Modified Food Ingredients 
(2014) 
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Alison Van 
Eenennaam  
 
 
 
Cooperative Extension Specialist, 
Animal Genomics and 
Biotechnology, Department of 
Animal Science, University of 
California, Davis 
 
 
 
Academic 
 
 
Oral and 
written 
 
 
Examining FDA’s Role in the Regulation 
of Genetically Modified Food Ingredients 
(2014) 
Scott Faber Senior Vice President of 
Government Affairs, 
Environmental Working Group 
NGO Oral and 
written 
Examining FDA’s Role in the Regulation 
of Genetically Modified Food Ingredients 
(2014) 
Kate Webb Assistant Majority Leader, VT 
House of Representatives 
Government Oral and 
written 
Examining FDA’s Role in the Regulation 
of Genetically Modified Ingredients 
(2014) 
Stacy Forshee Fifth District Director, Kansas 
Farm Bureau 
Farmer Oral and 
written 
Examining FDA’s Role in the Regulation 
of Genetically Modified Food Ingredients 
(2014) 
Tom Dempsey President and CEO, Snack Food 
Association 
Industry Oral and 
written 
Examining FDA’s Role in the Regulation 
of Genetically Modified Food Ingredients 
(2014) & Examination of the Costs and 
Impacts of Mandatory Biotechnology 
Labeling Laws (2015) 
Corn Refiners 
Association 
Trade association representing the 
corn refining industry (corn starch, 
corn oil, corn syrup) 
Industry Written Examining FDA’s Role in the Regulation 
of Genetically Modified Food Ingredients 
(2014) 
David B. 
Schmidt 
President and Chief Executive 
Officer, International Food 
Information Council and 
Foundation, Washington, DC 
NGO Written 
and oral 
Examination of the Costs and Impacts of 
Mandatory Biotechnology Labeling Laws 
(2015) 
Nina Fedoroff Senior Science Advisor, Olsson 
Frank Weeda Terman Matz (OFW 
Law), Washington, DC 
Academic Written 
and oral 
Examination of the Costs and Impacts of 
Mandatory Biotechnology Labeling Laws 
(2015) 
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Lynn Clarkson President and Founder, Clarkson 
Grain Company, Inc., Cerro Gordo, 
IL 
Industry Oral and 
written 
Examination of the Costs and Impacts of 
Mandatory Biotechnology Labeling Laws 
(2015) 
Chris Policinski President and Chief Executive 
Officer, Land O’Lakes, Inc., Arden 
Hills, MN 
Industry Oral and 
written 
Examination of the Costs and Impacts of 
Mandatory Biotechnology Labeling Laws 
(2015) 
Scott McGinty President, Aurora Organic Dairy  Farmer Written Examination of the Costs and Impacts of 
Mandatory Biotechnology Labeling Laws 
(2015) 
Rick Blasgen President and Chief Executive 
Officer, Council of Supply Chain 
Management Professionals 
Industry Oral and 
written 
Biotechnology Food Labeling Standards 
(2015) 
Todd Daloz Assistant Attorney General, State 
of VT 
Government Oral and 
written 
Biotechnology Food Labeling Standards 
(2015) 
L. Val Giddings Senior Fellow, Information 
Technology & Innovation 
Foundation 
NGO Oral and 
written 
Biotechnology Food Labeling Standards 
(2015) 
John Reifsteck Chairman of the Board and 
President, GROWMARK, Inc. 
Industry Oral and 
written 
Biotechnology Food Labeling Standards 
(2015) 
Gregory Jaffe Biotechnology Project Director, 
Center for Science in the Public 
Interest 
NGO Oral and 
written 
Biotechnology Food Labeling Standards 
(2015) & 
Agriculture Biotechnology: A Look at 
Federal Regulation and Stakeholder 
Perspectives (2015) 
Craig Morris Deputy Administrator of Livestock 
Poultry and Seed Program, 
Agricultural Marketing Service, US 
Department of Agriculture, 
Washington, DC 
Government Oral and 
written 
Hearing to Review USDA Marketing 
Programs (2015) 
Michael 
Gregoire 
Associate Administrator, Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection 
Service, US Department of 
Agriculture, Washington, DC 
Government Oral and 
written 
Agriculture Biotechnology: A Look at 
Federal Regulation and Stakeholder 
Perspectives (2015) 
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William Jordan Deputy Director, Office of 
Pesticide Programs, US 
Environmental Protection Agency, 
Washington, DC 
Government Oral and 
written 
Agriculture Biotechnology: A Look at 
Federal Regulation and Stakeholder 
Perspectives (2015) 
Susan Mayne Director, Center for Safety and 
Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug 
Administration, College Park, MD 
Government Oral and 
written 
Agriculture Biotechnology: A Look at 
Federal Regulation and Stakeholder 
Perspectives (2015) 
Daryl Thomas Senior Vice President, Herr Foods, 
Inc., Nottingham, PA 
Industry Oral and 
written 
Agriculture Biotechnology: A Look at 
Federal Regulation and Stakeholder 
Perspectives (2015) 
Gary Hirschberg Chairman and Co-Founder, 
Stoneyfield Farm Inc., Concord, 
NH 
Industry Oral and 
written 
Agriculture Biotechnology: A Look at 
Federal Regulation and Stakeholder 
Perspectives (2015) 
Ronald 
Kleinman 
Physician in Chief, Mass General 
Hospital for Children, Boston, MA 
Medical 
doctor 
Oral and 
written 
Agriculture Biotechnology: A Look at 
Federal Regulation and Stakeholder 
Perspectives (2015) 
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7Appendix G. Coding scheme and data summary for public statewide hearings 
Coding scheme Total 
% 
ME 
% 
MA 
% 
VT 
% 
CT  
% 
% of total observations 100 11.1 32.5 21.8 34.4 
Support for GMO label and general opposition to GMOs 
Risks with GMOs 
Human Health 
Critical of GMOs as a human health issue 25.18 21.79 21.30 17.65 34.71 
I have a sickness/allergy 10.1 12.82 12.61 7.19 8.68 
Increased pesticides are bad for human health 8.82 12.82 12.17 3.92 7.44 
GMOs will create increased allergies in the 
future 
5.69 10.26 1.74 5.23 8.26 
Autism caused by GMOs 2.13 3.85 1.74 1.31 2.48 
GMOs are poison 1.14 0 2.61 0 0.83 
You are eating a pesticide 0.85 1.28 0.43 0 1.65 
GMOs made me sick so I stopped eating them 0.71 0 2.17 0 0 
When I removed GMOs from my diet I felt 
better 
0.71 0 2.17 0 0 
Agent orange dangers tied to GMOs 0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
GMOs issue of food safety 0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
GMOs are not healthy 0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
Environmental 
Critical of GMOs on environmental grounds 9.39 16.67 8.26 8.50 8.68 
Contamination risks 4.98 12.82 3.91 3.27 4.55 
GMO harms wildlife 3.41 6.41 3.91 1.96 2.89 
Superweeds 3.13 2.56 3.91 0 4.55 
Herbicide-pesticide treadmill  2.70 3.85 2.61 0 4.13 
Increased use of herbicides/pesticides 2.56 1.28 6.09 0 1.24 
GMOs mess up evolution 0.28 0 0 0.65 0.41 
Social Justice 
Helpless children – our duty to help “save” them 8.53 1.28 7.39 8.50 7.85 
Experimentation without consent 6.11 7.69 4.35 5.23 7.85 
I cannot afford organic all of the time 2.84 5.13 3.91 0.65 2.48 
The GMO issue affects people more with lower 
socio-economic status 
1.85 3.85 2.61 0 1.65 
We need to protest this – we live in a democracy 0.71 0 0.43 1.31 0.83 
Identify as a young child 0.43 2.56 0 0.65 0 
Unfair to farmers in developing countries 0.14 0 0 0.65 0 
Farmer 
Identify as a farmer – emphasize farmer 
expertise 
7.82 12.82 1.74 16.34 6.61 
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Critical of GMOs on social justice issues for 
farmers 
4.12 11.54 2.61 3.27 3.72 
Farmer problems with patents 2.42 7.69 1.74 1.31 2.07 
GMOs threaten the organic farming industry 1.56 0 3.91 0 0.83 
Our state is beautiful and GMOs will ruin them 1.14 5.13 0 2.61 0 
GMOs will negatively impact our local 
agriculture 
0.85 1.28 0.43 1.31 0.83 
GMOs create economic problems for farmers 0.28 2.56 0 0 0 
Corporate Power 
Industry bullying, government needs to stand up 
to industry 
6.40 2.56 3.48 17.65 3.31 
Lack of transparency in industry 6.26 0 6.96 0.65 11.16 
Corporate profits come before public safety 6.12 7.69 7.39 0.65 7.85 
Corporations have too much power 4.98 5.13 5.22 6.54 3.72 
Industry conducting most studies around GMOs 4.84 5.13 4.78 2.61 6.20 
Benefits of GMOs are lies 2.99 0 2.61 0.65 5.79 
Revolving door between government and 
industry 
2.84 2.56 0.87 3.27 4.55 
Concentration of seed/food manufacturers  2.42 6.41 2.17 1.96 1.65 
Corporations have too much monetary power 2.42 1.28 1.30 4.58 2.48 
Same companies produce GMOs and dangerous 
chemicals 
0.85 1.28 0.48 1.31 0.83 
Dow made Agent Orange 0.71 0 1.30 0.65 0.41 
Corporations should have to prove safety 0.57 1.28 0.43 0 0.83 
Don’t trust companies 0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
Ethical/Moral 
Cannot control the technology once its released 2.28 1.28 3.04 0 3.31 
GMOs are different than traditional plant 
breeding 
2.28 2.56 3.04 0 2.89 
Seeds made in a laboratory - unnatural 1.71 0 1.74 0 3.31 
Identify as a religious figure 1.0 3.85 0 1.31 0.83 
Critical of GMOs on religious grounds 0.71 1.28 0.87 0 0.83 
Man’s domination over nature is bad 0.57 0 0 0.65 1.24 
Commodification of life 0.43 1.28 0 0 0.83 
GMOs are a real danger 0.43 0.43 0 0 0.83 
Economic 
Critical of GMOs on economic grounds 0.85 3.85 0 0 1.24 
GMOs hurt the state economy 0.28 2.56 0 0 0 
Perspective on GMO Labels 
Consumer Rights 
Consumer right to know issue 52.06 66.67 50.87 38.56 57.02 
Informed decision 18.07 28.21 14.35 12.42 21.90 
Information/ Education/ Transparency 12.09 11.54 13.48 9.80 12.40 
Choice for the consumer 8.82 5.13 13.48 3.92 8.68 
Cites reading/use of nutrition label when 
shopping 
4.13 7.69 2.61 5.88 3.31 
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Contentious consumerism: vote with wallets 2.42 0 3.48 0 3.72 
Freedom to choose 2.42 6.41 3.91 0 1.24 
A label will help retailer give what consumer 
wants 
0.57 0 0.87 0 0.83 
Labeling empowers consumers 0.28 0 0.43 0 0.41 
We need labeling consumers can trust 0.28 2.56 0 0 0 
Consumers need to manage risk through labeling 0.28 1.28 0.43 0 0 
Democracy 
“Legislators do your job” 9.53 8.97 5.65 15.69 9.50 
Calling on legislators to “do the right thing” 5.12 6.41 2.17 11.11 3.72 
People have the right to know – democratic right 3.56 1.28 1.74 8.50 2.89 
Community of people 3.41 2.56 0 13.73 0.41 
Corporate Greed 
GE companies should be proud and want to label 
their food. Why don’t they? 
4.55 5.13 8.26 0 3.72 
Economic benefits with a label 
Labeling will increase economic value for state 2.84 8.97 1.30 2.61 2.89 
Labeling will not increase costs 2.70 3.85 3.91 0 2.89 
Labeling means free market economy 1.14 0 3.48 0 0 
Food labels already exist – just add GMO 0.85 0 2.17 0 0.41 
Changing labels and packages always happens – 
adding a GMO label will not be a big change for 
companies 
0.71 0 2.17 0 0 
Labeling increases company revenue 0.57 2.56 0 0.65 0.41 
More difficult to sell internationally without a 
label 
0.57 1.28 0.43 0 0.83 
Labeling will reduce healthcare costs 0.43 0 1.30 0 0 
Labels create a niche market 0.28 0 0.43 0.65 0 
Farmers and local agriculture benefits 
Label enables choice for the farmer 1.14 6.41 0 0.65 0.83 
Label will help state agriculture 0.85 0 1.30 0 1.24 
Label will help farmers that grow conventional 
crops non-GMO 
0.28 0 0.43 0 0.41 
Label will help farmer give what the consumer 
wants 
0.28 0 0.43 0 0.41 
Rationale for opposition to GMOs and need for label  
Other countries label, why can’t we?  
64 other countries have done it, why haven’t we? 18.07 10.26 19.13 6.54 26.86 
Lack of Scientific Evidence 
Unknown consequences with GMOs 7.25 14.10 4.78 5.23 8.68 
Not enough science on GMOs 6.97 12.82 4.35 3.92 9.50 
Lack of independent studies 6.83 7.69 4.78 2.61 11.16 
No long-term studies 5.97 7.69 4.35 0 10.74 
Need to test GMOs for safety 3.56 6.41 2.17 1.31 5.37 
Cites uncertainty in scientific community on 
GMOs 
3.13 5.13 3.48 1.96 2.89 
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Scientists have been silenced 2.42 1.28 2.17 0 4.55 
Government is currently inefficient/distrustful  
Lack of FDA oversight on GMO regulation 4.69 0 1.30 2.61 10.74 
Lack of overall government oversight 4.28 10.26 1.74 3.27 5.37 
Government is corrupted  4.13 1.28 3.91 3.92 5.37 
Government was wrong before about safety 
(DDT) 
2.84 1.28 1.74 5.23 2.89 
Lack of EPA oversight on GMO regulation 0.71 0 0 1.31 1.24 
Lack of USDA oversight on GMO regulation 0.71 0 0.43 1.31 0.83 
Solutions 
Support alternative agriculture 
Benefits of organic, agro-ecological farming  12.66 15.38 12.61 20.26 7.02 
Benefits of local agriculture 3.27 6.41 1.74 1.96 4.55 
We need to stop monoculture farming practices 1.56 0 2.17 1.31 1.65 
Need sustainable agriculture for the future, not 
GMOs 
1.14 1.28 1.74 0 1.24 
We need to focus on food security 0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
States can lead to federal change 
Calls on state to be a leader 8.25 19.23 1.30 11.76 9.09 
No federal action so we need state action 2.70 6.41 1.30 0 4.55 
Follow other states who have passed a labeling 
law 
2.23 0 6.52 0.65 0 
State bills will produce a federal bill 1.56 6.41 1.74 0 0.83 
Reference bottle bill leadership 0.28 2.56 0 0 0 
Ban the cultivation of GMOs 
GMOs should be banned/implement a 
moratorium 
3.27 2.56 3.04 2.61 4.13 
Stronger government oversight 
Support for the precautionary principle 1.56 0 1.30 1.96 2.07 
Calls for more FDA oversight in GMO 
regulation  
0.28 0 0.43 0 0.41 
Calls for more government oversight 0.28 0 0.43 0 0.41 
Government meant to oversee corporations  0.28 0 0 0 0.83 
Voluntary labeling is not enough 0.28 0 0.43 0 0.41 
A company should not determine labeling policy 0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
 
Opposition for a GMO label and general support of GMOs 
Benefits of GMOs 
Environmental benefits of GMOs 
GMOs are a solution to environmental problems 1.14 0 0.87 0 2.48 
GMOs reduce pesticides 0.71 0 0 0 2.07 
GMOs result in higher land productivity  0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
Humanitarian benefits of GMOs 
GMO solution to humanitarian issues – “Feed 
the world” 
1.0 1.28 0 0 2.48 
GMOs can solve so many future problems 0.28 1.28 0 0 0.41 
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GMOs help countries gain self-sufficiency 0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
Economic benefits of GMOs 
GMOs lower the cost of food  0.85 0 0 0 2.48 
Sustainability benefits of GMOs 
GMOs are an example of sustainable agriculture 0.71 1.28 0.43 0 1.24 
Farmer benefits of GMOs 
GMOs help farmers out economically  0.43 0 0.43 0 0.83 
Health benefits of GMOs 
GMOs can help solve health problems in the 
future 
0.28 0 0 0 0.83 
Perspective on GMO Labels 
Consumer rights 
Organic label tells you if a food is GMO – GMO 
label unnecessary  
2.85 6.41 2.17 0 4.13 
A GMO label will confuse customers 2.70 5.13 1.74 0 4.55 
Consumers can look elsewhere for more 
information on their food – label not required to 
find information 
0.71 2.56 0.43 0 0.83 
A label will reduce consumer choice 0.57 1.28 0.87 0 0.41 
A label undermines consumer confidence  0.28 0 0 0 0.83 
Economic risks with a label 
More difficult for farmers to sell products state to 
state 
2.28 3.85 1.30 0 4.13 
Increases costs for producers and retailers 1.99 3.85 0.87 0 3.72 
Will increase the price of food 1.42 3.85 1.30 0 2.89 
Costs will be passed on to taxpayers 0.57 0 0 0 1.65 
Labeling will hurt future biotechnology research 
and that state’s economy 
0.43 0 0 0 1.24 
Label is just marketing for the organic industry 0.28 0 0 0 0.83 
Citizens will have to pay for a lawsuit if labeling 
bill passes 
0.14 0 0.43 0 0 
The state lacks the monetary resources to handle 
GMO labeling 
0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
A label should be based on science 
This label would not be based on science 1.85 3.85 1.74 0 2.48 
“Consumer want” has not held up in court  1.0 2.56 0.43 0 1.65 
Need uniformity in labeling 
There needs to be a federal before state 1.0 3.85 0.43 0 1.24 
A label will hurt future biotechnology innovation 
Government does not want to stifle biotech 
research 
0.43 0 0.43 0 0.83 
Those against GMOs will turn back technology   0.28 2.56 0 0 0 
A label will discourage investment in the biotech 
field 
0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
A label will hurt farmers 
A label unfairly targets modern agriculture 0.28 1.28 0 0 0.41 
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Too hard for farmers to segregate GMO from 
non-GMO 
0.28 0 0 0 0.83 
No choice for famers with GMO labels 0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
Increased corporate concentration/favor large businesses 
A label will increase corporate concentration  0.14 0 0.43 0 0 
Rationale for support of GMOs and opposition to labels 
Scientific evidence 
There is no scientific evidence that says GMOs 
have negative effects 
2.99 7.69 2.17 0 4.13 
Scientists have more control over genetic 
engineering than conventional breeding 
0.14 0 0 0 0.41 
Misinformation/Deception about GMOs from opponents 
GMOs are not directly linked to corporate 
agriculture 
0.14 0 0.43 0 0 
Solutions 
No change needed 
FDA already regulates GMOs  2.13 6.41 0.87 0 3.31 
Voluntary labeling already exists 1.85 2.56 1.74 0 2.89 
Voluntary labeling works well 1.14 3.85 0 0 2.07 
	 205 
Curriculum Vitae 
Sara Velardi 
702 Schuyler Street, Syracuse, NY 13204 
203-583-0181 
Email: shvelard@syr.edu 
 
EDUCATION 
 
State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse, 
NY 
Expected: May 2018 
 Ph.D. Candidate in Environmental Science and Natural Resource Policy, ABD 
 Candidacy Exam completed: May 2016 
Dissertation: A Call for Transparency in the Food System: The Role of Private Actors in 
the State and Federal Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) Labeling Initiatives in the 
United States  
 Advisor: Dr. Theresa Selfa  
Committee Members: Dr. Rick Welsh and Dr. Carmen Bain 
 
State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry, Syracuse, 
NY, 2014 
M.S. in Environmental Forest Biology  
Thesis: An Exploration into the Components of Effective Professional Development for 
Science Educators: A Case Study with the Environmental Education Program Project 
Learning Tree® 
Advisor: Dr. Beth Folta    
Committee Members: Dr. Diane Kuehn and Dr. Laura Rickard 
 
Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, NY, 2012 
Environmental Science Major, Anthropology Minor 
Advisor: Dr. Joshua Ness 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Instructor of Record 
 
Ecology, Summer 2017 
 Onondaga Community College 
• Designed and taught introductory ecology undergraduate lecture and lab course 
including field classes 
Exploring Biology, Fall 2015, Spring 2016 
 Onondaga Community College 
• Taught introductory biology lecture and lab for non-majors covering topics from 
molecular biology to environmental biology 
	 206 
Teaching Assistant 
Intro to Geospatial Information Technology, Spring 2018 
 SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry 
Will teach two lab sections on usage and interpretation of ArcGIS software 
 
Intro to American Government, Fall 2017 
 SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry 
Led class lectures, facilitated classroom discussions, edited and graded papers and 
exams 
 
Community Planning and Sustainability, Spring 2015 
 SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry 
Assisted in teaching, editing and grading students’ semester papers, facilitating 
classroom discussions and guest lectures 
 
Non-Personal Interpretation Methods and Design, Spring 2014 
 SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry 
Assisted in teaching, instructed how to create brochures through Microsoft 
Publisher, podcasts through iMovie and graded writing assignments and design 
projects. 
 
Comparative Vertebrate Anatomy, Spring 2014 
 SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry 
Assisted in grading and instruction for lectures 
 
Personal Interpretation in Environmental and Forest Biology, Fall 2013 
 SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry 
Led recitation, conducted field trips, edited and assessed writing of students’ 
lesson plans and individual service plans 
 
Organismal Biology and Ecology Laboratory, Fall 2012; Cell Biology and Genetics Laboratory, 
Spring 2013 
 SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry  
Taught two labs per semester including set-up, lecture, instruction, led field trips, 
graded lab reports, exams and weekly labs for over 40 undergraduates.  
 
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE 
 
Graduate Research Assistant, 2015 
Co-Principal Investigators: Dr. Stephen Shaw and Dr. Theresa Selfa, SUNY College of 
Environmental Science and Forestry 
USDA AFRI Water for Agriculture Seed Grant: Lake Ontario Basin in Coming Decades: 
Room for Expansion or Imminent Future Water Conflicts   
Utilized satellite mapping to identify irrigation sites for farmers along the Lake Ontario 
Basin creating maps through ArcGIS; designed survey questionnaires for farmer 
irrigation and water use 
	 207 
Graduate Research Assistant, 2013-2014 
Co-Principal Investigators: Dr. Beth Folta, SUNY College of Environmental Science and 
Forestry and Tom Shimalla, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 
(DEC) 
Project Learning Tree Model Program Initiative Grant for Professional Development 
Improvement 
Designed surveys and conducted phone interviews to assess effectiveness of professional 
development programs of the DEC’s Project Learning Tree environmental education 
curriculum program 
 
Undergraduate Research Assistant, 2010 
 Principle Investigator: Dr. Joshua Ness, Skidmore College  
Collected spring ephemeral distribution data along walking/hiking trails at Merck Forest, 
Vermont 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
Published Manuscripts 
Bain, C., Selfa, T., Dandachi, T., and Velardi, S. (2017). ‘Superweeds’ or ‘survivors’? Framing 
the problem of glyphosate resistant weeds and genetically engineered crops, Journal of Rural 
Studies, 51, 211-221. 
 
Velardi, S., Folta, B., Rickard, L, and Kuehn, D. (2015). Components of effective professional 
development for science educators: A case study with Project Learning Tree. Applied 
Environmental Education & Communication, 14(4), 223-231. 
 
Manuscripts in Progress 
 
Velardi, S. and Selfa, T. Framing the food system: A content analysis of congressional hearings 
surrounding the regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the food system (2011-
2016). Rural Sociology.  
 
Velardi, S. and Selfa, T. Local frames, local success: Case studies of genetically modified 
organisms (GMO) labeling initiatives in the northeast, US. Agriculture and Human Values. 
 
Velardi, S. and Selta, T. Understanding policy change with the advocacy coalition framework: 
An application to state genetically modified organism (GMO) labeling policy. Policy Studies 
Journal. 
 
Other Publications 
 
Velardi, S. Finding the Green Lining: The Restoration of a Hazardous Waste Site Planting One 
Tree at a Time. New York State Outdoor Education Association (NYSOEA). Pathways, Spring 
2013. 
 
 
	 208 
NATIONAL PRESENTATIONS 
 
Velardi, S. and Selfa. T. Governance and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs): A content 
analysis of congressional hearings surrounding the regulation of biotechnology in the food 
system (2011-2016). Presented at Agriculture, Food, and Human Values Society Annual Meeting 
and Conference at Occidental College in Los Angeles, CA, 2017. 
 
Velardi, S. and Selfa, T. A Call for Transparency in the Food System: Case Studies of 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Labeling Initiatives in the Northeast, US. Presented at 
the XIV World Congress of Rural Sociology at Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada, 2016. 
 
Velardi, S. A Call for Transparency in the Food System: Case Studies of Genetically Modified 
Organism (GMO) Labeling Initiatives in the Northeast, US. Presented at the 2016 Biotechnology 
Symposium at SUNY-ESF, 2016  
 
Velardi, S. What Constitutes Effective Professional Development: A Case Study with Project 
Learning Tree. Presented at North American Association of Environmental Education (NAAEE) 
Conference in Ottawa, Canada, 2014. 
 
Velardi, S. New York Evaluation Results: How Project Learning Tree is Used in New York 
State. Presented at Project Learning Tree Conference in Traverse City, Michigan, 2014. 
 
GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS 
 
Invited for second round submission for the National Science Foundation Sociology Doctoral 
Dissertation Improvement Grant, 2017, Co-PI, A Call for Transparency in the Food 
System: Case Studies of State and Federal Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) 
Labeling Initiatives in the United States. 
Graduate Student Association Travel Grant, 2017, 2016 (SUNY-ESF) 
Office of Instruction and Graduate Studies Travel Grant, 2017, 2016, 2014 (SUNY-ESF) 
Awarded scholarship to participate in Graduate Student Workshop on Socio-Environmental 
Synthesis: Interdisciplinary Proposal Writing and Collaboration hosted by National 
Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center, 2016, (SESYNC) 
Alumni Association Memorial Scholarship, 2016 (SUNY-ESF) 
Awarded scholarship to attend ComSciCon Conference hosted by Cornell University on science 
communication and public outreach, 2015 (Cornell University) 
Fink Career Fellowship, 2014 (SUNY-ESF) 
Maple Leaf Service Award, 2013 (SUNY-ESF) 
 
INVITED TALKS AND OUTREACH 
 
Technology Alliance for Central New York Scientifique Junior Café, Museum of Science 
and Technology, Syracuse, NY, 2017 
So Much to Know about GMOs, Our Friend or Our Foe? Analyzing the Controversial 
Genetically Modified Organism 
 
	 209 
Central Square Middle School STEM Guest Lecture, Central Square, NY, 2017 
So Much to Know about GMOs, Our Friend or Our Foe? Analyzing the Controversial 
Genetically Modified Organism 
 
Collaborator with ESF in the High School Outreach Program 2013-Present 
 Give guest lectures to visiting high school students on doctoral and masters research 
 
STEM Middle School Mentor, 2014 
 National Academy of Sciences STEM Mentoring Program for Syracuse City School 
District 
 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE 
 
Journal Reviewer 
Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems  
Applied Environmental Education & Communication 
   
University Service 
Member, Search Committee for Assistant Professor in Environmental Studies, SUNY-ESF, 2017 
 
RELATED WORK EXPERIENCE 
 
Science Coordinator for Father Champlin’s Guardian Angel Society 2017, 2016 
Planned science curriculum for summer school program, grades 5-9 
Taught interactive project-based science lessons to population of refugees or families of 
refugees in Syracuse, NY 
 
Graduate Ambassador for Office of Instruction and Graduate Studies 2015-2017 
Advised and mentored graduate students on degree requirements, candidacy exam and 
defense preparation, and edited theses prior to graduation 
Planned, organized and implemented the Graduate Student Orientation for fall and spring 
orientation 
Led campus tours to prospective graduate students 
 
Freelance Writer, Core Informatics 2015-2016  
 Wrote monthly articles for data management software company related to food safety and 
food safety 
 
Naturalist at Beaver Lake Nature Center in Baldwinsville, New York 2013-2015 
Led and created environmental education programs for visitors of all ages 
 
Graduate Student Leader of SUNY-ESF Science Corp Summer Program 2014, 2013 
Developed and taught science curricula for summer programs grades 5-12  
Led team of 4 undergraduates in organizing, planning and administering program 
activities 
	 210 
Graduate Teaching Fellow for SUNY-ESF Colloquium on Teaching and Learning 2013-
2017 
Developed, led and implemented two all-day programs on effective teaching strategies 
for incoming graduate teaching assistants  
 
ADDITIONAL WORK EXPERIENCE 
 
Indoor Cycling Instructor, Syracuse University Recreation Services, 2017 
 Schwinn Indoor Cycling Certified   
 
Board Operator, WMNR Public Radio 2009-2012 
 Broadcasted prerecorded and live radio programs including Tanglewood and Live from 
Vienna 
 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS 
 
Rural Sociology Society 
Agriculture, Food, and Human Values Society 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Theresa Selfa, Ph.D.      Rick Welsh, Ph.D. 
SUNY-ESF       Syracuse University    
Department of Environmental Studies Department of Public Health, Food 
219 Marshall Hall  Studies and Nutrition 
1 Forestry Drive      542 White Hall 
Syracuse, NY 13210      Syracuse, NY 13244 
Phone: 315-470-6570      Phone: 315-443-4060 
Email: tselfa@esf.edu      Email: jrwelsh@syr.edu 
 
Larry Weiskirch, Ph.D. 
SUNY Onondaga Community College 
Department of Biology 
Ferrante 250 
4585 West Seneca Turnpike 
Syracuse, NY 13215 
Phone: 315-498-2418 
Email: weiskirl@sunyocc.edu 
 
 
 
